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ABSTRACT

The proceedings consist of the presidential address, papers, responses, and dialogue presented at the annual meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society. Papers emphasized three themes: (1) tasks of philosophical and empirical inquiry in education, (2) moral and values education, and (3) educational policy. In the presidential address, Gordon Chamberlin of Pittsburgh Theological Seminary proposed that philosophers of education move from a narrow view of their roles identified with schooling to consideration for the larger education arena. Other papers focused on characteristics of a good teacher, historical developments in American education, the place of therapy in education, mental health, social relations in schools, the relationship between economics and educational structures, consequences of indoctrinational activities, and the relationship between social philosophy and educational practice. (DB)

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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION:

Proceedings

of the

1977 Annual Meeting

of the

Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society

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Edited by

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Terre Haute, Indiana

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EDITORS' PREFACE

This edition of the Proceedings of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society is again published under the title *Philosophical Studies in Education*. Geographic precedent was broken when the annual meeting of the Society was held at the origin of the Ohio Valley on the eastern edge of the region. This issue contains all papers and records of the 1977 annual meeting held at the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on November 18 and 19, 1977.

The publication of this edition was made possible by a financial contribution from Pittsburgh Theological Seminary and the technical support of the School of Education, Indiana State University. Special acknowledgment is extended to William H. Kadel, President of Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, and to the following individuals of Indiana State University: Frank W. Jerse, Acting Dean of the School of Education, and John Hill, Assistant Dean for Research and Services, for administrative arrangements; Jane Angell, who served as consulting editor; Jeanne Stefani, who typed the manuscript; and Robert Schacht of the Division of Printing, Indiana State University. Special thanks are again extended to Laura Snider who designed the cover.

William E. Brownson
John E. Carter

CONTENTS

Official Program of the 1977 Annual Meeting vii

INTRODUCTION 1

PART I
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

HOW GREEN WAS YOUR VALLEY
by J. Gordon Chamberlin 6

RESPONSE TO CHAMBERLIN: IN PRAISE OF GEOETHNICITY
by David E. Denton 17

PART II
PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

THE DYNAMIC USE OF 'POLICY' IN EDUCATION/DISCOURSE
by Edward Makruski 22

LEGITIMATION INQUIRY AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY
by John Scahill 32

RESPONSE TO MAKRUSKI AND SCAHILL: POLICY ORIENTED INTELLECTUALS---SYCOPHANTS OR REVOLUTIONARIES?; WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?
by Marvin J. Berlowitz 42

RESPONSE TO MAKRUSKI AND SCAHILL: A DYADIC AND DYNAMIC DILEMMA
by Frederick M. Schultz 47

THE RETURN TO 'MORAL EDUCATION': SHOULD DICK AND JANE TACKLE THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE?
by Henry Johnson 53

RESPONSE TO JOHNSON: WHY DOES JOHNSON WAX ELOQUENTLY?
by Richard Pratte 63

INDOCTRINATION AND BELIEF
by John M. Calvert 69

RESPONSE TO CALVERT
by Frank T. Hainer 77

PART III
PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

JOHN DEWEY AND BROOKWOOD LABOR COLLEGE: THE IDEAL AND THE REALITY
by Richard J. Altenbaugh 82

RESPONSE TO ALTENBAUGH
by Keith Raitz 92

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF VISCERAL LEARNING FOR EDUCATION: SOME SPECULATIONS
by Ronald Lee Zigler 95

RESPONSE TO ZIGLER
by William H. Bruening 102

RESEARCH ON TEACHING: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY
by Jerome Popp 105

RESPONSE TO POPP
by William F. Zenker 111

THERAPEUTIC MEASURES IN EDUCATION
by Kurt V. Varga 114

RESPONSE TO VARGA
by Robert J. Skovira 122

PART IV
RECORDS AND REPORTS

Minutes, Business Meeting 126

Treasurer's Report for 1977 128

Membership List 129

OFFICIAL PROGRAM
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1977 ANNUAL MEETING
NOVEMBER 18-19, 1977
WEBSTER HALL HOTEL
THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

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PROGRAM

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 18

REGISTRATION: 12:00 - 1:30

FIRST CONCURRENT SESSIONS: 1:30 - 3:00

Session A

Chairperson: Robert Wilhoyte (University of Toledo)

Paper: Richard J. Altenbaugh (University of Pittsburgh) "John Dewey and Brookwood Labor College: The Ideal and the Reality"
Response: Keith Raitz (University of Louisville)

Session B

Chairperson: Walden Crabtree (University of Akron)

Paper: Robert Zigler (University of Cincinnati)
"Philosophical Implications of Visceral Learning for Education: Some Speculations"
Response: William H. Bruening (Indiana/Purdue University at Fort Wayne)

FIRST GENERAL SESSION: 3:30 - 5:15

Chairperson: Louis A. Petrone (University of Pittsburgh)

Paper: Edward Makruski (Ohio State University)
"The Dynamic Use of 'Policy' in Education/Discourse"
Paper: John Scahill (University of Kentucky)
"Legitimation Inquiry and Educational Policy"
Responses: Marvin J. Berlowitz (University of Cincinnati)
Frederick M. Schultz (University of Akron)

FRIDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 18

RECEPTION: 5:30 Hosted by James Kelly, Jr., Dean, School of Education, University of Pittsburgh

SECOND GENERAL SESSION: 8:15 - 10:00 Cathedral of Learning

Chairperson: Gerald M. Reagan (Ohio State University)

Welcoming Remarks: Rhoten Smith (Provost, University of Pittsburgh)

Presidential Address: J. Gordon Chamberlin (Pittsburgh Theological Seminary) "How Green Was Your Valley?"
Response: David E. Denton (University of Kentucky)

SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 19

SECOND CONCURRENT SESSIONS: 9:00 - 10:30

Session A

Chairperson: Clinton Collins (University of Kentucky)

Paper: Jerome Popp (Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville)
"Research on Teaching: An Alternative Strategy"
Response: William F. Zenker (Ohio State University, Marion Campus)

Session B

Chairperson: Dennis Senchuk (Indiana University)

Paper: Kurt V. Varga (Ohio State University)
"Therapeutic Measures in Education"
Response: Robert J. Skovira (University of Virginia)

THIRD GENERAL SESSION: 11:00 - 12:30

Chairperson: David E. Engel (University of Pittsburgh)

Guest Paper: Henry Johnson (Penn State University)
"The Return to 'Moral Education': Should Dick and Jane Tackle the Categorical Imperative?"
Response: Richard Pratte (Ohio State University)

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 19

FOURTH GENERAL SESSION: 2:00 - 3:00

Chairperson: Irwin Rice (Louisville, Kentucky)

Paper: John M. Calvert (Indiana University)
"Indoctrination and Belief"
Response: Frank Hainer (University of Pittsburgh)

GENERAL BUSINESS MEETING: 3:15 - 4:00

INTRODUCTION

William E. Brownson John E. Carter
Indiana State University

The papers, responses, and dialogue presented at the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society's annual meeting again express a concern with both emerging and long standing philosophical and educational issues. The focus of analysis and debate was sharpened this year by the presentation of a formal response to each of the presented papers.

Although there was no single theme to the Society's 1977 annual meeting, the papers did emphasize consideration of (1) the contemporary task of philosophical and empirical inquiry in education (Chamberlin, Denton, Popp, and Zenker); (2) moral and value education (Johnson, Pratte, Zigler, Bruening, Varga, and Skovira); and (3) educational policy (Makruski, Scahill, Schultz, Berlowitz, Altenbaugh, Raitz, Calvert, and Hainer).

In his Presidential Address Gordon Chamberlin recalls the paper presented by Janice Weaver during the 1976 annual meeting of the OVPES which contained dire predictions about the future roles to be played by philosophers of education. Chamberlin's response to there projections is encompassed in his proposal that philosophers of education move from a narrow view of their roles identified with schooling to that of a consideration for the larger educational arena; that is, they must devote attention to the more inclusive scope of education. He describes more specifically what the role of the philosopher may be in this larger arena, proposing (1) that educational philosophers develop a broadened consciousness which stimulates, questions, and brings multiple perspectives to bear on every facet of life; (2) that they clarify the fundamental assumptions made in this larger arena; and (3) that they as individuals come to understand the limitations of the educational process. In conclusion, Chamberlin proposes that philosophers of education climb out of their "intellectual valleys" by "helping educators bring multiple perspectives to bear in the interpretation of each person's life experience, enabling a new consciousness to emerge." In response, David Denton takes issue with several points of Chamberlin's argument, including his call for extending the boundaries of what is now defined as education, his failure to give a justification when introducing his own purposes for education, the lack of an epistemic dimension in his analysis, and his neglect of the significance of theological studies in understanding philosophy of education. While agreeing with Chamberlin that we should look to other intellectual "valleys" (perspectives), Denton argues in his closing discussion that educators should also look to their own particular valley for giving secure roots as a source of philosophical dialogue.

In contrast to Chamberlin's discussion of philosophical inquiry in education, Jerome Popp explores the nature of empirical research in education. After describing a history of disappointing research findings focusing on the question "What is a good teacher?" Popp proposes that we would have better results if an alternative methodology were implemented. In place of the predominant empirical theories in which causal explanations are central, he argues for a cluster theory for evaluating the relevance or contribution of a particular characteristic to good teaching. He acknowledges, however, that this cluster, whole-to-the-part, analysis must be seen as complementary to present empirical, part-to-the-whole, analysis. Popp discusses how researchers may explicate definitive characteristics of good teaching and how a research model may be developed for analyzing the relationship of these particular characteristics to a "teaching totality." William Zenker, in response, suggests that the manner in which Popp proposes an architectonic analysis of the performance of good teaching raises "a myriad of unanswered aesthetic questions." Even more important than these questions, Zenker argues that Popp has failed to adequately demonstrate a need for the solution that he proposes; "Indeed the cure of the patient which Popp introduces may be worse than the disease which he diagnoses." Zenker argues that Popp's recommendation is dangerously close to the common sense perspective towards "a plurality of causes," yet such alleged plurality of causes consistently vanishes when effects are subjected to rigorous scientific specification.

Led by the belief that moral education is "perhaps potentially the most significant education movement in our generation," Henry Johnson begins his analysis in an invited paper by describing historical developments in American education. He distinguishes between those movements which were psychologically based (programs concerned with what children prefer or are likely to do) and those philosophically based (programs concerned with what children *ought* to do). After describing how the moral dimension has been historically lost by schools through the wide acceptance by educators of positivistic and scientific thinking, Johnson proceeds to discuss a series of problems and issues facing the return of "genuine" moral education. In this analysis, he discusses (1) "what schools can do" as they require students to confront moral issues, make moral choices, and weigh the consequences in ethical terms; and (2) what such a program would require, e.g., more attention given to the process of learning morals, better prepared teachers and a clear recognition of the college or university's role in such preparation, finding a consensus of moral content to be taught, and the assumption by the school of a role traditionally left to the family and church. In response, Richard Pratte, after raising several preliminary questions, focuses his remarks on two aspects of Johnson's paper: (1) that the criteria found in Johnson's definition of "genuine" moral education may be used to apply to some things that are not ordinarily regarded as moral; and (2) that, if Johnson intended the criteria to be used as a programmatic definition, careful examination of the proposed program indicates a lack of specificity as to what it is that the teacher selects when teaching morals and how a teacher is to evaluate a student's learning of a moral norm. In concluding, Pratte notes that a program of moral education is not one set apart as "simply a subject...rather, it has to pervade the whole of the school experience."

Also expressing a concern for the current discussion of moral education, Ron Zigler draws on recent works in physiology and endocrinology as well as research in biofeedback and meditation and challenges the traditional Western assumption that praise and blame can be assigned only to actions performed by the voluntary responses of the skeletal muscles and the cerebrospinal nervous system. Zigler argues that visceral processes can be viewed as an internal form of Ryle's 'knowing how,' as well as manifestations of Dewey's concept of habit. He suggests that with proper training individuals can learn how to modify undesirable internal responses. In so far as internal states may interfere with one's acting consistently with one's knowledge about the world and verbally professed moral principles, Zigler concludes that the control of internal bodily functions must be of concern to educators, and particularly those developing programs for moral education. In response to Zigler's paper, William Bruening argues that in the characterization of visceral states as forms of 'knowing how' Zigler has identified mind and body, thereby committing a category mistake. He then suggests that Zigler may only be making the weaker claim that "to know" can be correlated with physiological conditions. But this then poses a question for scientific investigation, not philosophical argument.

Kurt Varga examines the concepts 'mental health,' 'education,' 'teaching,' and 'therapy' with the purpose of determining the "place of therapy as an activity and mental health as an aim in the process of education." In developing his argument, Varga draws on the works on Wilson, Peters, McClellan, Scheffler, Thompson and Green. He points out that given commonly accepted definitions of education and teaching it is logically possible for mental health to be an aim of education only when the meaning of mental health is severely restricted. Using the concepts of education and teaching as developed by Peters and Scheffler, Varga argues that while certain emotional and cognitive states associated with mental health may be conditions of successful teaching or conditions of educational activities, they are not properly seen as aims of education. Robert Skovira argues that Varga's thesis is developed within the context of two grammars, one a grammar of education, the other a grammar of mental health. He then points to a confusion in our concepts of irrationality and unreasonableness as related to concerns of mental health and concludes that there is danger in losing sight of the teacher's primary task of teaching.

In a session devoted to the consideration of educational policy, two papers were presented by Edward Makruski and John Scahill with responses by Marvin Berlowitz and Frederick Schultz. Arguing that recent analyses and discussions of the concept of policy have failed to account for the dynamic use of the concept, Makruski sets his primary task as filling a gap in the literature on educational policy. He draws on C. L. Stevenson's distinction between the descriptive and dynamic uses of language and points out that to call a rule a policy is often to elevate the rule to a status in which it is held in awe and not easily challenged. In conclusion, Makruski argues that different uses of policy and policy language must be recognized and that dynamic uses of policy "in educational settings may serve to stifle and discourage meaningful and open debate."

John Scahill argues that the correspondence principle dealing with social relations in schools and those in economic institutions is not itself a sufficient theoretical foundation for the formulation of desirable educational policies. He summarizes the works of Bowles and Gintis and questions their presumption of not only a correspondence but of an actual causal relationship between economic and educational structure. Scahill argues that a more thorough understanding is needed of the processes by which the corporate economy continues to be legitimated and thereby maintains its position of dominance over other institutions. The task ahead, Scahill suggests is the development of theoretical research into legitimation processes and the lived-subjective experience in late-capitalist consumer economic systems.

In response to the papers presented by Makruski and Scahill, Berlowitz argues that Scahill's analysis only proliferates a "rising caricature of Marxism" and fails to get beyond simply alluding to "cultural impediments" to realizing humane educational policy. Berlowitz admits that Makruski's distinction is of some use, yet helps very little in understanding power structures. He concludes that analyses of educational policy grounded in linguistic philosophy, as well as symbolic interaction and cultural transmission theory, fail to meet the challenge of "revolutionary practice."

Fred Schultz's response to Scahill points to the incompleteness of his analysis and poses a series of questions concerning the processes of the legitimation of social policy and the relationships between political-economic forces and educational structures. Schultz agrees with Makruski that his own analysis of policy in the 1976 OVPES Presidential Address, and those of others, have been essentially descriptive in force. He acknowledges that Makruski's paper and Steinberg's response to his Presidential Address constructively emphasize the necessity of recognizing the reality that persons, including those administrating policy, often argue only assertively. In conclusion he turns to C. L. Stevenson in arguing for the necessity of recognizing and dealing with these differences in ethical discourse and in educational policy debate.

John Calvert briefly examines the recent debate over the distinguishing characteristics of indoctrination and rejects as key criteria content, method and intent. Calvert argues that one must look to the consequences of indoctrinational activity, that is, the achievement sense of indoctrination, for identifying defining characteristics. Utilizing H. H. Price's distinction between 'believing-in' and 'believing-that,' Calvert develops four criteria of indoctrinated belief which are not limited to any particular method or content and are not dependent upon the intention of the imparter of belief. Calvert discusses the conditions of structural knowing and criterial knowing and then concludes, using C. S. Peirce's concept of 'leading principles,' that the criteria he has developed for distinguishing indoctrinated belief do not damage the indoctrination/education distinction. In response to Calvert, Frank Hainer argues that the criteria and conditions of indoctrinated belief developed by Calvert may be defensible. Yet, such *ex post facto* conditions of "mental states" or dispositions are not particularly helpful when the task is seen as that of avoiding indoctrination. Hainer points out that Calvert's criteria of indoctrinated belief do not succeed in the apparent effort to completely shift the analysis to the consequences in so far as the second criterion seems to refer to the manner in which 'belief-in' is achieved. In conclusion, Hainer questions whether Calvert's use of Price's distinction adequately reflects the complexities of Price's analysis.

Richard Altenbaugh's paper examines the relationship between John Dewey's social philosophy and the programs at Brookwood Labor College. He briefly describes Dewey's writings which lent direct support to the college. Altenbaugh then discusses Dewey's social philosophy and, in particular, Dewey's concern with the centrality of modifying economic and work structures in the reconstruction of society, a concern he describes as being not unlike that expressed by the professors and students of Brookwood. In conclusion, Altenbaugh states, "...in the defense of Brookwood, John Dewey was only defending John Dewey's philosophy in practice." In response to Altenbaugh, Raitz suggests that it is necessary to distinguish "philosophy of education," meaning the consideration of the relationships between educational prescriptions and philosophical inquiry, from the loose sense of "philosophy of education," meaning only a set of educational prescriptions concerning goals, programs and practices. He argues that Altenbaugh considers only the latter meaning of "educational philosophy." Further, he argues that the meaning of educational prescriptions is embedded in philosophical context and suggests that upon closer investigation Altenbaugh would have discovered no evidence for the belief that the philosophy of Dewey and that of Brookwood were similar. He concludes with the suggestion that Dewey's support of the school does not imply that they had similar philosophical positions.

PART I

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

HOW GREEN WAS YOUR VALLEY?

J. Gordon Chamberlin

One advantage of being the president of this Society is that you get to present a paper without having to submit what you are going to say for approval by the Program Committee. Another advantage is that you have twelve months to work on your paper, a somewhat longer period between conception and delivery than for a human fetus. But like the arrival of a baby, what emerges is immediately slapped to determine how lively it is.

As a matter of fact, this paper has had a twelve-month gestation period, for it was conceived while driving back from last year's meeting, as I reflected on three occurrences during our days in Louisville. I will deal with them in turn.

I. A Philosopher's Public

At last year's meeting Professor Janice Weaver presented a paper titled "The Context of Selected Educational Power and Policy: An Essay on Walruses, Carpenters and Oysters." She described, with vivid illustrations, the lamentable position of philosophers of education within the educational establishment--oysters among the walruses. From description she moved to dire predictions about what those in the field face as they struggle with the university power game, job security, and teacher accountability. In the context of the university, according to Professor Weaver, philosophers of education are employees forced to fight for status and students.

Professor Reagan, as the respondent to Professor Weaver, challenged some of her more fearsome forecasts, yet agreed with her that the context in which philosophers of education seek to make their contribution is the teacher preparation sub-system of the university, itself a sub-system of the vast establishment of formal education. So philosophers have little opportunity to influence those who are in control, for the system rarely provides for the flow of wisdom from faculty to board.

Securely fixed in the American idea of a university is the conviction that ultimate control must be in the hands of a board of trustees supposedly representing the broad interests of society at large. George H. Williams, in an illuminating monograph about the founding of Harvard, explains how this structure of university control came about. The complex political and religious situation in Massachusetts in 1650 was that of a colony dominated by non-conformists seeking a university charter from the head of the established church, the King of England. Cotton Mather, and the others who framed the appeal to the King, claimed biblical sanctions and European precedents for the structure they proposed. After all, four hundred years earlier, Pope Gregory IX, in assuring the academic freedom of the University of Paris, gave trinitarian sanction to the coordinate orders--state (God), university (Son), church (Holy Spirit)--and had written:

> . . . if of the middle (the University) the other two are deprived, they fall into extreme corruption, because power, unless it is tempered by wisdom, luxuriates in presumption and gives itself over to arrogance, while benignity, too, if it is unsupported by knowledge, becomes amorphously degenerate and rendered akin to fatuousness.[1]

So Harvard vested its control in a tri-partite board representing school, church, and state. Though that particular distribution of representation has not continued in most American universities, assumptions about the role of trustees have persisted with the direction of control flowing downward from the power center to each university sub-system.

Located as they are in that structure, philosophers of education seldom have access to centers of power even though those in control have the greatest need of the illumination which philosophic insights would bring to the setting of basic policies and directions for the university. Instead, philosophers are assigned by the institution to the periphery of the sub-system designed to help prepare future educational professionals.

In fulfilling that assignment in the university, philosophers face in two directions. They face fundamental issues of existence and meaning, of the world and reality, of justice, truth, values, and beauty, and they must clarify their views on each. But having struggled to understand such matters, philosophers also face particular people with whom their insights and findings are to be shared. These two horizons cannot be kept apart, for those to whom philosophers seek to speak tend to determine what philosophers speak about. Philosophers of education meeting with future public school teachers can hardly pretend that they are conversing with lamas of Tibet. The problems which their students think they will meet as school teachers in Cleveland, Vincennes, or Philippi repeatedly obtrude. Future teachers realize that they soon will be conducting activities under the pressure of immediate programmatic expectations; they will have to decide, as John Holt put it, "What do I do Monday?" They recognize that in the jobs they hope to get they will have to provide a large segment of the population of the country with a great variety of services, including doing something about Columbus, I.Q., adjectives, quadratic equations, behavioral objectives, discipline, football, the Pledge of Allegiance, Ivanhoe, grades, and school lunches. Meanwhile, as Professor Weaver pointed out, they have very existential anxieties about contract negotiations, union organization, and salary disputes. Under the pressure of such immediate concerns, these hopeful professionals often find it difficult to give much attention to philosophy even though their professors demonstrate that threading through everything the students will be doing are crucial, fundamental issues.

So, with such a public, philosophers of education are constantly pressed to teach about aspects of formal education--to think of education as that which goes on in schools--in fact to become themselves cogs in the giant educational establishment.

Philosophers of education hope, through what they are doing, to influence the direction and quality of education. But they need to realize that professionals are not the only ones with such hopes. The men and women who serve on school boards, those serving in city, state, and national legislatures, parents, employers, and taxpayers are also concerned about attendance, budgets, curricula, and discipline. By policies they establish by legislation they adopt, and by their votes, they exercise significant control over public education. They too, act in terms of assumptions about the foundational issues that thread through everything schools do. If philosophers of education were assigned to deal with the concerns and questions of that larger public, there would be some very interesting shifts in what philosophers think about.

But a more significant shift would take place if philosophers of education were to accept Lawrence Cremin's more inclusive scope of education. In his recent book, *Traditions of American Education,* Cremin expands on a thesis he developed in writing about the colonial experience.

> I have defined education as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit, evoke, or acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, or sensibilities, as well as any outcomes of that effort . . . .
>
> The definition is latitudinarian in at least two major respects. First, it permits us several angles of vision with regard to the interplay of generations. Education may be viewed as intergenerational . . .; or it may be viewed as a self-conscious coming of age . . . .
>
> Second, the definition projects us beyond the schools and colleges to the multiplicity of individuals and institutions that educate--parents, peers, siblings, and friends, as well as families, churches, synagogues, libraries, museums, summer camps, benevolent societies, agricultural fairs, settlement houses, factories, publishers, radio stations, and television networks. It alerts us to the numerous occupational groups (only some of which have been professionalized) associated with educational institutions, and it directs our attention to the variety of pedagogies they employ.[2]

It would seem rather obvious that should we grant Cremin's view of the scope of education, and if the multiplicity of individuals and institutions to which he refers should seek help in understanding what they are about, then philosophers of education would be thinking, writing, and speaking about education from a very different perspective.

The change of public would change perceptions, priorities, and philosophical preoccupations. Or, to express the shift in terms of Professor Yi-Fun Tuan's stimulating analysis of environmental perceptions in his book *Topophilia* (or "the love of place"), it would be a shift of response to a new environment for "environment necessarily provides the major building blocks of autochthonous cosmologies and world views."[3] So, should philosophers of education see themselves in a larger environment than the one assumed by Professor Weaver, the field would take on new dimensions and fresh stimulus. But in that new environment, what would be our function?

II. A Philosopher's Function

The second occurrence at last year's meeting which prompted extended reflection took place at a luncheon held that Saturday noon for the officers and committee members of this Society. The luncheon meeting was set up to provide for an exchange of ideas in planning for the coming year. Out of the conversation, however, came a rather surprising fact: Of the nine persons sitting around the table, five had been or were then engaged in theological studies. Why would anyone leave the queen of the sciences to enter the troubled field of philosophy of education? That question was followed by another--What is the relationship between theology and philosophy which provides a bridge over which so many have crossed?

Obviously, I am not going to try to fathom what may have led to the shift of focus of the individuals who sat around the table that Saturday a year ago. I do not want to spoil their lunch at this late date. However, it is an intriguing puzzle--why so many persons now in this field have made such a shift in their vocational choice.

One possible explanation may be that many were raised in religious traditions claiming that their own theological perspective provided the only adequate understanding of the ultimate. Having been indoctrinated to accept a particular theological position before they understood its implications--each religious body attempts to do that with its young--may have caused many to realize that in a sense they were trapped. So, as they encountered other belief systems, they began to question their own and came to feel that understanding should precede commitment.

What the occurrence at the table prompted was not so much interest in why people shifted fields, but some reflections on the curious relationship between theology and philosophy. The relationship has been stormy in the past, but in the present some fascinating parallels have emerged.

The common view of a theologian is of a man or woman who develops or adopts a doctrinal position and then explains to the faithful what they should believe. But when a church selects a particular theological position and requires devotion to that position by its adherents, trouble begins. Western history is blotted with the terrible conflicts between true believers who defended their doctrines to the death, mostly the death of those who held to other doctrines. Phyllis McGinley has provided a delightful satire on this dark stain in our history, past and present.

How To Start A War

Said Zwingli to Muntzer,
"I'll have to be blunt, sir.
I don't like your version
Of Total Immersion.
And since God's on my side
And I'm on the dry side,
You'd better swing ovah
To me and Jehovah."

Cried Muntzer, "It's schism,
Is Infant Baptism!
Since I've had a sign, sir,
That God's will is mine, sir,
Let all men agree
With Jehovah and me,
Or go to Hell, singly,"
Said Muntzer to Zwingli.

As each drew his sword
On the side of the Lord.[4]

The idea that the appropriate function of theology was to provide a secure doctrinal stand for religious people was a bad habit copied by philosophers and later by philosophers of education. We cannot claim too much credit for the lack of wars among philosophers of education; the reason may be because few of them have claimed divine sanction for their positions.

Nevertheless, when J. J. Chambliss described the *Origins of American Philosophy of Education*, he did so in terms of the philosophical positions each writer held. He traced those origins to England in the early nineteenth century and credits Thomas Tate, a "champion of Baconian induction," with being the first to use the phrase *Philosophy of Education* as the title of his book published in 1854, with the subtitle being "The Principles and Practice of Teaching." As Chambliss reviews the subsequent contributions to the field--Spencer, Partridge, Wickersham, Horne, Dewey, and MacVannel--he does so by describing how these writers were exponents of Evolutionism, Scientism, Rationalism, Idealism, Naturalism, Empiricism, Experimentalism and Functionalism. Chambliss concludes his book, however, with the contention that whatever their philosophical position, a common objective united philosophers of education in

> a keen feeling of the responsibility to bring philosophic thought to bear in ways that would hold forth the prospect of making a difference in the practices of education . . . . These writings show us that philosophy of education has a work to do--the sort of work which must be both philosophical and educational--that is distinct from the work of other disciplines.[5]

While the work of a philosopher of education is distinct from the work of those in other disciplines, the parallels between the work of theologians and philosophers of education is intriguing, particularly so in light of the fact that philosophers bear in their intellectual genes the deposit of centuries of tension with theologians. Those who spend their lives in philosophical pursuits seeking to understand fundamental matters have been pressed again and again by theologians who claim that they are the ones who deal with more ultimate matters. Until recently philosophers in the West had to struggle with the pressures from one faith tradition--represented by the fissiparous branches of Christianity. But with the exposure to other faiths by those who set up and ran colonies for European empires, with the development of anthropology as a distinct discipline, with the spread of studies in comparative religion, and with advances in technology and mobility making possible the spread of Oriental religious traditions around the world, religious pluralism has relieved philosophers of the challenge they faced when a particular theological position was sustained by the political and sacramental power of a single religious institution, as in Europe in 1250 and Massachusetts in 1650. Now there is a growing awareness that philosophy provides the framework for theology and that theologians approach their field in terms of philosophical categories and structures of thought.

One of the major contemporary Protestant theologians, Karl Barth, inveighed against philosophy, yet employed a particular philosophical frame of reference and has been called a "Christological positivist."[6] Liberation theology emerging particularly in Latin American Roman Catholic thought employs Marxist insights. The latest catalogue of the Paulist Press lists six books on "process thelogy" in which both Catholic and Protestant theologians acknowledge their dependence on Whitehead. A major Roman Catholic theologian, Bernard Lonergan, approaches his work from a phenomenological perspective, noting that "transcendental method . . . does add considerable light and precision to the performance of theological tasks."[7] And Edward Farley makes the claim more explicit, writing that "the contribution of philosophy to theology is the discovery of these general structures (transcendental, cosmological, historical, epistemological) which reappear in modified form in the religious community."[8]

Philosophers of education do the same. Philosophical categories and structures of thought are employed in dealing with education. As Chambliss suggested, when philosophers of education consider their function, they move beyond promoting particular philosophical positions in their concern to contribute to education. And what they have to say may be no more comfortable to their followers than theologians' positions are to theirs. Because theologians are not particularly religious and they frequently challenge popular religion, many devout church members are scandalized and blame theologians for much disillusionment with traditional church practices.

But disillusionment with institutions is surely not limited to churches. Professor Weaver's lugubrious analysis last year could have included the recognition that problems for professors of education are in part a reflection of a vast disillusionment with the educational establishment. Primary among the reasons is that the goals held up for schools were far beyond what such institutions could effectuate, so an illusion was perpetuated. Colin Greer is only one of those examining the great expectations this nation has had from the public schools. He writes, "So the school was established in the American imagination as the primary means whereby the nation could resolve most of its internal social conflicts, even those generated by diverse foreign immigration."9 And Greer, blaming historians for offering a rosy but false picture of what schools had accomplished, quoted one historian who claimed that "common schools increased opportunity; they taught morality and citizenship; they encouraged a talented leadership; they maintained social mobility; they promoted social responsiveness to social conditions."10

Today, there are few who see schools as the great hope for meeting the nation's ills. The disillusionment and confusion which express themselves in voting down bond issues, burning offending text books, setting up competing schools, demanding a return to "the basics," and in many other ways, cannot be overcome by defensively saying "yes, but . . ." to every criticism by Dennison, Friedenberg, Goodman, Herndon, Illich or Katz, nor by insisting on a higher status for philosophers of education in the educational establishment. It is a time of disillusionment and confusion which calls for a philosopher's special contribution to society. A distinctive role awaits philosophers of education who are willing to step onto a larger stage, who accept the fact that many other individuals and institutions besides schools are engaged in education, and who are courageous enough to begin to deal with the issues posed by that larger public. Taking such a step involves one in peculiar *handicaps*, special *tasks* and distinctive philosophical *functions*.

Handicaps. Perhaps the greatest handicap is the common expectation that educators should be articulators of educational goals rather than evaluators of those goals. Holding that expectation, many people can blame philosophers for leading schools astray. And for those who know a little about what philosophers of education have been doing, the handicap is aggravated because they assume that philosophers are only interested in being, or making, disciples of some particular point of view.

A second major handicap is the common assumption that education equals schooling, and that philosophers of education are part of the machinery of the establishment and thus could hardly lead anyone out of the educational morass.

But even if these two handicaps could be met, a third is that education is a very difficult kind of process to explain since it is a subject that involves all other subjects and, as Rosenkranz observed a hundred and thirty years ago,

> The science of education cannot be deduced from a simple principle with such strictness as logic, ethics and like sciences. It is rather a mixed science, which has its presuppositions in many others.11

Tasks. Challenged by such handicaps--and undoubtedly there are others--at least three crucial tasks confront philosophers of education.

First, is the need to find ways to bring influence to bear, to be heard by that larger public, to gain visibility. Surely there are many ways to solve such a problem.

Second, philosophers need to help people see that schools have been assigned by this society to perform a wide range of essential social services--medical, dietary, recreational, disciplinary, etc.--over and above their distinctly educational responsibilities, so that the institution needs to be evaluated on broader grounds.

Third, to expand on Lawrence Cremin's historical observation about those who educate, it is necessary to more clearly identify the individuals and institutions who are responsible for education and to whom philosophers may speak.

Functions. In addressing such tasks on the wider stage, for a larger public, three fundamental philosophical functions need to be performed.

First, clarifying what the educational process is, its essential nature, its possibilities and limitations.

Second, lifting up the basic issues inevitably involved for anyone--parents, industries, radio stations, newspapers, churches, governments--who attempt to carry on educational activities.

The third function is at least as difficult as the other two, and that is to make it clear to everyone that the many poignant hopes of humanity for peace, or justice, or freedom from oppression, or dignity, depend upon education's distinctive contribution--helping people to understand themselves and their world.

It is that third function which makes the first and second so important. Cremin may be right that "a multiplicity of individuals and institutions educate," but it makes a great difference what he means by the term "educate." Most institutions in society--commercial, political, religious, military--seek to shape people to serve their vested interests. Robert Pirsig points to the common habit of most people to think along institutional lines, not realizing that "schools, churches, governments and political organizations of every sort all tended to direct thought . . . for the perpetuation of their own functions, and for the control of individuals in the service of these functions."[12] Such directing of thought is carried on by indoctrination, brainwashing, behavioral conditioning, and blatant selling. Cremin may mean that many people, caught in the midst of multiple competing claims, begin to see options before them and thus are able to escape domination in making choices. Surely the range of options has been widened by technology, mobility and the media, which make it possible for our generation to be the first in human history to know about--even to watch--everything going on anywhere in the world. And this has made some people realize that we are "one world" in an even more profound sense than Wendell Willkie realized. But this one world is in an age of creative depersonalization in mass cultures, of superbly organized repression in spreading dictatorships, of imaginatively justified injustice by the have nations against the have-not nations, and of fantastically rationalized irrationality in the mad preparation for nuclear holocaust.

It was to the responsibility of philosophers in such a world that Bertrand Russell was speaking in the early 1960s when he wrote,

> Philosophers, who are bookish and unusual people, are apt to emphasize forms of good and evil which are unusual and rare and to underestimate the common everyday pleasures and pains which make up the lives of the majority of mankind. This leads to an overemphasis on creeds, and thence to fanaticism. Fanaticism leads to hatred and hatred leads to war. Those who are willing to risk a nuclear

> war are willing that life, or at any rate the higher forms of life, should disappear from the earth, destroyed, not by some natural cataclysm, but by the fury of human beings . . . .
>
> There is, perhaps, one duty which falls specially within the province of philosophy, and that is to persuade mankind that human life is worth preserving.[13]

The individuals and institutions that educate need to see that their attempts to shape people, to direct thought, may not be education at all--for education bears much more radical implications. At the heart of the distinctive process of education is helping learning, in acceptance of the fact that the learner controls what is appropriated--the learner, not the helper, determines both what is learned and what helps. Thus, also essential to education is a distinctive relationship in which helpers submit to the pace and direction of learners, realizing that the accomplishment of a helper is in the accomplishment of a learner. Such help makes possible the distinctive outcomes of education--the stimulation of the internal authority structures of learners and the deepening and broadening of their understanding.

Such a process is as threatening in any society as it was when Paulo Freire began helping the peasants in Brazil to deepen and broaden their understanding of their own repressed situation. He had to leave Brazil but his use of the word *conscientization* spread around the world. Charles Reich used it to interpret what youth of the 1960s were producing in the culture of the United States; he called it Consciousness III. Reich wrote,

> Consciousness, as we are using the term, is not a set of opinions, information, or values, but a total configuration in any given individual, which makes up his whole perception of reality, his whole world view.[14]

And later,

> What we urgently need is not training but education, not indoctrination but the expansion of each individual--a process continuing throughout life; in a word, education for consciousness.[15]

Before any society can deal with corruption, poverty, uncontrolled technology, destruction of the environment, repression, population explosion, and the nuclear threat, it needs to understand in a deeper sense than knowing the facts of how all of these problems are intertwined in the culture--it needs help in developing a new consciousness.

Education for consciousness, to use the Freire and Reich term, is always subversive to concentrations of power, whether of the CIA, ITT, the Mafia or the smoke-filled rooms of state legislatures. Pope Gregory IX recognized this 700 years ago when he wrote about how the clerics in the university in their science and letters tempered the corruption of both church and state.

It is this most radical of human activities with which philosophers of education deal--an activity which challenges every absolutist claim, political or religious, which stimulates, demonstrates, encourages, questions, by bringing multiple perspectives to bear on every facet of life. The crucial function of philosophers of education is to help those engaged in this radical activity to understand the fundamental assumptions they make about learners, about helpers, about appropriate settings, and about appropriate goals. And it is particularly important that educators be helped to understand the limitations of the process they carry on--that education cannot attain every goal and that educators cannot produce the particular products which parents, industry, church, or government may desire; that the fundamental meaning of education in any society is enabling human beings to exercise responsible freedom.

Well, these are some of the thoughts prompted by what I discovered at that luncheon table last year. But there was a third occurrence.

III. Being a Philosopher of Education

While our Society was holding its meeting in Louisville in 1976, Public Television was featuring in weekly segments a new version, actually filmed in Wales with Welsh actors and actresses, of Richard Llewellyn's *How Green Was My Valley*. You may recall that the book opens with Huw saying:

> I am going to pack my two shirts with my other socks and my best suit in the little blue cloth that my mother used to tie around her hair when she did the house, and I am going from the Valley . . . . It has always seemed to me that there is something big to be felt by a man who has made up his mind to leave the things that he knows and go off to strange places.[16]

And after the flood of Huw's memories recounted throughout the book, he ends with these words;

> How green was my Valley, then, and the Valley of them that have gone.[17]

As you might imagine, thinking about the episodes week by week in that moving story of the hard life suffered by miners in a Welsh valley, one could easily see parallels to the hard life of miners in the valleys of Western Pennsylvania. As we were driving over the ridges from one valley to another, getting back to Pittsburgh a year ago, the valley metaphor seemed to offer one way to think about the two occurrences in Louisville. And it seemed doubly appropriate to employ that metaphor because a very significant topographic feature in American geography and history provides the name of this Society--the Ohio Valley. For the first time, the Society is holding its meeting where the Ohio Valley begins--here in Pittsburgh.

It would become monotonous to overburden the valley metaphor, but a few moments of seeing its positive and negative connotations offers a way to look at what we have been saying. Yi-Fu Tuan, to whom we referred earlier, in analyzing environmental perceptions, suggests that "symbolically the valley is identified with the womb and shelter. Its concavity protects and nurtures life. . . . The valley is chthonic and feminine, the *megara* of biologic man."[18] Valley suggests security. A valley, formed by a life-sustaining stream, can also be a place of threat from flood. The stream leads upward to a source and downward to a larger world.

Should you have occasion to look at a topographic or even a road map of the Pittsburgh region, you would see the vast confusion of valleys formed by the tributary streams of the Monongahela River as it flows north, the Allegheny as it flows south, and the Ohio as it goes northwest then southwest. The history of this region may offer an analogy to what we have been examining this evening. Into the many valleys around Pittsburgh moved wave after wave of immigration, so that one can now make a geoethnic analysis of the region by noting that by taking over a valley each ethnic group found welcome and security, a language they understood, food which tasted like home, a culture transplanted from somewhere else in the world, and a church which assured them that their god had come along. The result has been a vivid pluralism in this region, still largely unassimilated, and symbolized by the fact that in this county there are more than 130 municipalities in addition to the City of Pittsburgh. This region offers a rather intriguing metaphor for the situation in the field of philosophy of education.

Each philosopher of education is at home in some intellectual valley, has constituted a life-world out of the stream of personal experience, finds security in some philosophical tradition, has some interpretation of the contribution he or she is making to that stream as it flows on into other worlds. Helpers of learning need to realize that each learner who shares in an educational occasion also inhabits a "valley" constituted as a life-world out of the deposit of previous experience. But of all the fields of human endeavor none implies a greater responsibility to climb out of one's own valley by one or another of three routes--up stream, down stream or over the surrounding hills. It is in moving out of the valley that we gain fresh perspectives, enabling us to move toward a deeper and broader understanding of ourselves and our world. It is in helping others gain fresh perspectives that we as philosophers are educators, as Chambliss claimed.

We do not need to consider *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* as a fountain of wisdom to draw from Robert Pirsig's pen a very interesting insight as he uses the same metaphor when the professor, reading what he had written years before, thinks,

> It was what he had been saying, only in a different language with different roots and origins. He was from another valley seeing what was in *this* valley, not now as a story told by strangers but as a part of the valley he was from. He was seeing it all. He had broken the code.[19]

Llewellyn had Huw put it in a homelier way--"there is something big to be felt by a man who has made up his mind to leave the things that he knows and go off to strange places."[20] For Reich going off to strange places can be the experience of a whole people in trying to discern the influences now shaping American culture as "the rebirth of a future; the rebirth of people in a sterile land,"[21] as "April's green."[22] But Huw, looking back as he left the Valley expressed profound appreciation for the influences there which shaped his life, saying "how green was my valley."

No matter how green a person's valley may have been, the next valley has a contribution to make, and the next, and the next. Topophilia, the love of place, is challenged by philosophia, the love of wisdom; or better, philosophy invites the love of many places. Philosophical restlessness serves the world by helping educators bring multiple perspectives to bear in the interpretation of each person's life experience, enabling a new consciousness to emerge. Philosophers of education can serve that new consciousness as they help those individuals and institutions who are educators in other valleys to understand the crucial importance of their special calling.

NOTES

1. George H. Williams, *The Theological Idea of the University* (New York: National Council of Churches, 1958), p. 34.

2. Lawrence A. Cremin, *Traditions of American Education* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), p. 134f.

3. Yi-Fu Tuan, *Topophilia, A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 246.

4. From TIMES THREE by Phyllis McGinley
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5. J. J. Chambliss, *Origins of American Philosophy of Education* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 104.

6. Warren E. Groff and Donald E. Miller, *The Shaping of Modern Christian Thought* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1968), p. 314.

7. Bernard Longergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 24.

8. Edward Farley, *Ecclesial Man* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), p. 233.

9. Colin Greer, *The Great School Legend: A Revisionist Interpretation of American Public Education* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), p. 19.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

11. Chambliss, p. 54.

12. Robert M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 114.

13. Bertrand Russell, "The Duty of a Philosopher in This Age," in *The Abdication of Philosophy: Philosophy and the Public Good*, ed. Eugene Freeman (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1976), p. 17f.

14. Charles A. Reich, *The Greening of America* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 13.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 392.

16. Richard Llewellyn, *How Green Was My Valley* (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1949), p. 1.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 475.

18. Yi-Fu Tuan, p. 118.

19. Pirsig, p. 247f.

20. Llewellyn, p. 1.

21. Reich, p. 379.

22. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

RESPONSE TO CHAMBERLIN
IN PRAISE OF GEOETHNICITY

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Introduction

If we ask, What is history?, we are not asking an historical question; we are asking a philosophic one. If we ask, What is literature or mathematics?, we are asking neither a literary nor a mathematical question; again, we are asking a philosophic one. Yet, if we ask, What is philosophy?, we are asking a philosophic question. Philosophy it is which is the most self-reflective discipline. Operating in that tradition, President Chamberlin asks us once again to reflect on what it is to be now, and in the future, philosophers of education. This is not the first time he has asked that of us. In most of his papers since the publication of his 1969 book, *Toward a Phenomenology of Education*, he has been admonishing us to reflect on and reevaluate our roles.

In my response to his present admonition, I shall, believing as I do that paraphrase is the first step toward dialogue, attempt to paraphrase the general structure of his argument. If the paraphrase fails, then all else will be futile. Assuming success with the paraphrase, I shall make four critical notes. Then, I shall argue a counterpoint in favor of valleys, or, to play off one of his terms, geoethnicity. Relax; the response will be short.

Paraphrase

Superficially, we are presented with three disjointed sections each based on certain events, with their associations, of last year's meeting of this Society: a reaction to Professor Weaver's dire predictions; some random notes on theology and philosophic inquiry; and a final pronouncement regarding philosophy of education, a pronouncement derived somewhat obliquely from a novel set in Wales. But, this is a Presidential Address, and we all know that Presidential Addresses of this Society have never been superficial! Dull, maybe, but never superficial.

1. Professor Weaver's description of and predictions about philosophy of education are valid only if one accepts the context of schooling as the sole arena of our philosophic action. From the perspective of Professor Chamberlin's expanded view of our arena of action, Professor Weaver's description is a very limited and limiting one. President Chamberlin then urges us to move into this larger arena.

2. Once there, the question becomes, what do we do as philosophers of education? First, he tells us, we avoid the debilitating activities associated with doctrinal debates, and, second, we serve to clarify what education is in this larger arena, what the fundamental issues are, and the "crucial importance of helping people to understand themselves and their world."

3. President Chamberlin then speaks to us from his mountain-top, informing us of our valleys and urging us to rise above the horizons of each to achieve the understanding which results from multiple perspectives.

In summary, he has identified two directions he wishes us not to take and has called us up from and out of our valleys.

Four Critical Notes

1. The notion, and it is not a new one, that education has, will have, or must have a larger arena or stage puzzles me. What are the reasons for the claim? What are the social-political causes for the claim? Is it a species of educationalists' imperialism? Chamberlin accepts Cremin's latitudinarian definition of education to make his point against Weaver, but a few pages later finds that definition even too latitudinarian for his own taste, concluding that the definition is not really of education after all, but is of shaping. But what Chamberlin does not see is that, as long as education is conceived of as social process, the defining boundaries of education will be almost impossible to determine. Education, defined in social and political terms, loses its primary focus, which is, that it is first of all a knowledge enterprise, and, with the loss of that focus, almost anything and everything can be placed on the larger stage.

2. My second note is a variation on the first. In his helper/learner description, a description he bases on Scheffler's of 1960, Chamberlin tells us that a helper is necessary to differentiate between education and just any learning. He also tells us that it is the learner who determines what is learned. But nowhere in that account does he mention what for me is the definitive characteristic of a pedagogic (educating) relationship, namely, what we may call the epistemic dimension. Without a strong commitment to that dimension, one may have a medical relationship, a love relationship, a psychiatric relationship, an employee relationship, etc., but one will not have a pedagogic relationship. Without the inclusion of the epistemic dimension in his description, such absurdities as helping someone to learn that two plus two equals five are not precluded.

3. My third note raises questions about the call for clarification. This call also puzzles me, for isn't this already being done from a variety of perspectives and with various methods? The task of clarification, regardless of one's philosophic orientation, is, and has been, a primary one. But, granting that, what is the purpose of all this newly called-for clarity? Chamberlin tells us: the purpose is "to become conscious of all that is involved." Lucid awareness. But for what purpose this lucidity, this new consciousness? The purpose is to see the dangers of industrial pollution, the consequences of repression and poverty, the population explosion, concentrations of power, and absolutist claims. Clarification leads to lucidity; lucidity leads to seeing certain problems. What we now have is a clearer picture of President Chamberlin's purposes for education. I do not fault his specific purposes. I do, however, fault his method, or lack thereof, of introducing them into the paper without justification. Further, I doubt that his program of description will result in everyone seeing the same phenomena as constituting problems.

4. The fourth note is to point to an overlooked connection between theological studies and philosophy of education. An adequate knowledge, I think, of Western intellectual history, including contemporary movements such as Marxism, existentialism, and so-called scientific rationalism, requires a pretty good understanding of Judeo-Christian thought. The enrichment of one's philosophic understanding of education by way of theological studies is an "hypothesis" overlooked by Professor Chamberlin.

Counterpoint

I don't know if I'm Shana Alexander or James Kilpatrick at the moment. But I do know the point I wish to counter. Chamberlin asserts that we have a great responsibility to climb out of our own valleys. "It is in moving out of the valley that we gain fresh perspectives," he says.

Now, if his metaphor of leaving our valleys is intended to speak against rigidities, phobias, and dogmatisms, then there can be no serious quarrel. But, while those are possibilities for valley dwellers, I doubt that those are necessary consequences. Karl Popper and Albert Camus have influenced me to the point that I don't fear the valley dwellers; rather, I fear those who claim knowledge and values independent of all valleys, who, alienated from their own roots, disparage the value of roots and a sense of place for anyone.

Genuine philosophical dialogue is the passionate reasoning of those who are secure in their intellectual valleys. The insecure cannot be reasonable; those without roots have nothing firm to reason about. Huw Morgan, in *How Green Was My Valley*, a person whom President Chamberlin cites with warmth, is the very antithesis of the life of philosophic dialogue. His is a retrospective monologue. He does not reach the present until the last two pages, and he never touches the future.

And, just what is the contention of this counterpoint? Simply this: visiting other valleys is to be encouraged, of course, but the sources for philosophical dialogue come from the familiar soil and vistas of one's own valley. I think the modern history of German, French and English philosophy will support the contention. Intellectual geoethnicity is to be praised, not blamed.

PART II

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

THE DYNAMIC USE OF 'POLICY' IN EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE

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I INTRODUCTION

We have noted an increased interest in the concept of policy, and in particular the concept of an educational policy. Philosophers of education have lately taken to batting the idea around a bit, proposing and counterproposing various accounts of the concept, trying all the while to make a little clearer what it is we are talking about when we talk about educational policy. Last year's OVPES Presidential Address was concerned with that topic, and Professor Schultz attempted to give a synthesis of Kerr's, Ballinger's, and Green's accounts. Ira S. Steinberg, I took it, successfully refuted the synthesis.[1]

Thomas Green seems to think that policy involves choice among alternatives, optimality, the notion of a public, and so on;[2] James Anderson, in *Public Policy-Making,* proposes that a policy is a "purposive course of action followed by an actor in dealing with a problem or matter of concern. This concept of policy focuses attention on what is actually done as against what is proposed or intended...."[3] Kerr introduces the notions of an agent obligating itself, the notion of nesting, and so on.[4] It is not necessary to review the entire corpus of literature here: suffice it to say that there has been a great deal of discussion on the matter.[5]

My aim in this paper is modest, compared to what has been done before, and hopefully supplemental to the work of Schultz, Green, Kerr, Ballinger, et al. It will be to round off the analysis, to fill in what I take to be a lacuna in the literature: the absence of an account of what I call the dynamic use of the concept, policy. (An explanation of the phrase 'dynamic use' follows below.)

Although my main interest is this filling in of the gap, it will be shown in the concluding section of this paper that certain other points follow from the analysis, including (a) that more rigorous distinction-making is called for, and (b) the refutation of a proposed necessary condition for educational policy.

II THE DYNAMIC USE

My use of the word 'dynamic' and to some extent the analysis that follows in part III is patterned after C. L. Stevenson. As you may recall in *The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,* Stevenson makes a distinction between what he calls the descriptive use of language and the dynamic use of language.[6] In the former the purpose to which language is put to use is to record, clarify, and communicate beliefs, while in the dynamic use of language the purpose is to incite people to action and attitude, in other words, to get something done. To illustrate this distinction we may profitably turn to Stevenson's own example:

> A man says to a visiting neighbor, "I am loaded down with work." His purpose may be to let the neighbor know how life is going with him. This would *not* be a dynamic use of words. He may make the remark, however, in order to drop a hint. This would be a dynamic usage (as well as descriptive.) Again, he may make the remark to arouse the neighbor's sympathy.[7]

In other words, one may use language to inform or to do a number of other things as well. One can use language to arouse feelings in others, and it is this use that Stevenson seems to have in mind when he talks about dynamic use of ethical terms.[8]

Similarly it is not infrequent that an analysis of an ethical term will conclude with the idea that the term in question is a "mixed word," that is, the term is used to do two different things, to describe and evaluate.[9] For example the use of the word 'racist' in "Such-and-so hiring practice is racist" is such that it both describes the hiring practice (perhaps describing the hiring practice as being one which precludes Blacks or some other racial group from certain jobs) and evaluates the practice, in this case negatively (to say the practice is racist is to say that it is disapproved of, is evil, wrong, and so on).

The point of this is that it seems perfectly obvious that we do use language to do a number of things, and that a full analysis of a concept would include the various uses to which that concept is put. Concepts are tools, to use the popular metaphor, and sometimes we use the tool to convey information, sometimes to express an attitude, sometimes to render value judgment, sometimes to bring about action, sometimes to perform something (Austin's performatives and their near relatives, exercitives, behabitives, verdictives, and the rest).[10]

It strikes me that the analysis of 'policy' has proceeded primarily along one path, that of an analysis of the *descriptive use* of the concept, while little if anything has been done along the lines of other, non-descriptive uses, such as evaluative and other dynamic uses.[11] It is my aim to correct that, at least to a limited extent.

Before proceeding, some other methodological considerations are called for. One is that I will not be concerned with any evaluative dimensions of 'policy,' assuming that such dimensions actually exist. That is, I will not be concerned with any questions that have to do with the idea that to say that something is a policy is to say that it is good, or bad, evil or laudable, and so on. But I am interested in whether 'policy' is a mixed word: mixed *in the sense* that it may at times be used to do two different things at once, inform and some other (dynamic) use.

Thus, included within the realm of dynamic use I am including uses which may be to bring about feelings in the hearer or reader, and is thus emotivist, or uses which in another way bring about some specific results, the nature of which will be elucidated directly, and are non-emotivist. Excluded from this realm of dynamic uses are those which might be called ethical, having to do with goodness and evil and the like.

To further illustrate what I am trying to say, and to set the stage for an analysis in the dynamics of 'policy,' I will present some examples. One of the clearest has to do with the word 'principle.' If we imagine that someone is asked why they don't eat meat and they respond that "It is a matter of principle," and we direct our attention solely to the dynamic use of the word 'principle' and thereby ignore any possible descriptive use of the word in that context, we may find that the vegetarian's response "It is a matter of principle" can serve to stop further inquiry. It may be that he actually does have a principle (whatever that might mean) but the point of saying that it is a matter of principle is not necessarily to convey some information about the store and nature of the vegetarian's beliefs, although it might be. Rather the point of saying that it "is a matter of principle" is to stop the other person from discussing it further. That is to say, in some contexts the saying that something "is a matter of principle" is to redirect conversation, to stop inquiry into the person's vegetarianism, and the like. The use of 'principle' is dynamic in those contexts, and it may be dynamic in one of several ways. One way the use may be dynamic is through the emotional associations the hearer has with the word 'principle,' that is to say, the use of that word inspires people to awe or reverence or some similar emotion toward the thing so referred to. To capitalize on that emotive aspect of the word is to use the word in a dynamic way, using it to redirect the inquiry, in our example, to something other than the reasons for the person's vegetarianism.

On the other hand, the redirection brought about by the dynamic use of 'principle' may be out of a strict notion of propriety, of the sort when we say that we do or do not do something as a matter of principle then the rest of us, out of politeness, are not likely to press the matter. "I am a vegetarian out of principle." "Oh, I see. It sure is a lovely day, isn't it?" It is much like the custom of saying 'How do you do' when encountering a friend on the street. A friendly 'How do you do?' is not a genuine request for a report on his current medical or psychological status, and the proper response is, generally, "Fine! And how are you?" In a similar way custom sometimes demands that the proper response to the assertion that something is done as a matter of principle is not to pursue the issue but rather to not pursue the issue.

In either case it appears that one thing the speaker may be doing is trying to redirect discourse, even though he *may* also be trying to do other things, such as provide information about the reasons for his vegetarianism. This is not necessarily always the case, nor is it always easy to tell when it is the case, but nevertheless it is sometimes the case. It is a phenomenon of our language that we sometimes call something "a matter of principle" in order to get the other person to not discuss something for which we have no reasons or are sensitive about, etc.

Another example is to say of something, that "It is decreed by God." Sometimes, of course, such an expression is used to convey information about beliefs, and it may be used to reflect the speaker's belief that something really is decreed by God, and not at all to stop discussion of the matter. On the other hand, sometimes it is used to stop discussion of the matter, and thus it is used in a dynamic way.

One further comment is called for here, and that is that I am not interested in discussing borderline cases of dynamic use that are based on idiosyncracies of the people involved. What I have in mind here is that situation where, for example, someone happens to have a habit of responding to assertions about matters of principle and decrees of God by arguing vehemently about those alleged things. I am not even interested in those people who do it as a matter of principle. Instead, what I am interested in is those broad socio-linguistic patterns that involve 'language communities,' but how many people it takes to make up a language community shall be left up to others to decide.

III POLICY/EDUCATIONAL POLICY

Let us begin by looking at some cases of the use of 'policy,' all placed in an educational setting. A college student receives a letter from the dean informing him that "...because of a new policy, you will no longer receive financial aid at this institution due to your low grade point average." The student, typically, will either try to raise the grade point average, try to get other aid, or drop out.

As another example, consider this case: A male high school student who happens to have very long hair and who also, because of some courses that he is enrolled in, is exposed to dangerous machinery which might snag his hair and cause injury, is called before the principal, who is, of course, a very busy man (and who, by the way, doesn't like long hair on males) and really doesn't have the time to explain to the student that his hair is subjecting him to danger, instead tells him that "there is a policy in this school system that limits hair length to such and so." The student, upon hearing this, goes out and gets a haircut (mirabile dictu!).

There are several points to be made regarding these two examples. One is that by using the word 'policy' it serves to "turneth aside wrath." The students in both cases did not pursue the issue further because, I submit, calling something a "policy" elevates it to a certain status such that the person treats the thing called a policy with a certain respect or awe. It redirects behavior. The students see the rule as being something that is to be treated in a certain way, that is not easily challenged, that must be adhered to, which is, of course, what the users of the word want. They wished it to be taken in a dynamic way, as opposed to, in the cases I am dealing with, a descriptive or informative way.

I will grant, of course, that perhaps the students in these examples are being a little 'soft,' that what they should do and certainly could do is challenge the policy in appropriate ways in an effort to remove themselves from the domain of the policy, or challenge the policy itself by showing it to be unreasonable, not made by the proper person, improperly applied, and so on, in an effort to rewrite the policy so that it no longer adversely affects them. The point is, though, that they do not do so, and that the reason that they do not is because they are following certain conventions to the effect that one does not challenge the thing called a policy either because it is simply improper to do so, or because it inspires awe, both of which are dynamic uses of the concept. It is, I think, unfortunate that such browbeating exists and I will return to the matter of the effects of policy labeling on discourse shortly. Before I do so, I would want to pursue the analysis of 'policy' in terms of descriptive and dynamic uses a little more.

Going back to the two examples above, let us suppose that, as a matter of fact, there is something that we could ordinarily call a policy, that is, there might be a document which lists all the policies that each respective school is to follow and this document includes something that can reasonably be called a policy and does in fact regulate financial aid or hair length. That is to say, there is in addition to a dynamic use of 'policy' in the examples, a descriptive or informative use as well. Calling it a policy serves to inform the student that it is (perhaps) a rule of action created by certain authorized individuals--i.e., it is not mere whimsy on the part of the dean and the principal. Now whatever the conditions for the descriptive use of 'policy' are, we can fruitfully inquire as to whether the uses of the concept are limited to mixed uses, or if they can be purely descriptive uses, or purely dynamic uses. We may wonder, for example, is it legitimate to use 'policy' only as a dynamic word, or must there by at least some descriptive elements present as well?

If we consider the word 'good' we can see that it is sometimes used simply to describe something, as in saying of a wine that meets certain conditions of clarity, bouquet, viscosity, and so on, that it is a good wine, and there is no dimension of either expressing the speaker's taste about that wine, nor is it said to be good so that the person will drink it, etc., i.e., in this case to say that the wine is good is simply to say that it meets certain criteria, and that is all. Sometimes, on the other hand, we use the word 'good' to get someone to do something, such as a parent saying to the child that "The mashed spinach is good!" so that the child will at least taste the spinach. The purpose here is to get the child to do something, and not to describe anything at all, and this is also a perfectly legitimate use of the word. And sometimes we do both with the word 'good,' inform as well as bring about action, as in the case of a wine salesperson saying that the "wine is a good wine," where he is both informing the customer that it meets those criteria and trying to get him to buy it. (It goes without saying that the wine just might taste awful.)

Can the same sorts of things be said about the use of the word 'policy'? I am not sure of the answer, but an examination of some cases will be, hopefully, enlightening.

Suppose that we have a case where someone refers to the law of gravity as a policy, as in a case where someone explains his falling to earth after jumping from the third story window as "it is the policy of the earth to attract bodies to its surface." Somehow calling that a policy seems illegitimate, perhaps because we think that the earth is not the sort of thing that has a policy of any sort. Thus if the person was trying to use 'policy' in a dynamic way his use would have failed because a descriptive condition fails to obtain, viz., that only certain sorts of things have policies.

Suppose that we change the situation a little bit. Suppose that the person says that it is *his* policy to fall to earth whenever he jumps from a third story windown. Again, we are uneasy with this use of the word 'policy' because it seems as though it can be used (descriptively) only for patterns of behavior in which there is a choice in the matter, that is, where it is possible for something else to be the policy, and we don't think that we have a choice in the matter of falling to earth. It is silly to say that I have a policy of *not* falling to earth when I jump from the third story window, and it is just as silly to say that I have a policy of falling to earth. Falling to earth does not admit of policy. Thus, even though a person may attempt to use 'policy' in a dynamic way, say, in order to change the topic from gravity to something else, he says that it is a policy, it will not come off because there is a linguistic rule that has to do with the descriptive element of the concept, namely, that it applies only where there is an implicit choice in the matter, which is to say that calling something a policy, regardless of any dynamic use of the word in that instance, serves to tell us something about that which is said to be a policy, viz., that it has something to do with choice--it describes the rule as being not fixed by the nature of the universe but rather a matter of human custom. Whatever else we may try to do with the word 'policy,' we at least must be describing or informing of some rudimentary characteristics.

In spite of the foregoing argument I am not entirely convinced that the conclusion is wholly correct. Along that line I would like to consider two other cases, both of which suggest that the concept 'policy' can be used in purely dynamic ways.

The first example is the one Steinberg used in response to Schultz. It went as follows:

> Dean: The grading policy of this institution is simple--all grades are to be assigned by lot.
> Student: But this is irrational.
> Dean: True, but then this *is* our policy.
> Student: But it does not respect persons as persons at least in rewarding personal effort and ability.
> Dean: Granted, but it *is* our policy.
> Student: Transcripts constructed from such grades would be unintelligible.
> Dean: Granted, but it *is* our policy.[12]

This example can be construed as a case where just about every descriptive component of the concept is removed, and yet the person keeps on saying that it *is* our policy, so that one begins to wonder whether the dean construes the thing that he is calling a policy as being described at all by that word, what we ordinarily take to be said in calling something a policy. Furthermore, one suspects that no matter what the student says about the alleged policy the dean will respond in the same way. It is as though they were not even talking the same language, or about the same thing at all, and that there is not really a discussion here. That is to say, the Dean's use of the word is such that he doesn't intend to discuss, in any descriptive sense, the policy; rather, he will just keep saying that it is our policy in order to avoid responding to the student in any meaningful way. And this seems to be a purely dynamic use of the word.

Another example can be considered.[13] We have a person, say an admissions counselor at some college or other, and this person has vested in him the power to make policy. That is, by his saying that such and so is the policy it thereby becomes (official) policy. He says that such and so "is our policy" and by uttering those words he creates policy. He is using language in a dynamic way, in a way that Austin would call an "exercitive,"[14] and he brings into being policy by saying certain things. And this seems to be clearly a dynamic use of 'policy,' a use which does not obviously include a descriptive element.

Finally, as for the possibility of a purely descriptive use of 'policy' I think the answer is straightforward and unproblematical. There appears to be no difficulty with using 'policy' to simply describe, without any dynamic use attempted or taken. For example, take the case where a principal informs a parent that it is the school policy to require children to wear clothes to class, and in so doing the principal is informing the parent that there is a rule established by certain authorities, the disobedience to which may have adverse consequences (you are invited to substitute your own criteria for the descriptive use if the ones I have given seem to be unsatisfactory). In this case the parent does not, let us assume, react in any way which would indicate that he has taken the calling of the rule a policy in the dynamic sense (perhaps he challenges the applicability of the policy to this child), and we will assume that the principal has no intent to use 'policy' in a dynamic sense. With these conditions we have a purely descriptive use of 'policy.'

I would like now to return to a statement made earlier, that perhaps the students in the examples on page 25 were being a little 'soft' and that what they should do is challenge the policy in whatever ways are appropriate. It is worthwhile to distinguish two modes of discourse, what we might call the reason-giving mode and what we might call the assertive mode. In the former the discourse has to do with an honest give and take of argument, of the giving and evaluating of reasons, and so on. One could, for example, discuss the merits of the policy prohibiting long hair, the benefits derived from following the policy, the reasons why the policy was adopted in the first place, and so on. The mark here is that there is an open discussion of the matter, and its direction is toward rationality.

On the other hand, in the assertive mode of discourse one simply states his opinion or feelings or whatever, and does not inquire into reasons. One may, to be sure, restate what she has said before, but restating is not the giving of reasons. The mark of this form of discourse is that it does not have to do with rationality, with the giving and evaluating and accepting of reasons.

A parallel can be made between the reason-giving and assertive modes of discourse and the descriptive and dynamic uses of 'policy.' When one is interested in the reason-giving mode of discourse about policy then one is also likely to be interested in the descriptive use of that word. That is, does it mean or imply that the thing referred to is within the realm of choice, that it involved optimizing goods and services, that it must be based on reasonableness, and so on? The discussion will have to do with determining whether the thing referred to as policy actually meets those criteria.

Likewise, when we are talking on the assertive level we are more interested in 'policy' as a dynamic word, the use of which will enable us to avoid the issues involved and to win acquiescence.

Now when we have a student who challenges the grading procedure as irrational, arbitrary, immoral, unfair, stupid, and/or harmful (Steinberg's case), then it seems that he is talking about the procedure in the reason-giving mode of discourse. The dean, who grants all that the student says and still maintains that it *is* our policy, seems to be talking in the assertive mode of discourse, trying to use 'policy' in a dynamic way as opposed to a descriptive way. They are, it would seem, talking past one another. Look at what is happening: the student challenges the procedure on various grounds while the dean simply reasserts what he said before, thereby never admitting the student's objections into consideration. The student, that is, cannot shift the mode of discourse to the reason-giving because the dean will use 'policy' only in a dynamic, and never in a descriptive, way.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

As indicated in my introductory comments, one justification for this paper is simply that of completeness. Philosophers of education have overlooked one dimension of the logical geography of 'policy,' its dynamic use, concentrating instead on policy as a descriptive word and rendering their analyses in terms of the descriptive use. But completeness, important as it may be, is really a subsidiary consideration of this paper. The following considerations are perhaps more important.

Of particular import is the fact that the dynamic use of 'policy' in educational settings may serve to stifle and discourage meaningful and open debate. The case of the high school principal mentioned above illustrates that point--instead of engaging the student in meaningful, rational discussion the principal shuts off discussion by the dynamic use of 'policy' and thereby misses an opportunity to turn an administrative encounter into an educational one, one which gives the student an opportunity to exercise judgment. If we do want free and open discussion we would be well advised to keep in mind the adverse effects of the use of the word 'policy.'

The philosophic import of the foregoing analysis is that the failure to notice the distinction between the dynamic use and the descriptive uses of 'policy' has caused some difficulties. Take, for example, once again Steinberg's case. I take it that the case was supposed to serve as a counter-example to Schultz's argument. I took it as such when I first heard it, and I thought it was an impressive one at that. But now I am not so sure, for it seems as though what purports to be a counter-example is not one because the concept 'policy' is being used in two quite different ways. The dean, it would seem, is using the word in a completely different way than the student is, and thus the case is not a counter-example at all. The student is dealing with the descriptive use of the concept, the use that implies morality, rationality, fairness and so on, while the dean isn't concerned with any of those descriptive components. In other words, we might fail to notice a distinction that we really ought to take note of.

Furthermore, it seems that even within the realm of the descriptive uses of 'policy' there are a number of different senses and we often tend to ignore that fact. Thus there is a sense of 'policy' in which we only refer to a 'public,' as with Green, and yet there is another sense where we also have private policies, like not answering the telephone when certain other people are at home. In short, 'policy' is hardly all of the same fabric.

As a final example of the adverse results attendant upon the failure to notice the descriptive-dynamic distinction I call your attention to Green's claim that policies are more tentative than laws, procedures, or moral principles, that they are understood to be temporary.[15] Green is correct, of course, for some sense of 'policy.' Sometimes when we want to make a distinction between a law and a mere temporary procedure we call it a policy. But sometimes when we want to raise the status of some mere procedure to the level of a moral principle, that is make it anything but temporary, we also call it a policy, that is, in the dynamic usage of the word.

It does not appear that the dynamic usage can be totally ignored when discussing policy.

NOTES

1. Frederick Marshall Schultz, "Structural and Normative Considerations in Educational Policy Development in the United States," pp. 2-16, and Ira S. Steinberg, "Response to Schultz on Policy Development," pp. 17-19 in *Philosophical Studies in Education: Proceedings of the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society*, ed. W. E. Brownson and J. E. Carter (Terre Haute, Indiana: Indiana State University, 1977).

2. Thomas F. Green, "What is Educational Policy" in *Educational Policy*, ed. Janice F. Weaver (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1975), pp. 1-24.

3. James E. Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975), p. 3.

4. Donna H. Kerr, *Educational Policy: Analysis, Structure, and Justification* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1975), chs. 1 and 2.

5. See also Gerald M. Reagan, "Some Notes on the Uses of Social Science Inquiry in Formulating and Evaluating Educational Policy" in *Educational Studies* 7, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), 155-168, and other authors in that issue.

6. C. L. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," first published in *Mind*, 1937, and reprinted in *20th Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition*, ed. Morris Weitz (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 236-253.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 244.

8. Of course this idea of analysis as an inquiry into the *use* of language is hardly limited to Stevenson: Hare, J. L. Austin, Wittgenstein, etc., were all practitioners of the art of ordinary language analysis.

9. For more on the notion of mixed words see John Wilson, *Language and the Pursuit of Truth* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 25 ff.

10. J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words*, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 151 ff.

11. Although Green comes close in "What is Educational Policy," pp. 5-11, where he seems to suggest that problems of policy arise only in relation to scarcity, which at least comes close to the issue I'm concerned with.

12. Steinberg, p. 17

13. My thanks to Mr. Kurt Varga who suggested this example to me.

14. Austin, pp. 151 ff.

15. Green, p. 12.

LEGITIMATION INQUIRY AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY

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> *The long run success of any totalitarian system requires a widely accepted ideology justifying the social order and a structure of social relationships which both validates this ideology* through everyday experience *and fragments the ruled into mutually indifferent or antagonistic subgroups.*
>
> from *Schooling in Capitalist America*, p. 55 (emphasis added)

Educational critics and reform-minded persons in American society have long been alluding to a correspondence between social relations in schools and social relations in economic institutions. Correspondence theory, or the correspondence principle, is elevated to a new level of sophistication by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis in *Schooling in Capitalist America*. The correspondence principle is now well-developed and convincing, but it is not a sufficient theoretical foundation for the formulation of desirable educational policies. Educational theorists concerned with making the schools serve the end of full human development rather than the needs of the economy, when those functions are found to be in contradiction, should focus their attention on the economic system as a strategic barrier to full human social development and on the largely unexamined process by which that system is legitimated.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that while Bowles and Gintis are correct in their main conclusions which follow from their analysis of the correspondence principle, they have not adequately dealt with the process by which the economic system is legitimated and have therefore prematurely rushed to judgment in their advocacy of educational alternatives.

Their analysis of the economy, the social relations of production, and the correspondence principle has led Bowles and Gintis to conclude that the social problems which recent educational reforms were designed to alleviate have their roots not in the schools themselves, but rather in the *normal functioning* of the economic system.[1] At least five ideas are bound up in this premise:

- The central problems of American society are not a direct result of shortcomings of teachers or schools.
- The schools by themselves cannot alleviate social problems.
- The schools are but one institution among many in American society, and while the relationships between the many, including the schools, is one of reciprocal influence, they are not equally influential *vis à vis* one another, i.e., the economic system occupies a position of preeminent influence.

- Many of the structural aspects of the schools can be understood in terms of the needs of the economic system and the contribution that the schools have made to that system in its various historical phases of evolution.

- The schools can be a force for greater economic equality only to the extent that they can alter those aspects of the economic system that provide the institutional basis of inequality.

In short, the economic system is the root source of economic inequality and myriad social problems which affect American schools, and the schools are in the contradictory position of serving that economic system, the major cause of the very problems the schools are expected to redress.

How do the schools *serve* the economic system? "The educational system is an integral element in the prevailing class structure of our society."[2] Bowles and Gintis *do not* claim that the schools cause this state of affairs, i.e., cause the economic system to perpetuate itself, economic inequality, and related social problems. By "integral element in the reproduction of the prevailing class structure," and the "reproduction of stability in the economic sphere," they mean that patterns of power and privilege are maintained by a *variety of mechanisms experienced in daily life* which shape people's perceptions, beliefs, and actions.[3] The school is but one of these mechanisms. Bowles and Gintis do not attempt to sort out those mechanisms as they focus on the social relations of production as the central determinant of human development in America.

A second main conclusion of *Schooling in Capitalist America* is that the failure of recent efforts at educational reform to bring about social change is attributable to the habit of educational theorists to neglect characteristics of the economy while attempting to explain school phenomena. Thus recent reforms, like earlier reforms, have not addressed the contradictory functions of schools. It has been assumed that the schools *should* serve the economic system and that there is no necessary contradiction between that function and goals for human development. In fact, problems of human development, it has been observed, are intensified when the economy is not healthy, during depressions, and in slum areas. Moreover it has been assumed that the social relations of production are a natural state of affairs, determined more by human nature, the nature of modern technology, or some other set of inevitable circumstances, than by design. It has even been assumed that the schools should play a therapeutic role in helping young people to adjust to the demands of work roles. Bowles and Gintis reject those assumptions and argue that the social relations of production are autocratic, hierarchical, and alienating due to the preferred model of organization, not only for corporations, but also for government bureaucracies, and even socialist economies.

Their third central conclusion is that schools cannot promote full human development and at the same time integrate youth into existing adult society. If the social relations of production need not be autocratic, hierarchical, and alienating--and experiences in Europe and America challenge the assumption that the nature of work cannot be radically altered without sacrificing usual levels of production--then to integrate young people into the present economic system is to integrate the majority into an unnecessary position of subordinacy to a dominant few.[4] The net result of such an arrangement is the freedom of the few to put profit objectives before human welfare objectives and to dictate what will be produced, with what resources, by how many workers, and in what interval of time. That leaves the schools as well as other agencies and institutions in a position where they cannot have much effect on social and economic inequality in society.

Up to this point Bowles and Gintis's argument is sound and well documented statistically.[5] The subsequent steps in the argument, however, are open to serious question. The correspondence principle is generally understood to mean that the schools mirror in various ways authoritarian economic institutions. But Bowles and Gintis argue that they have "shown *more* than a correspondence between the social relations of production and the social relations of education at a particular moment."[6] For Bowles and Gintis "...the economic structure is a major determinant of the educational structure." That is, since at certain moments in history changes in the economic sphere preceded changes in schooling "...there is a strong *prima facie* case" that the former causes the latter. This line of reasoning is of questionable validity and unnecessary to the central conclusions.[7] The assertion that there is a strong (although not conclusive) case for causality explains their conviction that an educational system which at present plays a central role in the reproduction of the social order can be reformed so as not to reproduce that order but challenge it. The logic is simple enough; if the economic system has a greater influence on the schools than vice versa, and as a result the schools help preserve the economic order, then we should consider proposals that hold out the possibility of negating that causal relationship. Despite the dominance of the corporate economy, educational policy can contribute to a more equal and less repressive education which, Bowles and Gintis argue, might promote revolutionary change in connection with a more encompassing movement for social change. If, however, the causal relationship *does not* exist, then the proposals outlined in the concluding chapters of *Schooling in Capitalist America* are not adequately grounded in a well-developed theory of social change. By Bowles and Gintis's own logic, there is no assurance that their proposals for school reform really go beyond those of so-called liberal professionals and enlightened school reformers who have not concerned themselves with the correspondence principle. Despite the fact that Bowles and Gintis have transcended the previously mentioned assumptions held by more traditional reformers, they have not uncovered the complete process by which the corporate economy maintains its position of dominance over other institutions. Before it can be shown what the role of the school is categorically, it must be shown how the other mechanisms of "the reproduction of stability in the economic sphere" in conjunction with the school, interact as a totality of experiences in daily life.[8] To recommend proposals for educational reform on the basis of a presumed causal relationship, rather than a mere correspondence between social relationships in economic institutions and schools, is to be incautious and inadequately informed by theoretical knowledge.

In fairness, Bowles and Gintis never lose sight of what they refer to as a larger programmatic ideal for implementing social change, and the threat of cooptation; and they are careful not to present their proposals in an unproblematic fashion. In fact, they set three objectives for each proposal:

- An egalitarian program of educational reform must make it perfectly clear that equality is not a question of subcultural values, nor is it a biological issue, i.e., educational reformers should not get bogged down in issues of pluralistic tolerance or IQ and race. The only route to a more equal society lies through political struggle (e.g., to democratize economic institutions).
- Egalitarian reforms in education must seek to destroy the myths which make inequality appear to be beneficial, just, or unavoidable.
- A program of egalitarian reforms in education must seek to unify diverse groups and combat attempts to segment workers of different social circumstance.[9]

Their proposal of open enrollment in higher education would be a manifestation of these objectives. This reform, including free tuition, no tracking, curriculum and evaluation procedures appropriate to all students, increased resources, and a critique of conservative ideologies, would, say Bowles and Gintis, serve to delegitimize educational credentials as a criterion for maintaining hierarchical social relations. Second, it would put minorities in a position to refute culturally and class-biased social science research, since they would be confronted with that research in the classroom. Third, the increased numbers on campus would alter the political struggle for public resources for education. But is it not equally likely that open admissions could result in a stabilization of the corporate economy in that it might be contributive to a divisive meritocratic-performance ideology which is credible in part because we already have a significant degree of equality of access to higher education?[10] Even with open enrollment many poor persons would not, or could not, complete a higher education. Those who would endure might develop a commitment to, rather than a disposition to reject, the ideology that social rewards should be distributed on the basis of individual performance. (Recall the words of the welfare mother in Studs Terkle's *Working*, "They're printing money everyday up there in Washington; how come I don't got none?"[11] She believes she is entitled to a share in America's abundance whether or not she is able to earn it--an egalitarian ideological outlook that seems absurd to educated people who come to see a meritocratic opportunity structure as offering personal salvation from deprivation.)

Bowles and Gintis also advocate "free schools," a proposal which is also necessarily ambiguous since "...the free school movement contains elements thoroughly consistent with the modern corporate capitalist imperative for 'soft' socialization of at least a substantial minority of workers: whence the strange coalition of corporate and political leaders with the free school 'radicals.'"[12] Still, Bowles and Gintis argue, free schools can provide cooperative, democratic, and participatory experiences which may later contribute to personal discontent and job blues--but, more importantly, if the movement developed political understanding, free school experiences could contribute to an awareness of how personal troubles have political dimensions, and to a knowledge of the tools of liberation. Is it not just as likely, though, given the cultural impediments to the development of critical consciousness and the perennial problems of putting theory into practice in the classroom, that the free school movement--even if it should develop political self-understanding--

might not bring about the intended results? (Does it follow that young people emerging from free schools which produce nothing concrete, will assume that industry can be operated in a similar fashion?) Is it not just as plausible that free schools ought not to be given priority by reformers because breaking the rules in traditional schools prepares one for the struggle later to alter the social relations of production?

Bowles and Gintis are fettered in their effort to propose sound educational policies, not because their set of objectives is ill-conceived, but because they have not gone far enough in their efforts to understand the process of legitimation. They define legitimation as "the fostering of a generalized consciousness among individuals which prevents the formation of the social bonds and critical understanding whereby existing social conditions might be transformed."[13] Despite the ideological orientation this is not an unusual definition. Consider that of Kenneth Boulding in an entirely different ideological frame of mind: "Legitimacy may be defined as a general acceptance by all those concerned in a certain institution, role, or pattern of behavior that it constitutes part of the regular moral or social order within which they live."[14] In both definitions the concept of legitimacy involves a rationale for the acceptance of a state of affairs. Since the concern here is with economic institutions, the rationale makes acceptable the prevailing distribution of rewards and power and the social relations of production. Of course the rationale need not be logical or even consciously understood.

In the final chapter Bowles and Gintis call for a distinctly American variation of socialism, one rooted in our history, culture, and a common struggle for a better life. Then, having posed the question whether such a system is feasible, they answer that conventional social science supports a negative reply. But in contrast to such cynicism, they remain optimistic for the elementary reason that advanced capitalist society cannot solve the problems it creates, and therefore the possibility of its replacement is real. In other words, they claim to have an insight into the problems of the system which are not apparent to everyone. Moreover, they claim that the following problems tax the existing sources of legitimation and increase the likelihood of spreading critical consciousness.

- An ever widening gulf between human wants--what people need--and the imperatives of expansion and production.
- The proletarianization of the white-collar workforce and the displacement of the independent professional, farmer, artisan and entrepreneur, shrinks the number of the system's defenders.
- Developments in technology and experiments in new forms of work organization challenge old assumptions about the most efficient means of production.
- International expansion precipitates problems between capitalist nations and also with the developing nations.
- Radical movements among a variety of disaffected groups.
- Inflation, shortages, unemployment and unmet social needs--an increasing inability to deliver the goods.

- Increasing governmental responsibility brings with it increasing legitimation problems intensified by the politicization of social problems.[15]

Bowles and Gintis's treatment of the legitimation problems of late capitalism bears some affinity to that of Jurgen Habermas, but Habermas distinguishes between legitimation difficulties and a legitimation crisis.[16] *Crisis*, he says, suggests the notion of an objective power depriving a subject of its normal sovereignty, as, for example, that phase of an illness in which it is determined whether the self-healing powers of an organism are sufficient for recovery. For Habermas, a crisis of legitimation arises when demands outstrip rewards or when expectations come about that the rewards do not satisfy. He thinks that legitimation *difficulties* are more likely to escalate to a legitimation crisis in a rigid state-capitalist system than in a system with a sufficient amount of civil privatism, political democracy, and a widespread meritocratic-technocratic consciousness. Presumably a legitimation crisis is more likely in the USSR or Spain than in the United States or West Germany, because, says Habermas, the more the state intervenes in economic planning and takes over market functions, the more it creates legitimation difficulties for itself. In a rigid state-capitalist system increased demands and expectations result in increased efforts by the state to program culture in such a way as to solve legitimacy problems. In the United States, we can infer from his argument, demands don't exceed rewards regardless of disappointments, unemployment, and shortages, because we see ourselves as a free people whose culture is not programmed by the government. We tend to blame our collective economic problems on uninfluenceable systems restraints (as supply and demand, a trade off between inflation and full employment, etc.).

While Bowles and Gintis are troubled that uneven development resulting in regional difficulties and discrimination against whole groups prevents the realization of genuine meritocratic order--and while they tend to see the promise of meritocracy as a palliative for the masses--Habermas is of the opinion that the expansion of the administrative system makes a meritocratic - equal opportunity system inevitable. Habermas argues that since the meritocratic - performance ideology of the liberal era is undermined in an increasingly bureaucratic society--since we believe that educational credentials rather than individual initiative is now a significant determinant of one's chances for success--legitimation can only be maintained if the following conditions are met:

- Equal opportunity of access to higher education (read open admissions and financial aid).

- Nondiscriminatory evaluation standards for school performance (read culture-free standardized tests and remedial classes).

- Synchronic developments of the educational system and the occupational system (read the vocationalization of education, career education, and computerized counseling).

- Work processes whose objective structures permit evaluation according to performances that can be ascribed to individuals (read, for education, accountability, performance-based this and that, and behavioral objectives).

Are these the sort of reforms that stabilize the system, or do they push its systemic limits to satisfy expectations and contribute to what Daniel Bell calls "a revolution of rising entitlements"?[17] How are we to know? It might be observed that some of these reforms are already under attack from both the left and the right. Habermas accounts for this with an explanation that a countertrend to educational reform can coincide with the extension of meritocratic-technocratic reforms. He seems to be saying that as more education becomes available to the masses, we can expect that the relationship between years of schooling and success will loosen, and that as industry becomes more capital intensive it becomes increasingly unimportant or difficult to measure individual performance anyway, and thus it is likely that self-presentation and appearance will come to outweigh trivialized educational credentials (which is to say, ability, a conformist set of values--the right appearance and demeanor will open doors, but underclass persons lacking these traits will have made little economic progress).

Another view of the legitimation problems of late capitalism involves the idea that the primary aim of agencies of legitimation is to obscure the need to transcend capitalism. In this view, new strains on the system and the inability to solve these strains increase the threat of evolution towards more or less pronounced forms of conservative authoritarianism. But since late-capitalist rule has remained compatible with a wide range of civil and political liberties, and since schools and other agencies have been so effective in transmitting a fundamental set of values, including Lockian liberal values from which we derive our concept of freedom, and since the mass media have been so effective in confirming and reinforcing existing opinions, the specter of old-style fascism is to be avoided at all cost. Thus the agencies of legitimation are apt to celebrate that which obscures the likelihood of authoritarian solutions to new problems (e.g., all the flap about the free world, the welfare state, the affluent society, the end of ideology, and pluralistic equilibrium). If the agencies of legitimation are successful in their efforts to obscure the need to transcend capitalism, then consciousness of new problems and new needs does not by any means lead to a rejection of the social order that produces them, and authoritarian solutions remain unnecessary.[18]

Despite the somewhat divergent views on exactly what the legitimation process is and how it works, there is widespread agreement that it is effective. Americans remain tied to their ideological commitments no matter how remote they are from social and economic reality. Why? Why for example the taboo on socialism, but an acceptance that there is an inevitable conflict between reducing inflation and unemployment?[19] Why are left ideas perceived as wild foreign misconceptions of reality; and why, for that matter, do leftists encourage such thinking with imported slogans? Why has the left failed to link its aims with a genuinely American pattern of values and attitudes? To what extent is the left itself influenced by the powers of legitimation? Bowles and Gintis dissociate themselves from the liberal center of the spectrum of American politics and call for a uniquely American model of socialism, but they have not plumbed the depths of the problem of developing critical consciousness.

Clarence Karier states in his review of *Schooling in Capitalist America* that "In many ways this work reads as if it were written in a pre-Fascist era. One gets neither the benefit of Antonio Gramsci's insights into the subtle, but complicated ways the system works, nor does one sense the depth of the psychoanalytic boundaries of reason and technology with which the Frankfurt school was engaged. In short, this work is truly an enlightenment work and Bowles and Gintis are sons of the enlightenment."[20] Elsewhere, historian Russell Jacoby has explained that the group of intellectuals referred to as the Frankfurt school were drawn together by the need to explain why an earlier phase of capitalism survived the revolutionary crisis of 1914-1919 in Europe, in spite of the fact that the objective conditions for collapse of the system had been present for decades. What objective Marxists had overlooked, they concluded, were the subjective conditions of social revolution.[21] They therefore turned to analysis of culture, ideology, the early Marx, and dialectical (as opposed to positivist) Marxism. Karier's cryptic remark about an enlightenment work should be understood in the sense that Bowles and Gintis have attempted to find causal laws to explain the correspondence theory and the contradictions of late capitalism. That is, they have tried to explain this relationship without adequately conceptualizing the lived-subjective dimension of the problem.

The lived-subjective perception of daily life experiences is not exposed to critical reflection by facile subjective awareness. The legitimation powers of late capitalism go on, so to speak, behind our backs. Intelligence does not insure immunity from those powers. One is tempted to say the opposite is true. No doubt consumerism, as a lived-everyday experience with complicated psychosexual dimensions, is interpenetrated with ideas of progress, freedom, and the legitimation of economic relationships (and those of high intelligence tend also to have high purchasing power).[22] Educational theorists concerned with fostering critical consciousness for the purpose of making full human social development a greater possibility for more people will recognize the contribution that Bowles and Gintis have made to that end (of particular value are the objectives they have set for educational policies). But the need remains for theoretical research into the lived-subjective experience of the modern world and the effects of such experience as impediments to the development of critical consciousness.

The educational theorist intending to nurture critical consciousness in the classroom should reflect on the suggestion that the powers of legitimation are democratically directed to the left and the right. Of interest in this regard, and also as a further explanation of Karier's remarks, is Russell Jacoby's concept of social amnesia. For Jacoby, "our present enlightenment is really a form of...social amnesia, a willful repression of things we already knew."[23] That is, we collectively suffer from a "...general loss of memory...not to be explained solely psychologically; it is not simply childhood amnesia. Rather it is a *social* amnesia--memory driven out of mind by the social and economic dynamic of this society."[24]

Jacoby despairs over the end of critical thinking in modern society, forgetfulness driven by an unshakable belief in progress. Social amnesia is, then, a form of reification rooted in the needs of the economic system. Faith in progress is faith in the economic system. Faith in progress is also faith that the present is better than the past. Jacoby would caution critical thinkers like Bowles and Gintis not to rely solely on economic analysis and causal explanations in an attempt to further the frontiers of critical consciousness: "The point is...rather...to excavate the critical and historical concepts that have fallen prey to the dynamic of a society that strips them both of their historical and critical context."[25]

NOTES

1. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 245. By normal functioning of the capitalist system they mean that the quest for profits necessitates the subordination of social welfare goals to goals of efficiency and stability, the accumulation of capital and the requisites of a hierarchical division of labor.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 126.

3. The word "mechanisms" is theirs and is probably an unfortunate choice since it connotes some sort of system, understandable in terms of regular patterns of cause and effect.

4. See David Jenkins, *Joe Power: Blue and White Collar Democracy* (New York: Penguin Books, 1973).

5. See Bowles and Gintis, chapters 3 and 4.

6. Bowles and Gintis, p. 224. See also pp. 248 and 253. Their argument is that every major transformation of the school system and ideology has been precipitated by a shift in the structure of production, in the class composition of the work force, and the identity of oppressed groups. The structure of school has changed over time to accommodate the shifting associated with the capitalist relations of production.

7. For a critique of their work as historians, see Clarence Karier, "The Odd Couple: Radical Economics and Liberal History," in *Educational Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer, 1976).

8. For clarification of the concept of totality see Karel Kosik, "The Concrete Totality," *Telos*, No. 4 (Fall 1969), pp. 35-54.

9. Bowles and Gintis, p. 249.

10. By "significant degree" I mean enough to create the illusion in certain geographic areas that minorities have a chance to get a college education.

11. Studs Terkle, *Working* (New York: Avon Books, 1972).

12. Bowles and Gintis, p. 254.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

14. Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Impact of the Draft on the Legitimacy of the National State," in Deutsch and Howard, *Where It's At: Radical Perspectives in Sociology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). If there is a significant difference, there is so to the extent that Boulding is describing a state of affairs while Bowles and Gintis have in mind an interest group with a stake in maintaining a state of affairs. Boulding's article is of an ideological nature also and it is an excellent example of Gramsci's pronouncement that intellectuals can be experts in legitimation.

15. Bowles and Gintis, pp. 277-281.

16. Jurgen Habermas, "What Does Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism," *Social Research*, Vol. 40 (Winter, 1973).

17. Daniel Bell, *Fortune*, April, 1975.

18. Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western System of Power* (London: Quartet Books, 1969), p. 238.

19. See Robert N. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). A dialectical analysis and interpretation of cultural meaning--see especially his chapter on the taboo against socialism.

20. Karier, "The Odd Couple."

21. See Christopher Lasch's introduction to Russell Jacoby's *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

22. See William Leiss, *The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the Problem of Needs and Satisfactions* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1976).

23. Jacoby, p. 4.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 4

25. *Ibid.*, p. 5

RESPONSE TO MAKRUSKI AND SCAHILL

"POLICY ORIENTED INTELLECTUALS"
SYCOPHANTS OR REVOLUTIONARIES?;
"WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?"

Marvin J. Berlowitz
University of Cincinnati

The traditional trade union song "Which Side Are You On?" represents the rich heritage of proletarian culture growing from the bloody class struggles central to U.S. history. The Marxist maxim, "All history is the history of class struggle," is a central theme of the present response.

Marxism is the label given to that body of philosophy which interprets the world dialectically and conceives of it materially. In the *German Ideology*, Marx criticized the philosophers of the day, including the young Hegelians, for viewing the world "From Heaven to Earth" rather than vice versa.[1] In his tribute to Marx for having synthesized the materialism of Fuerbach with the dialectics of Hegel, Engels compliments Marx for his efforts to "turn Hegelian philosophy back on its feet."[2] Scahill and Makruski are among the vast body of philosophers who were never righted.

Thus their specific content is not so important as their form which, in itself, represents an emerging ideological development in the area of educational policy. In speaking of the superstructure in which my colleagues find themselves fixated, Marx observes that "The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure." He goes on to refer to "legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical" forms as "ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."[3] This dynamic process is stripped of all forms of "practice" and reduced to an illusion by means of the authors' sterile philosophical categories and the banal rigors of linguistic philosophy. Thus the seeds are sown for bastardized explanations of the reproduction and accumulation of capitalism in the wombs of sociology and history. These take the specific forms of symbolic interaction theory and more recently the notion of "cultural transmission" respectively.

In his discussion of the *Pedagogy of Oppression*, Freire not only explicates the process by which "the oppressed internalize the ideology of the oppressor" but goes on to develop a pedagogy of co-learning by which the oppressed can "demystify" themselves.[4] Makruski and Scahill only deal with the former by their references to the "oppressed" (Freire's term not theirs) being respectively "awed" by the "dynamic usage" of policy and being rendered passive by a process of "legitimation." Thus we would be unduly generous in judging my colleagues guilty of Marx's indictment, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is to change it."

One of Marx's theses on Fuerbach is at once a source of general enlightenment and a specific indictment of Scahill's and Makruski's work. The thesis is as follows: "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self changing can only be comprehended and rationally understood as revolutionary practice." Both works are certainly stripped of any semblance of "revolutionary practice."

Makruski takes 15 pages to belabor the admittedly useful distinction between the "descriptive and dynamic use of policy." His point that the omission of the "dynamic use of policy" is a severe limitation to policy studies is also well taken. His further limitation of the category of "dynamic usage" as "public" rather than capable of anthropomorphisization, as having the force of "moral principle" and even "law" and as being "assertive" to the point of excluding "further inquiry, reasoning or even clarification" substantiate his claim of having filled a "lacuna"; but leave an entire universe unfullfilled. There is no reference to power or even authority as limited as Weber's explication on the relationship between power, authority and legitimacy. If, in fact, the "dynamic usage" is "public" then it might be useful to deal with the realities of power structure research, such as the fact that the composition of the policy making body of the National Institute of Education (N.I.E.) conforms to the criteria put forth by Domhoff for membership in the "governing class."[5] If not power structure study, then one might at least expect some reference to the function of bureacracy in the "public" domain of the "dynamic usage" of policy.

While Scahill's work is characterized by the same limitations, it is distinguished by its explicit dishonesty. Recalling Marx's observation of the "spectre of Communism" "haunting Europe"[6] then the analogy might be developed that Scahill proliferates the spectre of a rising *caricature* of Marxism spawned by Marcuse, and perpetuated by Bowles and Gintis, Habermas,[7] et al. He extends the chauvinist cultural deficit theories of Basil Bernstein, Martin Deutsch...to the proletariat by his elitist rejection of their political consciousness as passive, docile and authoritarian and his imposition of a mechanistic unilateral approach to class struggle. His references to the "taboo on socialism," betray his widely shared ignorance of the history of the U.S. labor movement, history of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. (C.P.U.S.A.), and his white chauvinist exclusion of the role of the Black Liberation struggle. In his references to advanced capitalism, he objectively rejects Leninism by his omission of any reference to the special features of the epoch of imperialism including the proliferation of national liberation struggles, significance of the existence of a socialist block and rank and file motion in labor. He also mounts the bandwagon of avant-garde anti-Communism by his flippant anti-Sovietism embodied in his complicity with references to "state capitalism in the U.S.S.R." His hackneyed complicity with conceptions of the "young Marx" reveals the prevalent ignorance of the full context of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* as well as the most basic knowledge of the intellectual history of *Das Kapital*.[9] He joins the ranks of Eric Fromm...in his inferences to the "estrangement of labor" divorced from the basic Marxist premise of the "worker's labor coming to confront him." In a crowning glory, he joins Marcuse and the ranks of the New Left in accepting "cultural impediments to the development of critical consciousness" as a sufficient explanation for the reproduction and accumulation of capitalism.

The most useful function of the work of Scahill and Makruski is to take it as a point of departure for the oft neglected endeavor of investigating the roots of ideological development in the academy itself. One of the least discussed realities of even the most superficial intellectual history is the popularization of less severe critics of American society as opposed to the virtual banishment and purging of more penetrating, class-conscious scholars. Such data are hardly explained by the constructs of subjective idealism, mechanical materialism or their outgrowths of symbolic interaction theory, cultural transmission or even Scahill's "taboos on socialism" and "cultural impediments."

The latter explicitly rest on an assumption of exposure to socialist ideologies, for one can not logically be said to have rejected that to which he or she has not been exposed or permitted to study. The most recent example is the refusal by the State Department to grant visas to Soviet trade unionists invited to this country by rank and file members and executives of U.S. trade unions. Similar restrictions were imposed upon Linus Pauling as a penalty for his outspoken views on disarmament. In the field of the arts, the persecution of Paul Robeson for his speaking out on racism in the U.S. and the merits of Soviet Communism is legendary.

Such developments are far better explained by Marx's observation that "The class which has the material means of production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production."[10] Thus "cultural norms" are determined by the dominant class in power rather than by any "consensus" of the emerging revolutionary class. Education power structure studies by Counts, Nearing, Ridgeway, and even Gross, Kerr, and Ziegler substantiate the political control over education by the forces of capitalist oligarchy.[11] Studies of the dissemination of scholarly work by Reynolds and Willhelm provide similar data.[12] The study of the intellectual history of Afro-Americans reveals that the Hampton-Tuskegee tradition of Booker T. Washington was promulgated in contrast with the exile of W.E.B. Du Bois.[13] The Tri-Lateral Commission[14] promotes the illusory construct of Euro-Communism[15] as "acceptable" over Marxism-Leninism. McCarthyism serves to maintain the hegemony of Comminger, Moynihan...over Aptheker in the field of history and the economics of Samuelson, Friedman. ..over Perlo.

Similarly, the lack of prominence of power structure research has its explanation, at least in part, in the repression of Mills by the withdrawal of his Guggenheim Fellowship as his penalty for the publication of the classic *Power Elite* and the severe repression of Paul Nyden here at our host University of Pittsburgh. Summer issues of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* carried news of a wave of academic repression reminiscent of McCarthyism. Certainly the realities of the reward system of reappointment, promotion and tenure cannot be subordinated to vagueries of "cultural impediments."

The Tri-Lateral Commission observes that "The advanced industrial countries have spawned a stratum of value oriented intellectuals who devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions...who pose a threat as serious as that of fascist movements and communist parties." The Commission juxtaposes this indictment with their approval of the "contrasting behavior of increasing numbers of technocratic and policy oriented intellectuals."[16]

Certainly the banalities of linguistic philosophy, symbolic interaction theory and cultural transmission would place our colleagues safely within the range of the latter preferred category. The real challenge of "revolutionary practice" would be for members of this august body to join me in making some organizational commitment to take up the challenge of academic repression put forth by the sectors of finance capital represented by the Tri-Lateral Commission.

NOTES

1. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1947).

2. John Lewis, *The Life and Teachings of Karl Marx* (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 72.

3. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 20-21.

4. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971).

5. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 33-38.

6. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), p. 8.

7. See Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). Marcuse's book is one of the pillars of sand upon which the New Left ideology is built; Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973); see my essay review of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), entitled "The New Left Comes of Age in Education," in *Urban Education,* 12, No. 1 (April, 1977), 103-108.

8. Basil Bernstein, "Language and Social Class," *British Journal of Psychology,* 11 (Sept. 1960), 271-276; Martin Deutsch, "The Disadvantaged Child and the Learning Process," in Harry Passow, ed., *Education in Depressed Areas* (New York: Teachers College Columbia, 1963), pp. 163-181.

9. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* (New York: International Publishers, 1964); Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: International Publishers, 1967) (3 volumes unabridged).

10. Marx, *The German Ideology,* p. 39.

11. The exclusion of the working class from educational policy making has been documented throughout the century; see George S. Counts, *The Social Composition of Boards of Education: A Study in the Social Control of Public Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); Scott Nearing, "Who's Who on Our Boards of Education?" *School & Society,* 5, No. 108, (January 27, 1917), 89-90; Neal Gross, *Who Runs Our Schools?* (New York: Wiley, 1958); and Harmon Ziegler et al., *Governing American Schools* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974).

12. See essays such as Irving Louis Horowitz, "Sociology for Sale," pp. 179-187; Dusky Lee Smith, "The Sunshine Boys; Toward a Sociology of Happiness," pp. 371-388; and Diane Crane, "The Gatekeepers of Science; Some Factors Affecting the Selection of Articles for Scientific Journals," pp. 406-422, all in Larry T. Reynolds, and Janice M. Reynolds, *The Sociology of Sociology* (New York: David McKay, 1970). See also Sidney Willhelm, "Elites, Scholars & Sociologists," *Catalyst,* Summer, 1966, pp. 1-11.

13. W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Education of Black People* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). Although this is a handy compilation of his writings on educational policy, Du Bois's writing was far too prolific to be chronicled here.

14. Michel Crozier, et al. *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975). The book is one of many reports to the Tri-Lateral Commission which is composed of representatives from the highest sectors of finance capital in the U.S., Europe and Japan.

15. Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party U.S.A., provides an excellent summary of the contradictions of Euro-Communism in "Mandate for Struggle; The 1976 Elections" (New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1977).

16. Crozier, p. 6

RESPONSE TO SCAHILL AND MAKRUSKI
A DYADIC AND DYNAMIC DILEMMA

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I

I have been asked to offer a brief response to two papers which have only one thing in common. They both have the term "policy" in their respective titles. Beyond that point, there is *no* similarity in theme or content. I, therefore, must respond to them separately. We do, indeed, in this instance, have before us an interesting example of the multiple uses to which the concept "policy" may be addressed.

Mr. John Scahill takes a critical view of *Schooling in Capitalist America,* by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, and then proceeds to point out alternative ways of looking at the "Sum total reciprocal relations" existing among educational institutions, on the one hand, and political and economic institutions, on the other hand. Mr. Edward Makruski takes a very different view in his paper; he notes C. L. Stevenson's distinction between "descriptive" and "dynamic" uses of terms in human discourse. He uses, among other examples, as his vehicle for doing this, Ira Steinberg's response to my Presidential address before this Society in 1976. I have some specific points to emphasize in regard to Mr. Makruski's very helpful paper. I will, among other things, note what Stevenson has to say about differences in belief and differences in attitude as well as a reference to Stevenson's concerns regarding problems involved in attempts to be descriptively accurate in using concepts in language in meta-ethical debate. I will further conclude that "the Dean" in Professor Steinberg's example *was* using policy "dynamically" as both a defense mechanism *and* a weapon, whereas my paper was, *and remains,* an unrefuted effort at clearly descriptive clarification of specific and necessary dimensions of any *rational-descriptive "policy" decision* or *choices.* I shall respond to Mr. Scahill first and then to Mr. Makruski.

II

John Scahill's paper, "Legitimation Inquiry and Educational Policy," takes a macro-ideological approach to the critique of "legitimation inquiry" which might seek to justify "correspondence theories" regarding social relationships in schools and social relationships in other institutions, especially in work roles. He uses as the vehicle for this critical inquiry into various approaches to "legitimation theory" a critical review of *Schooling in Capitalist America.* He challenges the adequacy of Bowles and Gintis's position by asserting that greater economic equality cannot be obtained in the present late industrial period in the United States if schools only concentrate on preparing students for work in society as it is. Mr. Scahill's paper represents an effort to assert that even more fundamental ideological moves are called for to meet the present educational and economic situation in the United States than those recommended by Bowles and Gintis.

To the present reader of Scahill's paper, his remarks seem to recommend forms of revisionist critical analysis into ways to legitimate and actualize basic structural change in the United States. It seems that, while being sympathetic to the *general* ideological recommendations for analyzing school policies offered by Bowles and Gintis, he asserts as well the need for serious consideration of specific objections to their treatment of the relationships among schools and the dominant political-economic forces in society. Efforts of the present American economic forces in society to legitimize American social policy in the eyes of workers take the form of trying to get workers to accept present realities as inevitable. Scahill correctly cites the seven problem areas which Bowles and Gintis discuss in their critique of late capitalist society. Scahill seems to agree with them when he says, "if advanced capitalism cannot solve the problems it creates, it engenders problems of legitimacy." Scahill's recommendation for serious consideration of the works of Jurgen Habermas, Ralph Milibrand, and Russell Jacoby for alternate critiques of social structural legitimation efforts is interesting. But the present writer is not prepared to generalize either acceptance or rejection of Scahill's points on this matter. I trust critical readers of his remarks can draw their own conclusions. I will close this part of the present essay with a list of text-specific questions which I would, in all sincerity, like to see Scahill address in future publications:

1. How would Scahill respond more explicity to the assertion that schools by themselves *cannot* change a nation's economic system?

2. What further specific information on structural changes in the nature of work in late capitalist industrial societies can Scahill offer?

3. What therapeutic models of schooling does he have in view when he recommends that schools might become therapeutic instruments?

4. In what ways can Scahill clarify more specifically what he means when he asserts that a central point of his paper is that Bowles and Gintis, in the concluding chapters of *Schooling in Capitalist America*, do not assure us that their proposals transcend the traditional liberal critiques of non-marxist school reformers?

5. On another point, are "free schools" means for legitimation of capitalist ideology? In a recently produced film for use in schools of education and in-service meetings for teachers, Jonathan Kozol says that free schools represent the *capitalist* ideal of private enterprise and competition with publicly supported systems. Other comments might assert on the basis of such statements that much so-called "radical" educational reform rhetoric thinly masks ideologically arch-conservative motivations.

6. Finally, as I noted above, I found Scahill's brief discussion of the views of Jurgen Habermas, Ralph Milibrand, and Russell Jacoby's views of efforts at "legitimation" of social policy very interesting. However, three final questions press upon me as I study Scahill's remarks. They are:

    a. How does Scahill more specifically perceive the "legitimation" process to have worked in the United States? I think I know the answer, but he might consider writing further on this topic.

    b. What specific forms would be taken by a genuinely American pattern of values and attitudes which the American left might formulate? and,

c. Might the alleged shortcomings of Bowles and Gintis in comprehensive social ideological insight into the question of "legitimation" processes for rationalization of present social policy in the United States be related to the real social ideological constraint matrix within which American social critics must operate?

III

I will now respond to Mr. Edward D. Makruski's paper, "The Dynamic Use of 'Policy' in Educational Discourse." To do this, I must, in spite of spatial limitations, quote the first paragraph of Mr. Makruski's paper, for it demands specific reference from my point of view.

> We have noted an increased interest in the concept of policy, and in particular the concept of an educational policy. Philosophers of education have lately taken to batting the idea around a bit, proposing and counterproposing various accounts of the concept, trying all the while to make a little clearer at what [sic] it is we are talking about when we talk about educational policy. Last year's OVPES Presidential Address was concerned with that topic, and Professor Schultz attempted to give a synthesis of Kerr's, Ballinger's, and Green's accounts. Ira S. Steinberg, I take it, successfully refuted the synthesis.[1]

Then, Mr. Makruski discusses the very important distinction made by C. L. Stevenson concerning the need to distinguish between "descriptive" uses of terms and "assertive" uses of terms in ethical discourse. A fully "descriptive" use of a concept in conceptual analysis, whether in purely epistemological or in meta-ethical debate, requires a disciplined effort at the analysis and clarification of the idea in question on the basis of reasoned arguments and justifiable ground. Stevenson used the term "assertive" to refer to the uses of terms for very different purposes having to do with other than purely rational-descriptive types of uses to which terms such as "policy" may be put. This is particularly true in ethical and meta-ethical debate. Makruski has done us all a very good service in noting the significance of Stevenson's distinction between "descriptive" and "assertive" uses of terms in ethical discourse. Makruski says, in describing Stevenson's distinction for us,

> My use of the word "dynamic" and to some extent the analysis that follows in Part III is patterned after C. L. Stevenson. As you may recall in *The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms*, Stevenson makes a distinction between what he calls the descriptive use of language and the dynamic use of language. In the former, the purpose to which language is put to use is to record, clarify, and communicate beliefs, while in the dynamic use of language the purpose is to incite people to action and attitude, in other words, to get something done.[2]

Then Makruski, following Stevenson, describes different (that is, other than descriptive) uses of words. Mr. Makruski asserts that the analysis of the concept of "policy" by philosophers of education has been basically "descriptive."[3] Now let me respond.

First, let me say that my Presidential address was more than a synthesis. I put forward a very specific thesis regarding the necessity for consideration of the *meta-ethical* dimensions of policy choices and decisions in policy debate in any *rational* efforts to adjudicate or to attempt rational achievement of the *best possible* policy choices under any given set of conditions. *No one* has yet responded to that thesis, Steinberg included!

I not only synthesized some of the ideas of others on this matter; I offered my own ideas as well. Makruski failed to note that my work went beyond synthesis. I recognize in Chapter 11 of *Social-Philosophical Foundations of Education*[4] that other than rational-descriptive factors enter into philosophical discourse in educational settings. The first pages of Chapter 11 note this problem while Part 2 of that eleventh chapter discusses, in detail, my views on the relationship of the social foundations subject to educational policy studies.

I agree with Mr. Makruski that my own analysis of the concepts of "policy" and "educational policy" and the analyses of others of these concepts have been essentially descriptive. I, however, have engaged in descriptive dimensions of analysis of "policy" with equal concern not only for the nature of policy, but also for the meta-ethical dimensions of policy debate as well. When a reader studies the uses of "policy" in the dean's responses to the student in Steinberg's reply to me,[5] the Dean is clearly being assertive and saying "but this is our Policy," however ridiculous it may be. I acknowledge this state of affairs. Again, I have made clear my understanding in Chapter 11 of *Social-Philosophical Foundations of Education* that participants in any discourse can choose *not* to be rational. Makruski well notes what I have fully taken into account in the realization that others may respond merely "assertively" or "dynamically" to us. *Yet this realization does not constitute any "refutation"* of my (or anyone else's) *descriptive* analysis of any concept. The Dean in Steinberg's case is arguing from authority and power; he further is refusing to submit his views (and "policy") to independent, objective review. To say that people may choose to commit fallacies of relevance and even to be irrational is to say nothing we do not already know. To say that X and Y are in an argument, but Y may choose to be merely assertive and to ignore relevant evidence, is *not* to *refute*, other things being equal, X's argument. That persons *may* choose to argue fallaciously only from power, or for whatever other motivations, *is* clearly to recognize that Stevenson was right in saying that concepts in ethical debates can be used "dynamically," or in a merely "assertive" mode.

The foregoing, however, brings home the point that a merely assertive response to a careful *descriptive* analysis cannot be considered a refutation of the analysis in question. Mr. Makruski recognized this point at the end of his essay, and I thank him for that. I have never denied that persons often use words such as "policy" to justify irrational or tyrannical means or ends. My Presidential address was explicit on this matter; it is precisely for this reason that I, and Ballinger before me, have recognized the basic normative dimensions to policy analysis. Since "policy" is developed to influence behavior under specified conditions in specified contexts, it is an effort to influence or control human action systematically and for particular purposes. "Policy" seen not just as an object but also as a *process* is thus an area of thought and action to which meta-ethical concerns as well as epistemological concerns must be directed. My Presidential address of last year could not have been more explicit on this matter.

I view Professor Steinberg's response as an effort to strike a constructive distinction between the descriptive linguistic clarification of the concept of policy, on the one hand, and the reality, on the other hand, that authority figures (such as Deans) in our lives have the option, at times to our sorrow, to argue only or primarily "from authority," "the status quo," or other "dynamic" points of view. In Stevenson's terms, people often differ in attitude as well as in belief. Further, we all recognize that persons may and sometimes do use terms arbitrarily and "dynamically" for purposes other than those shared by subordinates.

The Dean in Steinberg's case clearly differed in his *attitude* toward what "policy" is and in how it *ought* to be used; the Dean also differed with the student therefore in *belief* about the uses of "policy." Stevenson provided an interesting comment to this point in *Ethics and Language:*

> Disagreement in attitude, like disagreement in belief, need not be an occasion for forensic rivalry; it may be an occasion for an interchange of aims, with a reciprocal influence that both parties find to be beneficial.[6]

Stevenson here is moving into detailed discussion of differences in attitude and differences in belief as prefatory to later discussions of emotive and descriptive meaning. He says in the next paragraph:

> Let us apply the distinction to a case that will sharpen it. Suppose Mr. Nearthewind maintains that most voters favor a certain bill, and Mr. Closerstill maintains that most of them are against it. It is clear that the two men disagree, and that their disagreement concerns *attitudes*--namely, the attitudes they believe the voters to have. But are Nearthewind and Closerstill disagreeing in attitude? Clearly not. So far as their above contentions show, they are disagreeing in *belief about* attitudes, and need not be disagreeing *in* attitude at all. Disagreement in belief about attitudes is simply a special sort of disagreement in belief, differing from disagreement in belief about head colds only with regard to subject matter. It implies not an opposition of the attitudes of the speakers, but only an opposition of certain of their beliefs that refer to attitudes. Disagreement *in* attitude, however, implies an opposition of the very attitudes of the speakers. Nearthewind and Closerstill may have opposing beliefs about attitudes without having opposing attitudes, just as they may have opposing beliefs about head colds without having opposing head colds. In so far as they are seeking detached descriptions of the state of human attitudes, they are disagreeing in belief; for attitudes enter only as a topic for cognitive study.[7]

What the present writer believes has been happening in recent discussions of the concepts of "policy" as well as "educational policy" has been the sort of "interchange of aims" to which Stevenson so well referred. I am grateful to Professor Steinberg for pointing out the need for dialogue on conflicting aims in policy debate. We are engaged in descriptive and interpretive synthesis and clarification of the range of meanings involved in the uses of "policy" in discourse. There are both differences in *belief about* attitudes toward "policy" as well as opposing attitudes regarding both the nature and the uses of policy. Stevenson realized the necessity for dealing with differences of attitude and belief in ethical discourse:

> When ethical issues become controversial, they involve disagreement that is of a dual nature. There is almost inevitably disagreement in belief, which requires detailed, sensitive attention; but there is also disagreement in attitude. An analysis which seeks a full picture of ethics, in touch with practice, must be careful to recognize both factors, neither emphasizing the former to the exclusion of the latter, nor the latter to the exclusion of the former. Only by this means can it reveal the varied functions of the ethical terms, and make clear how the methods of ethics compare with those of the natural sciences. Only by this means, indeed, can it envisage its proper task; for the central problem of ethical analysis one might almost say "the" problem is one of showing in detail how beliefs and attitudes are related.[8]

Mr. Makruski's point regarding Stevenson's distinction between "dynamic"-assertive and "descriptive" uses of terms in ethical discourse is thus very appropriate. It is a productive contribution to the literature on meta-analysis of policy debate.

NOTES

1. Edward D. Makruski, "The Dynamic Use of 'Policy' in Educational Discourse," *1977 Proceedings of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society*, p. 22.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

4. Frederick Marshall Schultz, *Social-Philosophical Foundations of Education* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company, 1974).

5. Ira S. Steinberg, "Response to Schultz," *1976 Proceedings of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society* (Terre Haute, Ind.: Indiana State University, 1976), p. 17.

6. Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 4.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

THE RETURN TO "MORAL EDUCATION": SHOULD DICK AND JANE TACKLE THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE?

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Relying upon the schools to make up for their private negligence is another of those things which are as American as apple pie. For two centuries, as participants in the world's largest scale continuous reform movement, Americans have given pedagogical answers to every sort of individual and corporate crisis. Whether the need be dietary deficiency, economic mobility, or low-cost therapy, the task is assigned to the American public school, the world's most elaborate and comprehensive humanitarian agency. It was predictable, given the "revelations" of Watergate, corporate bribery and chicanery, and the dramatic increase in cruelty and violence invading even the schools themselves, that Americans would rapidly insist that their schools reassume their illegitimately forsaken responsibility for "moral education."

The question, however, is whether the schools (meaning teachers, administrators, and students) are ready for any such enterprise. They are, as usual receptive--indeed, shufflingly eager to please. But, as with any pedagogical change, except even more crucially in this case, competence is not merely a matter of technique and good will. We have just spent more than a decade watching the "new" science and math wreck upon the shoals of an instructional incompetence, made inescapable by our practical persuasion that pedagogical adequacy is exclusively a methodological problem, to be solved by issuing teachers new instructions without a concomitant change in presuppositions and concepts. Yet, if the outcome of that has been sloppiness in the "basics," now being remedied by a return to the old drill, the results of an ill-defined and inadequately grounded campaign for moral education or development can easily be far more dangerous. The responsible moral formation of human beings is not reducible to a program or a classroom technique, cheerfully (if expensively) furnished by a beneficent Edubiz or (failing that) a district committee set up to complete the task of curricular reform on six "in-service days."

Before tuning their instruments for still another bandwagon performance, those with a stake in the outcome need to consider what "moral education" really is, why it has become a problem, what it can and cannot do, what some of its peculiar dangers are, and what any significant progress in the nurturing of moral competence will really require. These necessarily limited remarks are consequently addressed not just to specialists but to conscientious teachers and administrators, puzzled members of boards of education, parents, citizens, and, yes, even students themselves.

They are not answers but an invitation to look further and deeper. They are written in advocacy of *genuine* moral education. The necessity of making that distinction, however, signals both the controversy and the dangers which mark the movement. Whether such a distinction *will* be made is part of the danger. Whether such a distinction *can* be made is part of the controversy. I also think the school does now have, and always has had, a peculiar responsibility in respect to moral education. Indeed, it is its principal and legislative purpose. The contemporary school is not "adding" anything to its already excessive burden but reassuming a responsibility of which it illegitimately divested itself.

The Nature of Genuine Moral Education

What *is* moral education? Answering that vital and difficult question requires some crucial distinctions which are not mere quibbles over words. The program labels currently in use form a baffling array: "moral education," "moral development," "affective education," "value education," "values clarification" are some of them. A thorough account of each would require an extensive analysis, but one difference among them is of the utmost importance both in theory and practice. That is the difference between those which approach the process almost exclusively *psychologically* and those which approach it *philosophically*. The *psychological* approach appears most frequently under such titles as "values clarification," "affective education," or sometimes--and ambiguously--"humanistic" education. Often based on a crudely simplified and restricted notion of what "psychology tells us," it looks at human "behavior" largely from a so-called "affective" or *emotional* perspective. The moral-educational process, on this view, comprises an attempt to help the student get "clear" about what he "really wants," on how he "really feels" about things. Students are then "guided" to "accept" their "feelings," and those of others, to establish their personal "priorities," to look at "consequences," and so on.

The approach which we can call broadly "philosophical," on the other hand, looks at the choices human beings make as problems that are to be examined in primarily rational rather than emotional terms. Furthermore, it examines these choices in genuinely *moral* terms--i.e., as questions about what we *ought* to do rather than merely what we *want* to do or are *likely* to do. Indeed, as virtually any philosopher, and most educators, since Plato would insist, *we are not dealing with "values" or "moral" education at all until we think in terms of an "ought" that applies to our choices*, whether they be questions of individual conduct or social policy. On this approach, then, moral education means helping students to understand what genuine moral problems are (as questions of principle, not merely of preference), to identify them in their own and others' experience, to analyze them competently, and to look at the unique way in which we have developed, justified, and acted on moral principles as guides to responsible human action.

It seems to me clear that the schools have, in recent times, taken the psychological approach to the virtual exclusion of the philosophical. They have done so because we have committed ourselves, with little further thought, to some crucial and inter-related assumptions at the popular and practical level. First of all, we have assumed at the popular level that how one "should" behave is merely a matter of personal opinion, differing little if at all from one's other tastes and preferences. It is assumed that one's desires and appetites are really supreme, whatever the appearances. As a consequence, so-called "ethical" considerations really comprise attempts to rationalize tendencies to behave that are just *there* and cannot really be altered. Rather than fight against them, one should accept them, "learn to live with them," for the achievement of true peace and happiness.

As a further consequence, "educators" have assumed that one doesn't help people change for the better--as an educator surely tries to do--by appealing to their "minds" or "consciences" but to their self-interest. One changes them by making the desired behavior appear *advantageous* to them rather than either good or obligatory. A curious result then follows: neither moral education nor education itself makes any sense. Having come to view students as "organisms" which "respond" rather than as "persons" who "choose" and "act," the very notion of responsible, voluntary self-development, essentially focused in terms of an improvement in the value structures through which we govern ourselves, becomes absurd. In the place of "teaching" we are left with little or nothing but a crude process of manipulation from the outside--a process of "rewarding" or "conditioning" which need not (indeed cannot) involve genuinely reflective activity on the part of the student.

If, as I think is the case, on this view any notion of responsible self-development, any notion of education at all, simply seems to have disappeared, the assumptions which have led us to such a curious position need to be questioned. If we are to have not only moral education but any education at all, their roots need to be carefully explored.

Why Has Moral Education Become a Problem?

The sources of this all-important distinction between the psychological and philosophical approaches are very deep and help to explain why there has been a continuing controversy about the axiological or value dimensions of American education and schooling. I do not mean to suggest for a moment that the school has no legitimate function in respect to the development of the student's emotional well-being, still less that there is no legitimate role for psychological analysis. Education, as a concept of ideal development, however, is in itself inescapably bound to principles and judgments of value. What goes on in an education can ultimately only be grounded in someone's judgment of what is *good* and *fitting* for the individual and society. No amount of empirical evidence or reasoning can ever leave us other than in a position of confronting that question. Furthermore, both education and schooling have customarily involved a conscious attempt to develop the student's individual conduct as well.

A number of events, perhaps beginning in the nineteenth century, conspired to call the relatively straightforward logic of the educational process into question. Only a few can be cited, and then only briefly. In part they were broad and cultural: a growing commitment to positivistic philosophy and scientific thought, often crudely defined and applied at the popular level, tended to push into the realm of the "meaningless" any "knowledge" not based on sense-data or experiemnt. In such a pseudo-scientific ethos, moral rules and principles, not proper inhabitants of the realm of "fact," had necessarily to be relegated to the limbo of attitude and private opinion. Under the onslaught of an often over-blown Darwinism, the whole notion of human freedom and voluntary action, presuppositions without which meaningful moral arguments can hardly be constructed, also became increasingly suspect. Particularly as appropriated by the nascent social and behavioral sciences, essentially deterministic doctrines, when converted to explanations of "human" action, left man with only an "outside." His behavior was, as educational psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike argued, safely and productively understood only when viewed "objectively," just as one would (necessarily, of course) view the behavior of an amoeba or a fish or one's cat. Finally, finding that cultures differed, and that the content of particular moral rules was not always and everywhere the same, the slippery conclusion was drawn that because there were many, none could be authoritative. A crude relativism thus gained virtually universal popular acceptance.

The schools, as social institutions, followed suit. Faced with a growingly plural culture, turn-of-the-century educators tried to replace it, when it couldn't be eradicated, with an equally debilitating ideological nihilism: any opinions, or none, would have to be accepted as equally valid. The new "educationists," struggling for a place in the academic sun, grabbed at the then infant social and behavioral sciences for support. A crude "scientific" method borrowed from their immature parent disciplines (and maintained with paralyzing rigor long after change and growth had marked those disciplines themselves) shaped everything--pedagogical theory, research, and educational content--in spite of repeated warnings by broader and more perceptive educational thinkers such as William James and John Dewey. Eventually joined to the movement for "social efficiency" and "human engineering" and a frequently coercive liberal mythology, this methodological dogmatism held silent sway. Freedom and democracy became little more than a provision for value skepticism. School administrators often pleaded for a hygienic neutrality in the schools, in the midst of social and moral conflict, oblivious of the moral foundations of their own agenda. Teachers worked for professional protection of their "personal" privacy, as a defense against the moral responsibilities societies have always, and necessarily, expected from teachers. The assumptions of an impoverished learning theory were facilely extended to generate the notion that it was only what teachers did, not what they were inside the classroom or out, that mattered. To achieve professional status meant becoming a learning technician not an exemplar of human virtue.

Such a brief analysis is, of course, entirely inadequate, though I think not incorrect. The point is that in this process the curriculum and the schools' regimen became essentially psychologized: "drives" replaced "reasons" and "motives" as complete explanations of why people do what they do. Environmental inevitability and physiological necessity emptied notions such as "will" and "responsibility" of any real meaning and thereby deprived education of its unique content and discourse. Heroic figures and exemplary actions--admittedly often puerile and ridiculous in some of their nineteenth century textbook manifestations--became an embarrassment. What the younger Huxley was later to call the "nothing but" school of evolutionary thought prevailed--it was fashionable to see man as "nothing but" an animal. Children were encouraged to look to their continuity with "Nature" and to "accept" their feelings and instincts, rather than see themselves and form their identity against distinctively human and social models of conduct, on the argument that the former would "liberate" them while the latter would stifle their creativity. An army of counselors was created to assuage their wounds and aid in the process of their "adjustment," an "adjustment" which assumed that "education" was effected not by the *conflict* of thought and principle but by quiet absorption into a "natural" learning "environment" and, paradoxically, a mechanistically defined social system which was itself at least in part a fiction of the liberal-progressive imagination.

Consequently, insofar as the schools have, in recent decades, dealt with "values" at all, they have tended to take refuge either in a shallow relativism or in a "social morality" essentially defined by some statistically normative acceptability. Neither, of course, has succeeded in achieving the schools' purposes. Our shallow relativism has produced neither openness nor liberality but a state of affairs crudely contradictory and chaotic. Nor is there any social consensus upon which the schools can rely. It is, in fact, precisely because people do differ in how they judge and act that a critical, rational, and ethical examination of alternatives is required. Unfortunately, however, the schools now provide little if any guidance for this task.

What School Programs Can and Cannot Do

Distressed by what they regard as our signal failure to maintain, let alone improve, the nation's moral health by what were once promising new approaches, many people clearly hope that we can again use the schools to make people good. Unfortunately--or, perhaps, fortunately--moral education programs cannot promise that. The schools cannot guarantee that anyone will *be* good as a direct and immediate consequence of teaching and learning. To revert to lessons taught at least as far back as Socrates, we must realize that while we may be able to teach those who are willing *how* to go about finding out something *about* virtue, we cannot teach anyone to *be* virtuous, particularly in the American public school. In a genuinely pluralistic society we cannot *impose* the teachings of particular moral systems. Nor, even if we could legitimately do so, would that produce moral actions on the part of those whom we had so "taught." That is true partly because people do not necessarily act on the basis of right beliefs even when they hold them. It is also true because any such imposition of behavior would in itself contradict the notion of moral growth and integrity, resting as they do on voluntary, rational conduct.

That is not to say that we can as a people recognize and apply no moral principles whatever in our common institutions, nor is it to suggest that there is nothing for the school to do in this case. There are, among others, two ways in which the school's moral task is obviously warranted and inescapable. The maintenance of a genuinely free society is itself embedded in a prior moral commitment. Such a society, in contrast to both anarchy and autocracy, requires, as Horace Mann put it nearly a century and a half ago, a "voluntary obedience" to the "laws of reason and duty." The school, as an instrumentality in the achievement of a free society, has every right to bend its efforts toward achieving that goal. No school can, however, guarantee the successful accomplishment of such an objective, because it rests upon the individual's willingness to be bound by it. Yet the school can surely require that its students confront the moral issues implicit in human choices, both individual and social, take account of the potential consequences of their individual and corporate acts, and learn how to weigh them in ethical terms.

Secondly, the educational enterprise not only includes value content but as a process rests upon ethical criteria for its very intelligibility. Truth-telling and honesty are implicit in the very notion of self-development, for example. Furthermore, education and schooling are not solitary phenomena. The school as an intrinsically social organization may adopt only prudential and bureaucratic rules for its self-ordering, but the observance of even these antiseptic conventions rests upon a moral commitment to be bound by the legitimate claims of others. Consequently, the school has a right not only to teach the positive ethical principles and rules which are the presuppositions of its very existence but to insist upon their observance by all who choose to be members. The only alternative to this is the abandonment not only of free institutions but of society and community itself.

The schools, in short, both can and should make moral choice *possible*, by providing the student with the opportunity to learn what it means to make reasoned judgments respecting moral issues, to understand at least the major moral traditions in his culture--indeed, any he chooses responsibly to examine--and to reckon with those figures whom we have legitimately regarded as images of heroic conduct. Undergoing such an educational experience will not, as I have said, produce good conduct. But genuinely moral action cannot be achieved apart from the conscious, critical development of such knowledge and skill. It is unnecessary to accept all of Kant's moral theory to agree with him that, in some sense, moral action is never merely doing *what* is right but doing what is right *because* one has learned how to grasp its rightness as a demand upon oneself.

There is a third consideration at once more technical and more controversial. I should like to outline briefly a provisional definition of what I take to be a crucial element in the school's province of responsibility for moral development. It is the systematic expansion of the person's "moral universe." My concern for this aspect of things arose directly from working with both students and teachers. I discovered that individuals tend very frequently to develop their moral rules and principles only in a highly restricted area. For example, one teacher evidenced a highly developed moral rationale in relation to his wife, but no one else counted. Such reasoning might resemble, on Kohlberg's approach, both the very low level of "interpersonal concordance" and the very highest level as well. Yet, the treatment he believed ought to be accorded his spouse was, on the one hand, not the crude prudentialism characteristic of the lower stages. On the other hand, the higher principles invoked had logical universalization but only very limited application.

Now it seems to me that one practical task for which the school is particularly fitted is, if I may put it this way, the expansion of the moral universe or field of application, not just the logical expansion of principles and rules to logically universal status. Clearly, the school has some role in respect to the content of moral rules and principles, though perhaps more as vehicle than source. The school likewise, as Kohlberg and his disciples advocate, has a role in respect to the form of reasoning, in building and applying moral rules and principles. The extension of the moral universe may--I am not sure--constitute a third sort of role not usefully subsumed, at least for pedagogical purposes, under the others.

Although it is impossible to complete it here, looking at this issue seems to me to bring together three important contributions in the literature: First, Piaget's intriguing parallel between cognitive and moral adequacy, as embodied in the notion of "decentering." For Piaget both successful cognitive and moral relations require the systematic dissolution of an egocentric universe, with the upshot that justice is the moral analogue of truth in the epistemological domain. Secondly, there is Dewey's compatible notion of education and schooling as the deliberate cognitive extension of the environment. For Dewey, in *Democracy and Education* for example, the intelligent and "educated" person has developed a sense of environment, not only physical but social, not only immediate but "historical," if you will, in which he comes to see himself as part-in-relation-to-whole. Finally, William James insists that a central element in living morally is to recognize an unlimited universe of sentient beings who, all and each, have legitimate claims upon us.

Now, if we take it as a potentially useful definition of the school's task that the student is to develop to his maximum ability his sense of "environment," of things and persons in various modes of relation, clearly empirical knowledge is required. So also is progressively more adequate conceptual development. If the school is, further, to take as its responsibility persuading the individual that he also lives in a moral environment, uniquely moral conceptualization will have to be developed, in conjunction with his more general cognitive development. However, if we are to aim at his *becoming* moral, more than just conceptualizing such a larger "world" is entailed, I should think. This is a larger world which cannot be reduced to an abstraction. To avoid that, one's moral *imagination* must also be developed, a process which cannot be reduced either exclusively to the cognitive or to the emotional but demands the integration of both. It is this all important aspect, in which one grasps an environment of persons in their singularity, who have real and not merely titular claims that the arts, and particularly literature (including drama and poetry), play an absolutely irreplaceable role. That role is to make the singular present, without reducing it to an abstraction.

Although the schools are instruments of a particular society and culture, all depends upon what sort of society and culture they serve. It was Dewey's point, of course, that the presuppositions of a free, democratic society differed essentially and not merely accidentally from those of an authoritarian society, whether autocratic or anarchic. The principle of life of a democracy, Dewey in effect argued, is actively comprehensive rather than passively intensive, looking forward and outside itself. Hence it consciously aims at the construction of an environment larger than itself, more extensive than its immediate local or national interests. If there is any sense to that, the task of schools and teachers is to see to the expansion of knowledge and conceptualizing necessary for a comprehensive environment, but also one which is paralleled by a commensurate ability to *see* that environment morally and not merely selfishly or prudentially.

Finally, given a notion shared by all three, namely that the development of all uniquely human potential is for the purpose of human action, and that action, as opposed to mere response, is always and everywhere moral, since it involves the deliberate choice of means-ends, it is in a genuine sense the moral element which unifies any curriculum. More controversially, I should also want at least to try to argue that it is for this reason that both the artistic and the social *studies* are the mutually interactive core of the school's developmental regimen, 'round which all else is instrumental. It also suggests why the school's acts and purposes cannot be psychologized without being destroyed in self-contradiction.

What Is Required for a Moral Education Program?

The implications of what we have been discussing require first of all that any adequate program of moral education pay some rigorous attention to the process of learning how to make moral judgments in itself. No one is spontaneously wise about values, though everyone may be about his inclinations--indeed, no one else can be. Moral competence is no more "caught" than the ability to do quadratic equations or play the oboe. While both musical and mathematical virtuosity may, like highly ethical *action*, rise from springs the school can seldom divine let alone bring into existence, each rests upon skills than can be taught and practiced. But it seems to me that, unless we are willing to settle for a rather narrow competence, something more than a study of the process by itself will be required. A satisfactory program of moral development will demand the restoration of a long lost ethical dimension wherever it is appropriate in the entire curriculum. Although we may use "true to life" examples in the course of attempting to develop the skills necessary for moral competence as such, it is equally important to look at the moral issues which rise in virtually every study in the student's curriculum. This will mean learning once again to look at literature and drama, for example, as more than a discussion of social and psychological dynamics, as more than the anatomy of feeling. It will involve seeing history as more than the interplay of impersonal forces and ideological patterns. It will mean seeing science not as a colorless technique but as a form of human activity which has consequences requiring ethical judgment quite as much as any other.

The achievement of such a pervasive reordering of our perspectives on the curriculum, not to mention the addition of conscious philosophical skill development, will obviously require in turn a considerably broadened competence on the part of teachers, and administrators as well. This is not just desirable. It is absolutely necessary. Here again, recent educational experience should be instructive. As I have already suggested, most analysts would agree that the important new programs in the sciences pioneered in the last ten to fifteen years have been severely hampered, and indeed have often failed abysmally in practice, because they presupposed not merely new materials but "new" teachers for their success. And these teachers were rarely forthcoming. The situation in the case of moral education programs is even more serious, because there is in most cases little or no competence at all in respect to guiding moral development, through no necessary fault of the teachers. Colleges of education have not provided even rudimentary acquaintance with this matter until very recently--and even then, only here and there. Nor will the instructions of the pedagogical merchandisers, nor casually organized "orientation programs" or "inservice" days. The only possibility of an adequate moral education rests upon rigorous study of the field itself, and rigorous *re*study of much of the teacher's area of specialization as well, in order to achieve a genuine integration of the two.

At this point the politics of education becomes a vital concern. It is unfortunate that the teachers' organizations and many state departments, together with colleges of education, are locked in a struggle over the control of teacher preparation and certification. The crux of the matter is the proposal to move teacher preparation and certification, as well as much continuing professional education, off the campus. There is something to be said for the location of an important part of the teacher's practical training at the site in which it is practiced, and little to be said on behalf of unresponsive professional colleges. It is, however, also difficult to believe that the *fundamental* kind of preparation required by responsible programs in moral education can be handled by practitioner experts, if only because there are few if any, at least at this point.

Finally any genuine program in moral education will require at least one additional element, an element all too easily overlooked and quite possibly the most difficult of all to obtain. The principal practical question is perhaps one of consensus. The moral education "movement" is already experiencing some significant opposition along with its enthusiastic acceptance. Essentially this opposition tends to take two forms: a sharply expressed concern over what specific moral *content* will be taught and a reluctance to see the school as an instrument of moral development *rather than* the family or the church. These issues are also much too large to be dealt with satisfactorily in a limited space. However, a word or two may be useful. These concerns are real and probably very difficult to dislodge, even though I do not think they are well-founded. Clearly, both family and church have legitimate reasons as well as generally accepted authority for engaging in their own programs of value-formation. But, it does not follow that this fact pre-empts the school's authority or renders its efforts nugatory. Family, church, and school do not do the same thing, nor do they do what they do for the same reasons or purposes. Some application may make this clearer. Although other bases and contexts for moral formation may be provided, as we have already noted, the community *as a whole* has reasons and obligations of its own to foster a *broadly social* moral character. An adequate morality from the community perspective is necessarily connected at least in part with some of the functions an individual customarily learns how to exercise in school. He must learn how to look, along *with* others (whose moral orientation may differ), at questions of social policy as moral and ethical issues--issues that may, but need not, arise in a personal, family, or religious context. He must learn to look at his vocational role, the institutions he must deal with and himself responsibly shape, and the other contents of the society and culture which he shares, as problems in value, not merely as matters of fact. Indeed, unless the community sees to it that these moral connections are made, the outcome may be an exclusively private and therefore, from the community's perspective, an entirely inadequate morality.

It is implicit in most if not all the responsible current approaches to moral development that a *variety* of moral exemplars, principles, and arguments must be actively examined by the student, rather than impose upon him a single, preferred moral system. It is in dealing with conflicting moral claims and considerations that the student is provided with an opportunity to *grow* in his ability to reason about moral issues. This will understandably disturb many groups and persons. But it need not, provided that the process of analysis is maintained with real rigor and openness. Furthermore, given the incredible amount of intercommunication in the world of today, it is doubtful that any significant degree of isolation from "unsatisfactory" moral concepts and claims could be achieved, even if it were desirable. Indeed, it is the fact that there are claims and counter-claims which makes developing the student's critical moral competence all the more necessary at this juncture. Finally, it is frequently suggested by the inadequately informed that there are widely disparate moral principles floating about. But, upon more adequate examination, there is probably a much greater moral consensus than division. There are, of course, certain issues, many quite serious, in which there is considerable and severe conflict, if only because of a rethinking of these issues in the light of changed situations. But at least a large proportion of the morally bizarre is little more than posturing, and its inadequacy would be easily exposed by anyone who possessed even an elementary competence at moral analysis.

There is also another kind of consensus that will have to be achieved, I believe, if really adequate programs of moral education are to be made to work. As anyone familiar with recent writing on the "movement" knows, the philosophers tend to be suspicious of "moral educators" with insufficient preparation or procedural rigor. Mutual distrust characterizes the relations of both with the psychologists, who rightly point out that even given the necessity of clearly distinguishing descriptive social and behavioral scientific approaches from genuine value concepts and issues, there are significant psychological questions involved in human moral action. Much of this distrust and confusion arises, however, from long dissociation and evasion in working with the problems of this realm of human inquiry. Much also stems from the excessive territoriality which has grown up in the American academy, a characteristic which has rendered it frequently unfit to tackle serious problems in many realms. Some constructive peace treaty, without a stifling of serious cross-disciplinary debate, will have to be voluntarily signed, or risk a destruction born of our specialisms. It is difficult to believe that the lot of either philosophers, psychologists, or educators would be advanced by such a catastrophe, let alone the public good.

I have been trying to suggest, then, that the recovery of serious and responsible "moral education," is both an intrinsically dangerous enterprise and one of supreme importance. It is perhaps potentially the most significant educational movement in our generation, not only because of its own importance but because of its potential effect upon the whole educational enterprise. Whether it will work, or turn into yet another pedagogical bandwagon, depends absolutely on our ability to recognize the true article from those which are bogus--those which will only further expand the already excessively private and psychological preoccupation of the schools, or those which will lead to the uncritical imposition of some particular form of the moral development we ostensibly seek. The avoidance of these dangers will entail not only a great deal of careful thought on the part of all involved, from teachers to parents, to students, but an enormous amount of homework. In this case, there simply are no crib-sheets and no cram courses. As the ancients knew: *corruptio optimi pessima:* The worst things we do as human beings usually stem not from the pursuit of evil as such but from a corruption of our highest goals.

RESPONSE TO JOHNSON
WHY DOES JOHNSON WAX ELOQUENTLY?

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Before examining the contents of Professor Johnson's paper it is important to note that he does tackle a significant and difficult task. He does not spend his energy on trivial matters. And despite his claim that no educational 'consumer advocate' is likely to turn up to offer intelligent guidance *before* the wave (moral education faddism) inundates the schools, he has turned "Nader-like" to offer an eloquent criticism of what he sees as either moral trivia at best or at worst, and more likely, serious minded faddism. What is this fad? Namely, the coalescing of many different forces, for quite different reasons--some for the highest of motives, others for pecuniary gain, still others for want of something to teach, and so on--to bring moral education back into the classroom again.

What is central to Johnson's position is Victor Hugo's "The power of a great idea whose time has come." But Johnson, I believe, would not be too happy with the exact rendering of this slogan; rather, he would want the slogan to catch the errors of the resurgent moral education movement and thus read: "The strength of a mediocre or pernicious idea whose time has come." Moreover, Johnson would want to remind us that what often gets overlooked in education is that although we look for the power of a great idea whose time has come we must realize the strength of a mediocre or pernicious idea whose historical moment has arrived can be just as awesome.

But perhaps this rendering of the slogan is not fair to Johnson. Perhaps it might be more on target to say that his paper does deal with the power of an idea whose time has come--the idea called "genuine" moral education. Yet, in another sense, it might be the story of an idea that ought never have arrived, namely, what he calls the psychological approach to moral education.

First, it seems rather obvious that the moral education movement is not all of one piece. There are many diverse groups, including Kohlberg; Simon and Rath's "values clarification"; Teaching Philosophy to Children, as in the work of Matthew Lipman; the religious education view; Michael Scriven's work; and of course, the position of the systemizers, namely, the works studied in ethics courses, the main event being the clash between deontologists and utilitarians. I do not wish to enter the dialogue concerning the strengths and weaknesses of these positions. But it does seem appropriate to point out that if Johnson is going to talk about a "new moral education movement" in schooling, some qualifications need to be offered. The fact is that there are wide differences among these positions and this seems not to be accounted for.

The second difficulty has to do with the assertion "...the school does now have, and always has had, a peculiar responsibility in respect to moral education. Indeed, it is its principal and legislative purpose" (p. 53). This claim raises large concerns but my objections are simple. First, no evidence or support is given for this claim, yet it is central to the purpose of the paper. We may or may not agree with the claim but it is merely asserted and not supported. Second, when we consider the claim itself we see the problem of reification; obviously, the school has no responsibility, for it is only people--teachers, counselors, administrators, etc.--who have responsibility. Finally, we see here an almost textbook case of vagueness with regard to the use of 'peculiar.' What, if anything, in this case does 'peculiar' mean? Why is the school's responsibility peculiar? What makes it so? The questions are basic and exceedingly important. It is not just that they help to clarify the claim; it is that without clarifying the claim there is no way of producing any facts--any evidence--at all regarding the validity of the claim.

Thus, the confrontation is by no means as dramatic as it might be. It is easy to see that the confrontation set up by Johnson is not so much between the "new moral education movement" and his position but rather between what he says is common to the movement, a psychological approach to morality, and his antidote, a philosophic approach to morality. Much, if not most, of Johnson's concern with moral education is devoted to supporting the view that the nature of "genuine" moral education involves a philosophic approach. He says that whatever the title of this article may suggest, his remarks are "written in advocacy of *genuine* moral education" (p. 53).

> The approach which we can call broadly "philosophical," on the other hand, looks at the choices human beings make as problems that are to be examined in primarily rational rather than emotional terms. Furthermore, it examines these choices in genuinely *moral* terms--i.e., as questions about what we *ought* to do rather than merely what we *want* to do or are *likely* to do (p. 54).

Johnson considers "genuine" moral education to be:

> ...helping students to understand what genuine moral problems are (as questions of principle, not merely of preference), to identify them in their own and others' experience, to analyze them competently, and to look at the unique way in which we have developed, justified, and acted on moral principles as guides to responsible human action (p. 54).

Given this elaborate statement of four carefully phrased and thought-out criteria, we can easily grasp the nature of Johnson's "genuine" moral education. Or can we? Let us apply the criteria to the subject of, say, the Nazi leadership prior to World War I planning the systematic annihilation of of six million European Jews, a situation which hardly seems to have the pureness of a moral undertaking suggested by Johnson. Surely the Nazis' task was that of helping students (others) understand what genuine moral problems are (as questions of principle, not merely of preference, namely, eliminating the "unfit," non-Aryan Jews from this planet); to help other Nazis identify the "Jewish problem" in their own and others' experience, namely, charging Jews with a conspiracy to bring down the German state; to analyze the problem competently as well as efficiently and comprehensively, namely, establishing concentration camps, crematoria, etc.; and to look at the unique way in which Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and its moral principles could be used as guides to responsible human action.

Perhaps another example might help. Consider a television advertising campaign whipped up to sell a new mouthwash called "Success." The ad people want to help viewers "understand" that not having a fresh, clean mouth is a genuine moral problem and not a matter of preference. They want the viewers to "identify" this problem in their own experience and in others, namely, seeing that Mister X uses "Success" regularly and his breath is always fresh and clean, whereas Mister Y doesn't use "Success" and his breath is offensive. The viewers are challenged to "analyze" the merits of clean breath, the values of being accepted and "loved" by others, of how to get ahead in the business world, etc. Finally, the viewers are to look at "Cleanliness is next to Godliness" as a moral principle and see how it acts as a guide to responsible human action.

My major point is that these criteria may be employed to apply to something we ordinarily do not regard as moral education. If this is accepted, then what are we to make of the definition? I believe that we can conclude that the definition is, at least, inadequate. Although it appears that Johnson has offered four criteria for defining "moral education," the fact is that they do not stand the test of counter-example. The proffering of a definition we are not in fact able to use in any significant way is--to put it politely--not worth the effort. Johnson has failed to offer an adequate definition, and his lack of clarity merely leads to confusion. My minor point is that we need to be leery of eloquent but vague criteria which sway us and direct our thinking. Eloquence sometimes exacts too high a price.

But, of course, it is entirely possible that I have misjudged the nature of the criteria put forth. Perhaps in all fairness we ought to see the four criteria as a programmatic definition; one whose function is to apply the familiar phrase 'moral education' in a strange way, in order to rechannel the practice associated with it.[1] In this sense, the definition functions to narrow the teacher's responsibility for moral education, hitherto thought to be the justification of wishes and desires, in such a way as to embrace the cognitive moral development of students. If this indeed is the case, then following Scheffler we should not evaluate the definition itself but the program offered. Let us turn to that task.[2]

According to Johnson, the criteria for "genuine" moral education involve "helping students to understand," "identifying," "analyzing," and "looking at the unique way in which we have developed, justified, and acted on moral principles as guides to responsible human action." In effect, he tells us that moral education should consist entirely in teaching for cognitive learning; a teacher should aim at producing "understanding," "identification," "analysis," and "being able to see."

But when we ask what constitutes 'moral education,' ordinarily we include such aspects as shaping behavior, attitudes, dispositions or propensities. That is, the phrase 'moral education' is commonly used by laypersons and academicians alike to refer to the shaping of behaviors (learning how to and to)--the molding of morality by example, reward, punishment, and the like--as well as to the shaping of belief, knowledge, and understanding. In most instances teachers try to bring about behavior in the child other than would have taken place. What is involved in such 'moral education'? Well, in part the pedagogical "moves" of directing, correcting, explaining, guiding, detecting, exhorting, punishing, praising, admonishing, and a host of deterrents. Fundamentally, the teacher is involved in "bridging" the child's short- and long-range interests. And in many cases, though not all, the bridge is psychological as well as objective and rational. (Thus, we may question Johnson's alleged dualism regarding the mutual exclusion of the psychological and philosophic approaches to moral education.)

In effect, then, we have a definition of moral education whose program consists entirely in cognitive teaching aimed at student "understanding," "identifying," "analyzing," and so on. Yet, it seems odd that this definition projects a program that omits a large category of things which most people take to be valuable. Taking a simple literal view of Johnson's position, we would ask teachers to narrow moral education to the cognitive sphere and ignore behaviors and dispositions entirely. Moreover, we would have to determine at what age children could conceivably profit from this type of moral education. I assume that in the child's early years no "genuine" moral education would be possible.

This brings us to another question regarding Johnson's programmatic definition of moral education as cognitive moral development. Considering cognitive knowledge as subject matter to be taught, we would know what to select *from*, but as far as *what* to select is concerned, we wouldn't have the foggiest notion of what specific cognitive knowledge and beliefs to select. Obviously, there is a world of difference between knowing from *which* category to select and knowing *what* to select. Analogously speaking, it is as if I were to send my son to the supermarket to select *from* vegetables and not other categories, but I do not tell him what to select. Hence, what puzzles me is what specifically is the teacher to select to teach to help students 'understand,' 'identify,' 'analyze,' and so on in teaching "genuine" moral education.[3]

Next, and this is a corollary of the last point, a difficulty with the definition has to do with the evaluation of cognitive knowledge.

Scheffler has told us that if Johnny is said to have learned *that* honesty is the best policy we may, ordinarily, interpret what is said in two ways.[4] One way is to suppose that Johnny has learned to answer the question: "What is it I should say to someone who asks, 'What is the best policy to follow where truth/falsity are involved?'" In other words, we may suppose that Johnny has learned that "Honesty is the best policy" in the purely cognitive sense of 'learned.'

We may, on the other hand, suppose that Johnny has acquired the norm or pattern of action called 'honesty' or 'truth-telling,' that he has developed the propensity or tendency to pursue the policy of honesty in his own conduct, that he has learned, in other words, to behave honestly or to be honest. This second sense refers to Johnny's having acquired the norm or pattern of action called honesty; but the first sense discussed merely takes account of the fact that Johnny has the cognitive knowledge (Johnny has learned *that*) "Honesty is the best policy" and we cannot infer from it that he has gained the behavior.

The ambiguity just noted has to do with the problem of "norm-stating" sentences, namely, those statements that lend themselves to a particular ambiguity when we use them to fill in the blank in contexts of the form "Johnny has learned that...."[5] The ambiguity between the "active" and the "non-active" sense of "Johnny has learned that...." is crucial in terms of the evaluation of moral education. In putting forth a purely cognitive view he commits the teacher of moral education to a potentially ambiguous position regarding evaluation. One group of teachers will say that they have successfully taught if the student demonstrates, in the non-active sense, that he or she has learned that and yet proceeds to act in ways incompatible with the adoption of what has been learned.[6] Another group of teachers will reject this view and argue that in the evaluation of student learning the student has not learned if he or she does not behave in accord with the norm (active sense).

Johnson recognizes this problem when he says:

> ...we may be able to teach those willing to learn *how* to go about finding out something about *virtue*, we cannot teach anyone to *be* virtuous, particularly in the American public school....Nor, even if we could legitimately do so, would that produce moral actions on the part of those whom we had so "taught." This is true partly because people do not necessarily act on the basis of right beliefs even when they hold them (p. 57).

Granting this recognition of the problem, Johnson is still on the hook. Although he allows that intellectual or cognitive apprehension of moral principles and intellectual avowal of them may go together with a rejection of such principles in conduct, what are we to say to help teachers insofar as some may describe and evaluate such a case as a failure in teaching whereas others describe and evaluate it as a failure of the student's will?[7]

Now, Johnson is correct about 'teaching' not implying 'learning,' and cognitive learning not being a sufficient condition for behavioral learning. Part, at least, of the implication of saying that moral education can be taught is that reasons can be given for certain beliefs, but that is not all. By "being moral" or "bringing about moral development" in children we are saying that moral behavior does not always, consistently, come "naturally." Johnson senses this when he claims that one is spontaneously wise about values, though everyone may be about his inclinations--indeed, no one else can be. Moral competence is no more 'caught' than the ability to do quadratic equations or play the oboe. But morality is no more different from other things taught partly because what is required, say truth-telling, sensitivity to the wants of others, etc., is that one not do what he or she is spontaneously inclined to do. That is, we teach students to act against their spontaneous inclinations, and such teacher's work is the essence of most formal education, including moral education. Teaching, be it mathematics or morality, involves guiding, explaining, showing, telling, proving, justifying, exhorting, and so on in order to get the student to appreciate something other than that he or she spontaneously enjoys or is interested in. How this "bridging" aspect of teaching is accomplished generally marks the many different schools of pedagogy and education. But most generally it is agreed that we bridge the child's interests and other's interests by making it in the child's interest to take other's interests into consideration. Hopefully, the bridge is rational, argued for, and defensible; but it is also psychological insofar as it involves praise, punishment, exhortion, admonition, kindness, and the like.

Hence, moral education in this regard is not unique from other formal education. What is different about moral education is that we simply are not interested in the child doing the right thing; we want him to do it for the right reasons. And in this regard I could not agree more with Johnson. This makes of cognitive moral education a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral action.

In summary, I believe that Johnson has given us some advice that has undeniable relevance for much of formal education. What is the province of morality in the school? Can morality conceivably be construed as a subject, consisting in a set of maxims of conduct or, since morality pertains to the whole of what transpires in school, is the very notion of specific moral educational altogether misguided?

These questions are quite hard, not only as matters of implementation, but also in theory, as I tried to show. On balance, I must view Johnson's theory with a somewhat jaundiced eye, for he has not persuaded me enough to lead me to believe that the essence of genuine moral education is what he has taken it to be. If we are to go forward, and if I am right in my analysis, we have to re-examine what Johnson has told us in the light of developing critical thought in all aspects and phases of schooling, not merely in moral education. Moral education is not a thing apart, something to be embodied in a list of criteria or maxims, something to be reckoned as simply a subject, or another activity. Rather, perhaps, it has to pervade the whole of the school experience.

NOTES

1. Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), p. 19.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

3. The analysis here follows closely the analytic "moves" of Jonas F. Soltis as he examines the question "Is education a discipline?" See Jonas F. Soltis, *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 26-32.

4. Scheffler, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 85. Scheffler describes, in more traditional terms, "...one view describes such a case as a figure in teaching whereas the other describes it as a failure in will."

INDOCTRINATION AND BELIEF

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Debate over the meaning of the concept of indoctrination has attracted renewed interest among philosophers in general and philosophers of education in particular. For more than a dozen years, discourse concerning this topic has moved our awareness to much more sophisticated levels.[1] This is not to say that our present levels of understanding are adequate. The purpose of this paper is not to recount the subtle argumentation of the past, but to take the present state of the discourse and take it a further step toward clarity and comprehension.

Discourse on the concept of indoctrination has generally been to justify content, method, or intent as the key criterion which distinguishes indoctrination as a unique activity. The literature has also revealed that none of these three positions can justifiably be maintained for very long. I. A. Snook, who has written extensively on the subject, can be seen as a transitionary figure between the predominantly ordinary language perspective of the recent debates and the more formal perspective which is offered here.

Snook in particular has done a thorough job in pointing out the problems of the method and content positions.[2] He himself took the intention position. Henry Rosemont has offered cogent criticisms of Snook's position.[3] It is from Snook's response to Rosemont that we will depart.[4] Although Snook's revised position is not entirely consistent, he does point us in the direction where attention is needed. He sees the importance of viewing the consequences of an indoctrinational activity. It is this position that will be expanded. Viewing the results of an indoctrinational activity from an epistemological perspective, one can build a clear, consistent, and reasonable theory of indoctrination, and also identify possible causes for previous confusions.

As we have noted before, Rosemont's analysis of Snook's position compelled Snook to re-think his various claims. In light of these criticisms, Snook shifts his focus from 'indoctrination' to 'indoctrinated.' He sees the futility of attending to the distinguishing features of the task, and the fruitfulness of attending to the results of a particular task. Content, method, and intention all involve aspects of what some ordinary language analysts call the task sense of the concept. Just as Snook showed the errors involved in holding the method and content positions, Rosemont showed the errors of the intention position. Thus Snook is forced to find a new alternative. He finds this alternative by looking to the consequences, or the achievement sense, of indoctrination.

It is patent that indoctrination involves, in some manner, the development of beliefs. This singular fact, although much discussed, is also the source of much confusion. Snook claims that the concept of indoctrination is clearly pejorative. He claims that "this derives from the fact that we value rationality and condemn irrationality."[5] What is to be condemned in an indoctrinated individual is "the manner in which he holds his beliefs."[6] Snook is correct in that it is necessary to distinguish between types of beliefs, but what is at the heart of the matter is not the manner in which the beliefs are held, but the kind of belief which is held.

Following H. H. Price,[7] it can be seen that there is a clear and distinct difference between 'believing-in' and 'believing-that.'[8] There are some cases where belief-in something can be reduced to a belief-that something is the case, e.g., to believe-in King Arthur is to believe-that there was a king named Arthur. A belief-in which is reducible to a belief-that can be called a factual belief-in. But there are also many cases in which a belief-in something does not reduce to a belief-that. For example, a belief-in a free enterprise economy is not necessarily the same as a belief-that a free enterprise economy exists. It is not even necessary that a free enterprise economy exist in order to believe-in it. This is not to say that one cannot believe-in something that does exist. One can believe-that Q, and also believe-in Q.

But in a case like this, where does the difference between believing-that and believing-in lie? The answer to this question is found in the additional characteristics found in non-reducible beliefs-in. These non-reducible beliefs-in are called evaluative beliefs-in. An evaluative belief-in involves elements of trust and preference. To believe-in one's country means more than to believe-that one's country exists. Also involved are elements of faith, esteem, and confidence in one's country.

There is also what Price calls the prospective character of belief-in. There is a definite relationship between an evaluative belief-in and time. Evaluative beliefs-in always have reference to the future, though not necessarily to the future only. Where factual beliefs-in can refer to the past alone, e.g., believing-in King Arthur, evaluative beliefs-in cannot.

As was just mentioned, evaluative beliefs-in cannot refer to the past alone. It is a characteristic of evaluative beliefs-in that there is always a reference to the future. One of Price's examples is the case of evaluatively believing-in one's doctor. One not only believes "it is and has been a good thing that he is good at curing /one's/ diseases, but that it will continue to be a good thing and that he will continue to be good at curing them."[9] One can find this reference to the future in all cases of evaluative belief-in.

But what about those cases where factual beliefs-in contain a future reference? These cases differ from evaluative beliefs-in because they deal with the acceptance of propositions only. Evaluative beliefs-in make valuational claims as well. If a weather forcaster factually believes-in the proposition that it will rain tomorrow, he is not making a valuational claim.

This brief sketch does not do justice to Price's more detailed treatment of belief-in and belief-that, but it is hoped that it does give an adequate indication of the difference between these different types of belief.

It is on this distinction, between belief-that and belief-in, that I base this proposed beginning of a theory of indoctrination. Snook, although he seems to recognize the need for a set of conditions on the consequences of the indoctrinational activity, reverts back to his previous position that intentionality on the part of the indoctrinator is necessary. He cannot have it both ways. He must look at those conditions which occur after the fact without holding on to conditions on the task.

To answer the question 'How does one know that indoctrination has occurred?', one needs, as was said before, to look at the results of the activity. The following are the conditions for indoctrination:

X has been indoctrinated iff

1. X has an evaluative belief-in a state of affairs, Q
2. X has been brought solely to evaluatively believe-in Q by another person, Y
3. X had intended to learn Q, a state of affairs that is justified theoretically
4. X lacks adequate structural and criterial knowing.

These conditions have an advantage over the three main attempts at describing indoctrination in that they are not limited to any particular method or content, and they do not depend on the condition that the imparter of information must be aware of, or intend, what he or she is doing.

The first two conditions distinguish indoctrination from education. In the educational process, a person is brought to know some state of affairs. In the indoctrinational process, the person is brought solely to believe-in a state of affairs. The person believes-in the state of affairs in the evaluative sense. It is for this reason that it is entirely plausible that a teacher can point and say, 'He indoctrinates, while I teach.' The difference between teaching and indoctrinating is the difference between education and indoctrination.

When these first conditions are met, one need not find fault with particular methods of imparting information. One also need not always be troubled about keeping up on all of the newest methods that are emerging, for fear that an indoctrinational method might be put into use inadvertently. For one method can be used to achieve widely different results, depending on the contextual conditions.

Among these contextual conditions is a condition which distinguishes indoctrination from propaganda. If successful, both activities will result in an evaluative belief-in. The difference between them lies in the context in which the information is imparted. To be entirely accurate, propaganda is not really an activity, but rather the content of an activity, i. e., propagandizing. Propaganda is any message, or set of ideas, whose intent and structure are designed to result in an evaluative belief-in. Thus propagandizing is an intentional act.

Acts can also be unintentional in the sense that an act can be voluntarily done, but the consequences of the act were unintended. One can intentionally change lanes on the highway, and not intend to, but still cause, an accident. In like manner, a public school teacher can intend to teach economics in a descriptive manner, but actually present propaganda developed by large corporations. Thus we can see at least one major difference between indoctrination and propagandizing; propagandizing is always done with the intention of developing evaluative beliefs-in, while indoctrination can take place without this intention. Propaganda can be used in the indoctrinational process, but it is not a necessary condition.

From what was said above, one may ask what the difference is between propagandizing and indoctrination in those cases where intent to bring about certain evaluative beliefs-in is present. The answer is that when an additional condition is added, i. e., Y intentionally brought X to evaluatively believe-in Q, then propagandizing and indoctrination are the same. Most analyses of the concept of indoctrination which see intent as the distinguishing feature of indoctrination seem to have these kinds of cases in mind. What is left out of these analyses is the fact that indoctrination can take place without this added condition.

The purpose of requiring Q to be a state of affairs that is justified theoretically is to distinguish the process and result of indoctrination from the process and result of therapy and counseling. One of the major goals of clinical psychology is to change the client's self-image. Part of this change involves changing the person's attitude toward his or her self. This, in turn, involves the development of the person's self-confidence. This self-confidence is a person's belief-in one's own self. This belief-in one's self is an evaluative belief-in. To develop in a person a pro-attitude toward one's self, and to find that self to be good, and worthy of esteem, are goals of clinical psychology. The state of affairs which is believed-in is the person's self, his or her 'I.' The development of this type of belief-in is not what is involved in indoctrination. That is why there must be a condition which stipulates that the state of affairs to be evaluatively believed-in must be limited to states of affairs which are justified theoretically.

As one can see, there are beliefs-in certain states of affairs which are not capable of justification. For a belief-in one's self is atheoretical. The state of affairs that is believed-in is unique, and an attempt to justify the belief must necessarily deal with general states of affairs of some kind. Thus it is that if the state of affairs to be believed-in as a result of indoctrination must be justified theoretically, then all atheoretical evaluative beliefs-in must be ruled out as results of indoctrination.

If, in conjunction with the first three conditions, X lacks adequate structural and criterial knowing, then one can say that X has been indoctrinated. There is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining the presence of structural knowing.

X knows that Q structurally iff

1. X believes that Q
2. X is completely justified in believing that Q
3. X has an adequate, undefeated evidential argument for that Q
4. X explicates the force and reach of the argument that Q
5. Q is a state of affairs.[10]

If X does not know the structure of Q, X will not be able to present adequate and appropriate justifications for holding that Q is true. A person who does have adequate structural knowing will be able to demonstrate a cognitive grasp of the state of affairs in question "which is more than parroting."[11]

There is also a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining the presence of criterial knowing.

X knows that Q criterially iff

1. X believes that Q
2. X is completely justified in believing that Q
3. X presents adequate and undefeated justificatory arguments for the credibility of that Q
4. Q is a state of affairs.[12]

Criterial knowing involves the knowing of standards. One relevant instance of criterial knowing is the adequate assertion of standards for evidential arguments. Criterial knowing is "manifested by assertions that characterize the force and reach of justificatory claims."[13] This type of knowing is necessary for evaluating evidence.

Earlier in this paper, it was noted that as a result of indoctrination a person has been brought solely to believe-in some state of affairs. The importance of this is emphasized when contrasted with someone who has been brought to know structurally and criterially the same state of affairs. If person X has been brought solely to believe-in Q under all four conditions, it follows that X will lack complete justification in believing Q, will lack adequate, undefeated evidential argument for Q, will not be able to explicate the force and reach of the argument for Q, and will not be able to justify his or her evidential claims. X will, as a result of these deficiencies, believe-in Q in spite of the fact that X does not have a warrant for his or her belief.

In contrast, person Y, who knows Q structurally and criterially, will be able to produce an adequate evidential argument for Q, will be able to explicate the force and reach of that argument, and be fully justified in believing Q.

One may legitimately raise some important questions at this point. Could not, one may ask, person Y be indoctrinated with respect to Q even though he knows the structure and criteria of Q? After all, it seems perfectly conceivable that one can evaluatively believe-in some state of affairs and still be justified in doing so. Isn't there a sense where a person can believe-in a state of affairs and still be justified in doing so? And if there is, doesn't that do some damage to the thesis that indoctrination and education differ on the distinction between having been brought to believe-in some state of affairs, and having been brought to know some state of affairs?

In response to whether the indoctrination/education distinction has been damaged, it should be noted that it was claimed that if indoctrination has occurred, a person has been brought solely to evaluatively believe-in Q by another person. It is not claimed that if one has been brought to evaluatively believe-in some state of affairs by another person, that the former has been indoctrinated. The reason for claiming that X must have been solely brought to evaluatively believe-in some state of affairs is because there is indeed a case for the existence of justifiable evaluative beliefs-in.

What is needed to clarify this last point is a further refinement of Price's notion of belief-in. Just as one can distinguish between reducible and non-reducible beliefs-in, one can, and must, distinguish between justifiable and non-justifiable non-reducible beliefs-in.

As we have seen, a person who has been indoctrinated cannot adequately justify his or her belief-in the state of affairs in question. Whatever is believed is taken as fact. These would-be facts are taken as true by virtue of fitting into the person's preconceived framework--a framework not well supported. The faith element that exists is a kind of blind faith, where claims are not tested to determine their truth, but put to the test of coherence with already formed beliefs-in. An example may be in order here. A member of the Flat Earth Society presumably believes-in the fact that the Earth is flat. On this basis, explanations and descriptions of the nature of the Earth will be accepted or rejected as true on the grounds of whether or not the conclusions agree with what is believed-in, i. e., that the Earth is flat.

Alternatively, one can evaluatively believe-in some state of affairs such that the nature of the evaluative belief-in is radically different from the one just presented. This second type of evaluative belief-in can be called 'an evaluative belief-in with a leading quality.' The notion of a leading quality comes from Charles Peirce's concept of 'leading principles.' For Peirce, a leading principle is a "habit of thought," which allows a person to make valid inferences. Habits for Peirce always referred to action. In fact, a habit was a rule for action. As a habit of thought, a leading principle is a rule for mental acts. In particular, it is a rule for the making of valid inferences. It is by way of inference that we generate, develop, and verify our empirical hypotheses, and prove our philosophical ones. As David Savan has perceptively pointed out,

> [the act of inference] together with the rule which governs it, has as its objective truth, and knowledge of what is real. The rule will therefore express the faith, hope, or expectation (Peirce uses these and similar words) that what is validly inferred will be true, that valid inference will give us knowledge. The faith, hope, and expectation is not itself true. It "is unsusceptible of any support from reasons . . . . It cannot conflict with the results of knowledge." (5.357) It "expresses rather the scientific attitude than a scientific result." (7.134) In short, the logical leading principles of inference are *constitutive* of reason. They formulate what will count as truth and knowledge.[14]

Habits of thought, for Peirce, were beliefs. Thus, leading principles were types of beliefs. Put in Price's framework, the kind of belief which Peirce has described is a type of evaluative belief-in. The leading quality of this type of belief-in leads one to a faith which is justifiable; a reasoned faith, as opposed to the blind faith described earlier. With this type of belief-in, propositions which are believed-in can be tested to determine their truth. In fact, it is in the very nature of a belief-in with a leading quality that it not only *can* be tested for truth, but *must* be. As one can readily see, an evaluative belief-in need not be just a matter of blind faith.

Going back to the question of whether a person can be indoctrinated with respect to Q even though he knows the structure and the criteria of Q, the answer must be, for the following reasons, no. If a person has been brought solely to evaluatively believe-in Q, the nature of that evaluative belief-in cannot lead one to knowledge. For if it did, then he or she would not have been solely brought to evaluatively believe-in Q. Thus the type of belief-in which an indoctrinated person has is not an evaluative belief-in with a leading quality. An evaluative belief-in with a leading quality is a necessary condition for knowledge. If one knows Q both structurally and criterially, he or she will necessarily have an evaluative belief-in with a leading quality. Thus we see that if X has adequate structural and criterial knowing, he or she will have a belief-in which is inconsistent with the kind of belief-in that an indoctrinated person will have.

It is worth noting that because of the intimate relationship between belief and action, the indoctrinational consequences extend to action as well. While no type of action can be mapped to a corresponding belief, it is not the case that there is no connection at all. When one acts and chooses, choice is based on the hypothetical alternatives available. When one evaluatively believes-in some state of affairs, the same number of hypothetical alternatives are not available. One's belief-in functions to rule out some alternatives, and to keep other alternatives in consideration. Thus, the consequences of believing-in a state of affairs are not limited to cognitions alone. There are possible consequences in action. Based on the considerations presented in this paper, future inquiry into the consequences of indoctrination should be attentive to these consequences in action, and their logical relationships to belief.

The position argued in this paper rejects the method, content, and intention criteria as keys to defining indoctrination. The key to understanding indoctrination lies in an understanding of the kind of belief held by the indoctrinated individual. The indoctrinated individual will have an unjustified evaluative belief-in some state of affairs. Failure to distinguish between types of belief will result in a failure to understand the nature of indoctrination.

Taken collectively, the four conditions that have been presented are necessary and sufficient for determining whether indoctrination has taken place. It is hoped that this initial move toward a more formal analysis of the concept of indoctrination will suggest fruitful paths for future inquiry.

NOTES

1. Contemporary debate over indoctrination can be seen as stemming from symposium papers presented by John Wilson and R. M. Hare in 1964. See John Wilson, "Education and Indoctrination," and R. M. Hare, "Adolescents into Adults," in *Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach*, ed. T.H.B. Hollins (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964).

2. I. A. Snook, "The Concept of Indoctrination," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Fall, 1970).

3. Henry Rosemont, Jr., "On the Concept of Indoctrination," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (Spring, 1972).

4. I. A. Snook, "Indoctrination and the Indoctrinated Society," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Summer, 1973).

5. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

6. *Ibid.*

7. H. H. Price, *Belief* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), pp. 426-454.

8. The hyphenation of the expressions 'belief-in,' 'belief-that,' 'believing-in,' and 'believing-that' was done as an aid to the reader. There is no special implication about the ontological status of beliefs.

9. Price, *Belief*, p. 445.

10. George S. Maccia, "Pedagogical Epistemology," in the *Proceedings of the 1973 Annual Meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society* (Terre Haute, IN: Indiana State University, 1974), p. 66.

11. George S. Maccia, "Epistemological Considerations of Educational Objectives," read at the Philosophy of Education Section, XVth World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, Bulgaria, September, 1973, p. 5.

12. Maccia, "Pedagogical Epistemology," p. 66.

13. Maccia, "Epistemological Considerations," p. 10.

14. David Savan, "Peirce's Infallibilism," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Edward C. Moore and Richard S. Robin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), p. 199.

The author thanks G. S. Maccia for his cogent criticisms and constructive comments. The author is also indebted to Dennis Senchuk for conversations on various aspects of this paper.

RESPONSE TO CALVERT
INDOCTRINATION AND BELIEF

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John Calvert's paper is an interesting and intriguing piece of work. It seems that each time I read it I found more intricacies, subtleties, and, of course, some more puzzles. There is a great deal compacted into the first few pages. The reason for this, of course, is that we are coming in on the middle of a conversation. Snook speaks, Rosemont gets his attention, Snook responds, Calvert picks up the argument and, unbeknownst to Snook, introduces Price, and that is where we come in. Much has gone on before and we must get on board as quickly as possible. This comment is not intended as a criticism but only as a reminder of the special context of the discussion.

There are numerous interesting questions which, hopefully, will come up during the question period. I will get things rolling by focusing on those few issues that caught my attention.

1. One of the issues seems to be discerning "the key criterion which distinguishes indoctrination as a unique activity" (p. 69). How can one know when a certain state of affairs may be characterized as "indoctrination," rather than, say, "education"? The conversation before this time has pointed to content, method, or intent as providing the necessary and sufficient discrimen. Calvert offers a new emphasis and a set of conditions. These conditions answer the question, "How does one know that indoctrination has occurred?"

We should assay whether Calvert can deliver on that promissory note, but first I have another question. If the epistemological issue of the meaning of the term is the main one, there is a meta-issue which is ethical in nature. That issue is, Why are we asking the question? Why is it that we want to know what distinguishes "indoctrination" from other states of affairs, say, education? The answer seems to be so that we can condemn "indoctrination" states of affairs. Snook said that the concept was "clearly pejorative" and no one in the conversation so far appears to cavil at that judgment. But, surely, we want to know what "indoctrination" is, not only to condemn it but also to avoid it. The moral principle is that we want to maximize those states of affairs that may be characterized as "education" and minimize those characterized as "indoctrination."

Now, in light of this, assuming Mr. Calvert's criterion and conditions to be justifiable and defensible, are his criterion and conditions helpful? The answer, I think, is a firm yes and no.

The criterion, you will note, shifts the emphasis from the action-aspect of indoctrination to what he calls the "result" aspect, but which I prefer to call the "mental state" or "dispositional" aspect. He concentrates, in short, on the term "indoctrinated," which is a mental state. If we accept his conditions, and some may not, he provides a rational way of answering the question, Has indoctrination taken place? Thus, he gives us a way of identifying "indoctrination" so that we may condemn it. For that we are grateful.

Unfortunately, he does not provide us with a means of identifying it soon enough so that we may avoid this unwanted state of affairs. His conditions are *ex post facto* conditions. We cannot know that the state of affairs before us is one which can be characterized by the term "indoctrination" until after it has occurred, until after the conditions have been met. In fact, he deliberately cuts off the state of affairs, "indoctrinated," from what comes before, considering it an advantage that these conditions are not connected to method, content, or intention.

These conditions, if accepted, may answer the question, How do we know when "indoctrination" (mental state aspect) has occurred? What they do not help us with is in identifying the state of affairs described in statements like "He is indoctrinating them"; "Is he indoctrinating them?" Is he indoctrinated yet?" If we are not only to identify the mental state, "indoctrinated," but also avoid it, then our criterion for "indoctrination" must be broader; it must include not only the mental-state aspect of indoctrination but the act-aspect as well. Mr. Calvert's treatment does not address the significant ethical questions which are a part of this issue.

2. My second objection is related to the first. We have here one of those situations, characteristic in philosophical discussions, about which we can say, What is abundantly clear is that the concept of "indoctrination" is abundantly unclear. "Indoctrination" is used in at least two senses. We speak of "The victim of indoctrination" and of "The state of indoctrination." Put another way, we say, "He indoctrinates, I teach." We also say, "His students are indoctrinated; mine are educated." Now, assuming that we are not simply involved in code words and emotive language, in simply insulting someone, what is the difference here? Calvert has referred to this as the "task" and the "result" use of "indoctrination." I do not think this characterization is adequate. It is not strong enough and thus obscures significant and interesting differences. "Task" and "result" make it appear we are talking about a single phenomenon with two related aspects. The distinction is made more critical when we speak of "indoctrinating" and "indoctrinated." "Indoctrinating" is an action. More precisely, it is a human action. The analysis of any human action is a legitimate philosophical activity. The philosophy of action has provided considerable literature and offered criteria and questions which cannot be ignored in such an analysis.

"Indoctrinated," on the other hand, is a mental state, a mental disposition. The analysis of mental states is likewise a fit activity for philosophers, but quite different from the activity mentioned above. This latter kind of analysis is what Mr. Calvert does in his paper.

My point is that Calvert has attempted to overcome the deficiency of concentrating on one sort of phenomenon included under the rubric of "indoctrination," that is, on the action of indoctrinating, by concentrating on the other sort of phenomenon, the mental state of being "indoctrinated." However helpful the analysis may be in clarifying that phenomenon, to restrict the clarification of "indoctrination" to this is still to leave something out.

3. An internal criticism may be made at this point. Calvert has deliberately tried to avoid reference to the action-aspect of indoctrination in determining what "indoctrination" is. I have said that that program is questionable. But he has not completely succeeded in that program anyway. His conditions do not completely escape reliance on a consideration of the action of "indoctrinating." Consider condition number 2, "X has been brought solely to evaluatively believe-in Q by another person,

Y." How shall we judge if one has been brought *solely* to evaluative belief-in unless we examine the process, the action of indoctrinating? The condition is not that X have the mental state, that is condition 1. The condition is that we have been brought to it. We should need some criteria by which to judge this, for instance that Q did not present alternative views, that the views presented were not criticized, that thesis and counter-thesis were not presented, that evidence was not presented and weighed, etc..

4. Finally, and in connection with the above comment about some action-criteria in order to judge whether condition 2 is present or not, one is curious about just how X *is* "brought solely to evaluatively believe-in Q?" Calvert has made a sharp distinction (p. 73) between "having been brought to believe-in some state of affairs" and "having been brought to know some state of affairs," with the implication that the former is the result of "indoctrinating," the latter the result of "educating." Does this mean that the result of "educating" or "teaching" is always knowledge and never belief? Or is it just never evaluative belief-in?

H. H. Price, at another place ("Some Considerations about Belief"), has said that knowledge is infallible and direct, belief (including, one supposes, evaluative belief-in) is fallible and indirect; that belief includes entertaining a proposition, then asserting or adopting that proposition. Belief thus includes a volitional and emotional element. The volitional aspect includes moving from consideration to assent and involves some evidence. Assent upon evidence involves knowing some fact, thus all belief involves knowledge. The point of this very quick summary is that even Price appears to hold that beliefs may result from "teaching" and "educating" and do not result exclusively from "indoctrinating." In fact, that Price contributes to this conversation in just the way represented in this paper is not completely verified.

PART III

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

JOHN DEWEY AND BROOKWOOD LABOR COLLEGE:
THE IDEAL AND THE REALITY

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In 1929, John Dewey severely criticized the American Federation of Labor for its attack against the policies and practices of Brookwood Labor College. Later, in 1932, Dewey and other noted individuals appealed for financial support for Brookwood. Why was John Dewey interested in this school? Did the school's ideology, perhaps, approximate some characteristic of Dewey's philosophy?

The purpose of this study will be to compare Dewey's social and educational philosophies with the actual goals and programs of Brookwood. Such an analogy should demonstrate that Dewey was deeply concerned and actively involved in ensuring the survival of Brookwood College because it symbolized the practical embodiment of many of his social and educational theories. This task will be accomplished by, first, providing a brief historical description of the actual connection between John Dewey and Brookwood Labor College. The second part of this paper, and the bulk of it, will relate selections of Dewey's social and educational theories to Brookwood's social and educational ideals and practices.

John Dewey's first public acknowledgment of Brookwood appeared in a 1929 *New Republic* article entitled "Labor Politics and Labor Education" in which he hailed the educational spirit of Brookwood:

> The official statement of the College is that it "aims to train active members of labor organizations for more intelligent and efficient service to their organizations".... Part of the same official statement says that Brookwood thinks of the labor movement as "having for its ultimate goal the good life for all men in a social order free from exploitation and based on control by the workers."[2]

Dewey fervently believed that Brookwood represented a unique educational experiment. For him, "the college, more than most educational institutions of whatever sort, has been truly educational in living up to its effort to lead students to think--which means, of course, to think for themselves."[3]

In the same article, Dewey aimed a rather lengthy and vehement attack against the American Federation of Labor for its censure of Brookwood. Federation officials accused Brookwood of strong "communistic sympathies and presumably, affiliations; that disloyalty to the American Federation of Labor was inculcated among its students; that 'sex' occupied a large place in its teachings, and that religion was freely criticized and anti-religious views promulgated."[4] The AFL further recommended that its affiliates withdraw financial and moral support from Brookwood.[5]

Dewey was not only angry over this condemnation, but he seemed to be particularly incensed because the AFL had denied Brookwood any semblance of due process. The result of these actions, for Dewey, meant the elimination "from the labor movement the schools and influences that endeavor to develop independent leaders of organized labor who are interested in a less passive and a more social policy than that now carried on by the American Federation of Labor...."[6] "Social reconstruction," according to Dewey, had received a setback.

The author is most grateful to David Engel and Richard Seckinger for their guidance and support in formulating this paper.

By 1932, the Great Depression had caused Brookwood to experience severe financial hardships. Along with Sinclair Lewis, and "other labor officials, editors, authors, and publicists," Dewey wrote an open letter to the *Nation* in order to publicly solicit financial support for Brookwood.[7] Dewey's name headed the list of the letter's endorsers. This short plea lauded Brookwood's social and educational goals and programs:

> We submit that no activity can be more important than that of a labor college giving to workers themselves the vision of a new world and some comprehension of the means by which it may be achieved.
>
> Since its founding in 1921 Brookwood has made an outstanding contribution. In every section of the country its graduates are giving creditable, in some cases noteworthy, service to labor, progressive and radical movements--in unions, labor colleges, cooperatives, labor political organizations, unemployed leagues. It has given inspiration and help, has been a rallying center, for other workers' education enterprises, such as summer schools and local colleges and classes. The members of its staff have written books and pamphlets which are used throughout the workers' education movement.... Through extension classes and lecture services the school reaches each year thousands of workers who cannot take a residential course.[8]

In both instances, then, Dewey actively supported Brookwood. In 1929, along with his praise of Brookwood, Dewey aggressively and openly assailed the American Federation of Labor, the largest labor organization in the United States, for its anti-Brookwood attitudes and actions. Later, Dewey joined with others to advertise Brookwood's accomplishments and to campaign for funds for the school. It was no accident that John Dewey continually sanctioned Brookwood's efforts and concerned himself with the school's survival. Quite simply, Brookwood Labor College demonstrated in practice what John Dewey argued in theory.

The Ideal and the Reality

In a 1918 article titled "Internal Social Reorganization After the War," John Dewey explicitly outlined what he believed to be the primary deficiencies in the social order; and, he offered some proposals for ameliorating them.

Unemployment headed Dewey's list of social problems:

> The first of the deficiencies which I will mention has having to be cared for in an effective reorganization...is the failure of our social order in the past to secure to its members steady and useful employment.[9]

Dewey believed that underemployment and unemployment engendered a feeling "of impotence and enfeeblement, or else one of bitterness and hostility."[10] While Dewey displayed sympathy for the poor unemployed, he held little regard for the rich unemployed--or the leisure class:

> We have the unemployed not only at the lower end of the social and industrial scale, but we have them at the upper end, also, of the industrial and economic scale--the parasites, the persons who live for display and luxury, instead of from the fruits of social service actually rendered.[11]

These "slackers," as Dewey termed them, constituted a social liability since they failed to engage "in occupations which perform in work useful to society."[12] In essence, they represented more of a social burden than the unemployed poor.

Society's second inadequacy, to Dewey, stemmed directly from the first:

> The second evil that I would mention is the degraded and inhuman standard, or scale, of living which is found on the part of so many of the industrial population--of course, partly as a consequence of chronic unemployment or, at least, insecure employment, but partly because of the low rate of return for employment.[13]

More importantly, though, the consequences of the adverse conditions generated by the low standard of living occupied Dewey's attention. The high infant mortality rate among the poor represented one illustration. To Dewey, the workers experienced a depressed standard of living because of irregular employment, total unemployment, or low wages. Consequently, proper nutrition and medical care became unavailable for expectant mothers and newborn infants of this class. Yet, these people were perfectly willing to work if they had the opportunity. Members of the leisure class, on the other hand, did not work nor did they desire to work; but, their suffering was non-existent. For the compassionate Dewey, this situation represented a paradox.

Efficiency entailed the third part of Dewey's critique. This was not efficiency in a mechanical or an industrial sense. Rather, Dewey referred to efficiency in a human context. "What is called the 'turn over' of labor, the fact that so many men have to be hired and then fired in order to keep a certain average number at work, is simply one symptom of the breakdown of our industrial system on the human side."[14] According to Dewey, this experience produced a negative attitude among workers. Job performance, in turn, was adversely affected:

> ...men's minds, hearts, thoughts, interests, are not engaged, under the present system, in the work which they are doing, and there is, consequently, an economic waste and inefficiency.[15]

In other words, laborers might have more regard for their work if it had permanency and if they were truly interested in their labor. This aspect, to Dewey, embraced intellectual and moral implications as well:

> Now, this is serious not merely because of the relative failure of product and the waste of energy, but because of the intellectual and moral deterioration which inevitably occurs when large bodies of people are doing things for which they do not care, to which they have an aversion, and which do not in any way appeal to them.[16]

Following his analysis of the existing social structure, Dewey presented his scheme for reorganizing it. However, he did not opt for a gradual, evolutionary change. Instead, Dewey proposed an immediate, active, and planned revamping of the social order.[17] To be sure, the restructuring process was to begin by correcting the shortcomings listed by Dewey.

"The first great demand of a better social order...is the guarantee of the right, to every individual who is capable of it, to work---productive work which a self-respecting person may engage in with interest and with more than a pecuniary profit."[18] In this regard, it was "the duty of the state" to assure employment. Subsequently, it was just "ordinary common sense" to employ the socialistic model as a means to reform the social fabric.[19]

The state should also function, in Dewey's mind, to protect the welfare of the workers. This facet would include a minimum wage, a source of "decent, comfortable and sanitary housing facilities for the population," and health and old age insurance.[20]

Dewey's final recommendation involved job control:

> ...the need of securing greater industrial autonomy, that is to say, greater ability on the part of workers in any particular trade or occupation to control the industry, instead of working under these conditions of external control where they have no interest, no insight into what they are doing, and no social outlook upon the consequences, and meaning of what they are doing.[21]

Dewey felt that "industrial socialism" represented the means of attaining this democratic process. In this model, the worker would actively participate in the industrial decision-making process. The result would mean a greater "share given to the laborer, to the wage earner, in controlling the conditions of his own activity."[22]

Hence, John Dewey was extremely critical of the existing social order. He further proposed an organized reconstruction of the social framework through the adoption of state guaranteed jobs, a minimum wage, subsidized housing, health insurance, old age benefits, and industrial socialism. Without this restructuring process, the ramifications would be disastrous. Not only would the working-class continue to suffer, but class conflict would result.[23] In lieu of the strong laissez-faire attitude which predominated during this period, Dewey's suggestions must have seemed radical.

Brookwood's social goals, which strongly reflected Dewey's pronouncements, certainly were considered by many to be radical. Founded in 1921 by militant labor leaders and intellectuals, Brookwood functioned as a coeducational, residential workers' college and included a variety of foreign, ethnic, and racial groups in its student body.[24] The school's bulletin best summarized its purposes:

> Brookwood thinks of itself as part of the labor movement of America and the world. Brookwood thinks of the labor movement both as a practical instrument by which workers achieve higher wages, shorter hours, and better conditions of work, and as a great social force having as its ultimate goal the good life for all men in a social order free from exploitation and based upon control by the workers. Our chief concern in this connection has been to discover means for increasing the power of the working-class and its organizations, for the achievement of both its immediate and ultimate goals....[25]

This latter "concern" implied the training of labor leaders who would function to organize workers as a means of achieving the primary goal of a new social order.

Dewey and Brookwood, therefore, stood for similar social goals. These ideals incorporated a new social order, and a better life for workers, with control of the decision-making process.

Since education represented an integral part of the social experience to Dewey, the role and structure of schools would also have to be reconsidered as a facet of the social reorganization process. More specifically, the public system could not be relied upon to solve social problems. In fact, Dewey felt that the school system failed miserably in serving the interests of the poor:

> We are too apt to pride ourselves upon our public and universal system of education without knowing that the great majority of the population get the benefit only of the more rudimentary and elementary phase of our educational system, and that by far the larger percentage of children leave the public schools before they have an education which any one of us...would regard as any education at all.[26]

To Dewey, the public schools could not be considered seriously as vehicles for social mobility because working-class children were too impoverished to attend them. Hence, the public schools served a limited social role. What characteristics, then, constituted Dewey's educational ideal? Moreover, did Dewey's educational ideal complement his social ideal? Finally, how did Brookwood reflect Dewey's ideals?

In *Education and the Social Order*, published in 1934, Dewey condemned the spirit of the American educational system. Public schools bred individualism and competition while Dewey saw a need for community and cooperation; that is, a "social purpose" which meant preparation for social change.[27] As Dewey saw it, the public schools could not continue to teach "as if the Constitution and our forefathers had finally determined all important social and political questions...."[28] Ultimately, the schools failed to meet the needs of students and, most importantly, the requirements of a changing society.

Dewey proceeded to delineate his educational model:

> The first great step, as far as subject-matter and method are concerned, is to make sure of an educational system that informs students about the present state of society in a way that enables them to understand the conditions and forces at work.[29]

Current social problems therefore, would dominate Dewey's curriculum. This entailed more than just academic polemics, however. Dewey wanted to create students who would "take their own active part in aggressive participation in bringing about a new social order."[30] Teachers, as well, had to assume an active role and join the organized labor movement and thereby work for a new social order.[31]

Like Dewey, Brookwood attempted to integrate theory with practice. Brookwood endeavored to foster the needs of the working-class by utilizing a curriculum based on practice in a social context rather than abstractness in an academic sense. Thus, Brookwood students assumed responsibility to help organize and to participate in some off-campus strike activity such as the long and brutal Marion, North Carolina, textile workers strike of 1929.[32] Moreover, Brookwood instructors joined in these activities and formed Local 189 of the American Federation of Teachers. These practices certainly corresponded to Dewey's paradigm.

"Secondly, teachers and administrators should undertake among themselves organization for the study of economics and social problems."[33] Since the social structure, with its concomitant social deficiencies, was based on economic relationships, Dewey implied that a good comprehension of economics would provide the skills necessary for a social transformation.

Likewise, economics and the study of social problems dominated Brookwood's program which consisted of Economics, Modern Industry, Basic Industries, American History, the History of the American Labor Movement, and Current Events. Tool courses such as Labor Journalism, Public Speaking, Preparation for Field Work, and Psychology represented courses which fitted the students with skills necessary to organize workers.[34] As a result, Brookwood students were able to combine the examination of social problems from an academic standpoint with the means and opportunities to solve these problems. Again, the approach appeared to fulfill Dewey's prescriptions.

In his third suggestion, Dewey called for a cooperative attitude to be implemented in the schools. This characteristic transcended the classroom because Dewey wanted the schools to be democratically run. "It should extend to administration so that oligarchical management from above may be abolished."[35]

In comparison, Brookwood operated as a democratic, cooperative community. This enabled students to actively participate in all phases of the school. For example, the students preferred a discussion format in class because it allowed them to share different opinions and views. The community meeting, in addition, governed the everyday activities of the college. In this assemblage, students and faculty alike had an opportunity to vote.[36] Students were also actively represented on the school's Board of Directors.[37] Furthermore, students completed "two hours (of) manual labor each day" by gardening, or cooking, or sewing, or washing dishes, etc.[38] Like Dewey's ideal, this communal setting was expected to encourage a cooperative feeling which transferred to the development of fraternal attitudes among workers who belonged to a common union and to a radically new social arrangement.

Dewey promulgated education as a lifelong process as his fourth recommendation:

> Social and industrial conditions are so complex that it is absurd to expect boys and girls who leave their schools in great numbers at the ages of fourteen and fifteen to be prepared for intelligent and active citizenship.[39]

Consequently, Dewey promoted adult education as a means of providing education for adults who were forced to quit school at an early age. This concept was important to Dewey for individual growth and betterment as well as the larger social benefits.

Brookwood students were adults, generally in their twenties, who "had already acquired a good deal of experience; they knew about industry, politics, labor relations, and what the economic system meant in its impact on human beings."[40] However, they lacked the skills to verbalize and to communicate this knowledge, and the tools to reconstruct the social order. It was Brookwood's responsibility to mold these experienced workers into a cadre of leaders for the labor movement, and for a new society. This task was accomplished by providing inexpensive residential facilities for students at Brookwood; or summer courses, extension programs, books, pamphlets, dramas, and literature for those who could not attend Brookwood on a full-time basis.[41]

Dewey's final point summarized his preceding recommendations:

> ...all of these considerations reach their culmination in reorganization of subject-matter of study and methods upon a directly social basis and with social aim.[42]

Here, Dewey again disavowed the individualistic aspects of the schools. Schools in his scheme would emphasize the social context in order to generate social change. Dewey assumed that the individual would automatically benefit as a member of a better society. Not surprisingly, then, Dewey's educational ideal, as described in *Education and the Social Order*, did not differ substantially from his social prescriptions outlined in "Internal Social Reorganization After the War." For instance, while Dewey promoted shared decision-making--which he labeled industrial socialism--in the social realm, he also supported democratic decision-making in the schools. In this respect, the school served as a model of Dewey's reconstructed society. Moreover, the students and teachers of Dewey's schools were expected to play an aggressive role in the restructuring of the social order. This social remodeling, of course, was expected to follow Dewey's prescriptions in "Internal Social Reorganization After the War." Schools, according to Dewey's plan, were to function as models as well as vehicles for social change.

Just as Dewey's social and educational ideals could not be separated, Brookwood's social and educational programs could not be segregated. The founders of Brookwood perceived the prevailing economic structure as exploitative. The only way to eliminate the hardships of the working class was to construct a new social order. It became Brookwood's task to produce enlightened and active leaders who would organize and direct the workers in this restructuring effort. Subsequently, education became an important vehicle for social reordering. More importantly, though, because of its cooperative spirit, Brookwood also symbolized the new society.

Conclusions

John Dewey's association with Brookwood Labor College represented no isolated event. Dewey had similar experiences with other labor colleges. During the 1930s, for example, Dewey was listed among many noted contributors to Commonwealth Labor College, which was located in Mena, Arkansas.[43] On another occasion, Dewey corresponded with Myles Horton, who was director of Highlander Folk School, situated in Tennessee.[44] Obviously, Dewey was cognizant of the ideologies and practices of the labor college.

However, were these schools aware of Dewey's social and educational philosophy? If so, did they consciously adopt and implement these views?

In *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State*, Joel Spring revealed that many of the labor schools readily adopted characteristics of John Dewey's philosophy. In the Manumit venture of 1924, which Spring specifically described, the school's founders particularly favored Dewey's concept of "community":

> One of the papers of intention presented by the new faculty at the founding meeting of the school called it a community school to affirm Dewey's belief that education comes through life. "The community life of our school," the paper stated, "is the socialized incarnation of our belief in industrial democracy." This statement reflected the strange career of John Dewey's ideas. The public schools could point to Dewey's concept of community and use it as a justification for socialization into an interdependent corporate state. Radicals reading Dewey took the idea of community and translated it into industrial democracy.[45]

More significant, perhaps, was the fact that A. J. Muste, director of Brookwood, was elected chairman of the executive board of Manumit.[46]

For Dewey, then, education had to have social aims which included cooperation, community, and social change. In a practical sense, Brookwood upheld these same goals. Thus, in his defense of Brookwood, John Dewey was only defending John Dewey's philosophy in practice.

NOTES

1. Brookwood represented only a part of a broader workers' education movement which transpired during the early decades of this century. For a concise description of the characteristics of the workers' education phenomenon, see Richard Dwyer, "Workers' Education, Labor Education, Labor Studies: An Historical Delineation," *Review of Educational Research,* 47 (1977), 179-207.

2. John Dewey, "Labor Politics and Labor Education," *New Republic,* 57 (1929), 211-214.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

5. *Ibid.* See American Federation of Labor, *Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Annual Convention,* New Orleans, Louisiana, November, 19-28, 1928, for ample material concerning the floor debates and parliamentary manipulations of the Brookwood issue.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

7. John Dewey, et al., "Correspondence Help for Brookwood," *The Nation,* 135 (1932), 592.

8. *Ibid.*

9. John Dewey, "Internal Social Reorganization After the War," *The Journal of Race Development* (Journal of International Relations), 8 (1918), 385-400. Hereafter referred to as "Social Reorganization."

10. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 389.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, p. 392.

15. *Ibid.* See John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916), p. 260, for a similar discussion: "More fundamental is the fact that the great majority of workers have no insight into the social aims of their pursuits and no direct personal interest in them."

16. *Ibid.*, p. 393.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 396.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 396-97

20. *Ibid.*, p. 397.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 398.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 399.

23. *Ibid.*

24. See A. J. Muste, *The Essays of A. J. Muste*, ed. Nat Hentoff (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), for a former director's autobiographical view of the school.

25. *Brookwood Bulletin and Announcement of Courses for 1923/33* (Katonah, New York: Brookwood, 1932), p. 3.

26. "Social Reorganization," p. 390.

27. John Dewey, *Education and the Social Order* (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1934), pp. 6-8. Hereafter cited as *Education.*

28. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

32. Muste, p. 143. Also, see "Call on Gardiner to Act," *New York Times*, 3 Oct. 1929, p. 24, col. 5.

33. *Education*, p. 9.

34. *Brookwood Bulletin*, pp. 7-9.

35. *Education*, p. 12.

36. Arthur Gleason, *Workers' Education* (New York: Bureau of Industrial Research, 1921), p. 56.

37. "Labor To Govern Faculty," *New York Times*, 4 Feb. 1925, p. 23, col. 3

38. "First Labor College Sends Out First Class," *New York Times*, 1 June 1923, p. 7, col. 2.

39. *Education*, p. 12.

40. Muste, p. 103.

41. *Brookwood Bulletin*, pp. 11-12.

42. *Education*, p. 13.

43. Donald H. Grubbs, *Cry From the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and the New Deal* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 71-72. Other supporters included "Harvard's Law Dean Roscoe Pound and economist Sumner Schlicter, labor historian John Commons, H. L. Mencken, Justice Louis Brandeis, and Albert Einstein."

44. Frank Adams, *Unearthing Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Highlander* (Winston-Salem, North Carolina: John F. Blair, Publisher, 1975), p. 232.

45. Joel H. Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 145. Also see "A New Community School," *Survey*, 53 (1924), 91-92.

46. Devere Allen, "A School for Workers' Children," *The Nation*, 119 (1924), 417-418.

RESPONSE TO ALTENBAUGH

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On the first page of his paper, Mr. Altenbaugh tells us that his purpose will be "to compare Dewey's social and educational philosophies to the actual goals and programs" of Brookwood Labor College. Later, on the last page, he concludes that in defending Brookwood "John Dewey was only defending John Dewey's philosophy in practice." Sandwiched between these two claims--in the meat of the paper, so to speak--we might expect to find a discussion of Dewey's philosophy. If we were to take seriously the word "philosophy," that is, we might expect to find an explication of Dewey's theory of experience, an analysis of his concept of freedom, an examination of his epistemology, or a discussion of some of the more important ideas which, taken together, could be said to constitute John Dewey's philosophy. From the first page to the last, however, I find very little which represents an explication, analysis, examination, or discussion of any of Dewey's philosophical considerations.

Still, I would be less than honest if I were to say that I did not have even an inkling of what Mr. Altenbaugh has in mind; for I am aware that there is a rather loose, everyday sense of "philosophy of education" which is used to refer to one's prescriptive *approach* to education, i.e., to the educational goals, programs, and practices that one advocates. Apparently, the purpose of Mr. Altenbaugh's paper is to compare Brookwood's approach to education with the approach advocated by Dewey. If this is the intent of the paper, however, it is disconcerting to find, still on the first page, claims and suggestions to the effect that Brookwood's "ideology" corresponded to Dewey's "philosophy," that Dewey's social and educational "theories" are related to Brookwood's social and educational "ideals and practices," and that Brookwood "symbolized the practical embodiment" of many of Dewey's "social and educational theories." There is much talk in this paper having to do with ideals, realities, ideologies, philosophies, theories, practices, reflectings, symbolizings, and practical embodyings; but, put in more straightforward language, the purpose of the paper, if I understand it correctly, is to compare the educational goals, programs, and practices advocated by Dewey with those found at Brookwood Labor College.

Before going any further, I want to make it clear that I am not merely quibbling with Mr. Altenbaugh's use of language. In particular, I have something more than a quibble involving his use of the phrase "philosophy of education." As I have already indicated, "philosophy of education" is often used loosely to refer to one's prescriptive approach to education, i.e., to the goals, programs, and practices that one advocates. The same phrase is also used, however, to refer to educational prescriptions *in their relation to* the philosophical inquiry--or, more often, the results of such inquiry--which is said to undergird them. This latter sense is the one I will use in the rest of my response unless I specifically indicate otherwise.[1] In this sense, the phrase "philosophy of education" refers to the conjunction of educational prescriptions and their philosophical foundation. The former sense of "philosophy of education," the sense that refers only to educational prescriptions, I will henceforth avoid and will speak of "educational prescriptions" instead.

Now, returning to Mr. Altenbaugh's paper, it seems to me that he wants to say that Dewey stated certain educational prescriptions and that at Brookwood these same prescriptions were not only shared "in theory" but were acted upon in practice. But there is a problem here involving the assumption or claim that Dewey and Brookwood had the same educational prescriptions. Dewey's prescriptions are a part of his philosophy of education, the meaning of the words used to state them is determined in the context of his philosophical inquiry, and, therefore, Dewey's prescriptions cannot be properly understood if they are separated from his philosophy. I am not aware of any evidence--certainly Mr. Altenbaugh's paper contains none--to suggest that Brookwood Labor College, its faculty, or its director, A. J. Muste, put forth a philosophy of education which in any way parallels that of John Dewey. And there is no evidence brought forth to even suggest that Brookwood's faculty and administration studied, understood, or embraced any position of Dewey's which could be termed a philosophical position. Yet, without a comparable philosophy of education, Brookwood could not have had comparable educational prescriptions.

The claim I am putting forth here is a fundamental one. Unfortunately, space is insufficient to properly develop or adequately justify it. But I must at least make the attempt.

As almost everyone who considers the matter is fond of pointing out, Dewey argued that theory is sterile unless it is tested in practice. In *Experience and Education*, for example, he says, "a philosophy of education, like any theory, has to be stated in words," but "it is reduced to a form of words which may be emotionally stirring but for which any other set of words might equally well be substituted unless they indicate operations to be initiated and executed."[2] It is often forgotten, however, that Dewey viewed practice which is not directed by theory to be equally undesirable. In those same pages of *Experience and Education*, he also says that "a coherent *theory* of experience, affording positive direction to selection and organization of appropriate educational methods and materials, is required by the attempt to give new direction to the work of the schools."[3] He was specifically taking to task those progressive educators who based their educational programs, not upon a defensible theory, but upon reaction and aversion to the practices of the traditional schools. Theory must be tested in practice, Dewey said; but, just as loudly, he maintained that practices must be informed by theory.

My point is that prescriptions, too, must be stated in words; and these words derive their meaning at least in part from the philosophy, or theory, from which the prescriptions spring. Therefore, if we consider aims of education such as "developing the student's ability to think" or "social reconstruction," we cannot know what they mean unless we know the philosophical context in which they are to be interpreted. When I consider these aims of education in light of Dewey's philosophy, I find myself considering his theory of experience, his theory of inquiry, his concept of growth, and so on and so on. Even the phrase "aims of education" has special meaning when I consider Dewey's philosophical analysis of aims in *Democracy and Education*.[4]

Consider the aim of social reconstruction. Mr. Altenbaugh says that Dewey "proposed an organized reconstruction of the social framework through the adoption of state guaranteed jobs, a minimum wage, subsidized housing, health insurance, old age benefits, and industrial socialism" (p. 85). These are ends-in-view, of course; and, if they were all somehow achieved, social reconstruction in the Deweyan sense would still be unachieved because it is not an end. I have a suspicion, however, that the people at Brookwood would have considered the aim of social reconstruction achieved if the ends-in-view listed above had been reached.

The failure or the refusal to understand Dewey's philosophy may account in part for the failure of many schoolmen who apparently adopt Dewey's educational prescriptions to achieve anything resembling a Deweyan program in practice. The disregard of Dewey's philosophy may also account for Joel Spring's strange notion, quoted by Mr. Altenbaugh (p. 88), that Dewey's concept of community could be used as "a justification for socialization into an interdependent corporate state." At best, I submit, only an unDeweyan interpretation of Dewey's words could be used for such a "justification." It seems that unless educationists (and radical critics of educationists) become philosophers they are doomed to misunderstand the educational prescriptions that issue from a philosophy of education.

Finally, although I am aware that my thesis has not been completely developed, I want to address another point made by Mr. Altenbaugh in his paper. He claims that Dewey endorsed Brookwood because the school represented "John Dewey's philosophy in practice" (p. 89). In general, it is probably true that when a person endorses something we can assume that it is not inconsistent with his beliefs. But is it not often the case that we are led to endorse something because it is as good as we can get? Very often we endorse that which represents the lesser of two evils. Dewey may well have endorsed Brookwood even though, in terms of his philosophy of education, it represented less than half a loaf.

NOTES

1. Although "philosophy of education" is often used in this way, I want to point out that serious difficulties accompany this use. These difficulties involve the nature of the relation between philosophical inquiry and educational prescriptions which are said to "follow from" the inquiry. It seems clear that there is no deductive relation and that there is no logical relation in any but a derivative sense of "logical."

2. John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1938), p. 28.

3. Dewey, *Experience and Education*, p. 30 (Dewey's emphasis).

4. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916), Chapter 8.

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF VISCERAL LEARNING FOR EDUCATION: SOME SPECULATIONS

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I

Since the time of Aristotle, it has been assumed that praise or blame could be assigned only to voluntary actions--actions which are performed with the outward acting part of our nervous system. It has, for the most part, been assumed that the internal, visceral responses of the body were somehow inferior to the highly coordinated voluntary responses of the skeletal muscles and the cerebrospinal nervous system that controls them. This is because our internal processes are involuntary, and require no immediate attention or will for their functioning. As Leo DiCara[1] wrote, a corollary of these long-standing assumptions is the belief that the internal, visceral responses can be "conditioned" but cannot be "learned" in the same way as skeletal responses. Yet, research by Neal Miller[2] and DiCara[3] on animals and research on people involved in biofeedback and meditation has suggested that these long-standing assumptions may not be valid. That is, people are capable of visceral learning whereby they may modify their internal responses.

The significance of the possibility of visceral learning for human beings becomes most apparent when one examines the work of the endocrinologist Hans Selye. An examination of Selye's work on biological stress reveals that these internal responses may, at times, have a detrimental effect upon ourselves and our conduct with others. The possibility of our reducing this detrimental effect through visceral learning processes suggests a re-evaluation or re-estimation of the internal portion of our nervous system. In other words, perhaps we should be willing to assign praise to nervous systems which avoid the detrimental effects which Selye has so well described.

In this paper, I will examine the nature of the body's visceral responses and their potential influence on conduct, and then discuss some of the possible implications that our capacity for visceral learning has for a philosophy of education in general and for moral education in particular.

II

To understand the implications of changing visceral responses, we must first examine how they affect us and our behavior. In his classic study *The Wisdom of The Body* (1939), Harvard physiologist Walter B. Cannon described, in detail, the body's internal mechanisms which seek to maintain a constant or steady state in the body's internal environment. This state he referred to as *homeostasis*--a basic condition for the life of any living system. Cannon's examination of the body's internal, visceral functions led to his description of the body's extreme internal reaction to changes in the outer environment which seriously threaten the constancy of the body's internal environment. This response he termed the "flight or fight response"--a response which is characterized by a complex of physiological changes in which the internal viscera prepare the organism for extreme muscular exertion in order to preserve the overall constancy or continuity of the internal environment, i.e., homeostasis.

Cannon's work on the body's internal, visceral responses was extended by the endocrinologist Hans Selye, who studied the chemical changes which external or internal events could produce inside the body. His work and thesis on the *general adaptation syndrome* are well documented and described in his book *The Stress of Life* (1956). Selye noted that despite the variety of changes which the body faces from the inside or outside, such changes all elicit similar biochemical adaptive reactions inside the body. This generalized, stereotyped, or "non-specific" response made by the body to different internal or external changes, which threaten homeostasis, Selye termed "stress." According to Selye, all changes produce some stress. The body's release of chemical hormones, which characterizes stress, normally provides defense against aggressors within the body, such as toxic chemicals produced by the body or introduced to it, and also enables the body to mobilize itself quickly for muscular exertion--for fighting or fleeing as Cannon described when external threats are severe.

Ideally, the body's internal chemical changes, which characterize stress, represent a perfect system of checks and balances for preserving homeostasis. However, as Selye noted, sometimes our responses are too weak, so they do not offer adequate protection, and at other times they are too strong, or elicited unduly. The result of the latter is that we actually hurt ourselves by our own excessive production of stress hormones which act as destructive enzymes in our own system. This phenomenon may have a result which is long lasting. Selye has indicated that the body's undue production of stress hormones can produce "chemical scars" in the nervous system which greatly reduce the body's "adaptation energy"--i.e., its capacity to endure change, thus hastening the general deteriorization of the nervous system. This problem is complicated by the fact that the body, as Selye wrote, often develops a "habit" in which its own inappropriate internal reactions fall into a "groove" and the response is then continually elicited in the same exaggerated manner whether appropriate or not. Significantly, Selye considers many common diseases to be directly related to these "errors" in our adapative mechanisms. But, in addition, Selye indicated that these "internal habits" can exert a profound influence on our outward conduct, and thus, as I will suggest, precipitate a split between knowing and doing. This important point will be returned to shortly. But first, another important issue must be addressed. This concerns the logical status of the biological errors or mistakes which Selye has described.

III

In his book *The Concept of Mind* (1949) Gilbert Ryle argued that we can only use the term "mistake," logically, to describe a failure to exercise *knowing how*. It would appear that, according to Ryle, Selye's biological errors could be logically described as errors or mistakes only if the body's internal mechanisms were an internal form of procedural knowledge, i.e., knowing how. I will argue that these internal mechanisms, controlled by the autonomic nervous system, are in fact, an internal dimension of knowing how. Therefore, Selye is fully justified in speaking in terms of biological errors or mistakes. To understand the rationale for this position and its implications it will be necessary to examine Ryle's criteria for knowing how.

Ryle indicated that it is not necessary to be able to state the rules of chess, i.e., knowing that, in order to be able to play chess properly, i.e., knowing how. He added, we need only be able to make right moves, avoid forbidden moves, and protest if our opponent makes forbidden moves. If we can fulfill these criteria, even without being able to state the rules of chess, then we could be said to possess procedural knowledge. Accordingly, the terms "intelligent" and "responsible" could be used to describe our successful execution of the game of chess.[4]

In a similar manner, one need not be able to state the maxims for successful biochemical adaptation, whereby we avoid mistakes or errors, to be able to adapt successfully, that is, intelligently. That we do not reflect before performing such internal actions is no reason to deny the use of the term "intelligent" to describe them when we perform them successfully. As Ryle pointed out, not all intelligent action requires reflection. This is because if it did, then reflection itself, to be intelligent, would require intelligent reflection *ad infinitum*. It would be logically impossible to break this chain.[5] Thus, the performance of internal actions does not need to be prefaced by consideration of appropriate propositions to be termed intelligent, and thus a dimension of knowing how.

An important difference arises with regard to our capacity to recognize biological mistakes in others. For obvious reasons we do not identify such mistakes biologically, that is, as biological errors. This is because we normally can only see, and provide feedback on, external moves. Internal behavior often goes unnoticed. Nevertheless, it is suggested that our internal responses do represent an internal knowing how since, with proper training (e.g., biofeedback, meditation) it appears that individuals *can* learn how to modify undesirable internal responses. Ryle has suggested that our endeavor to use the terms "intelligent" and "responsible," logically, when describing procedural knowledge is a matter of the truth or falsehood of certain "could" or "would" propositions. A "could" proposition is an empirical consideration, a consideration of human potential or capacity. Research on the Transcendental Meditation technique, for example, conducted by Wallace and Benson[6] and other studies by Orme-Johnson,[7] indicate that internal, autonomic responses *could* be modified to the advantage of the individual. That is, people could reduce biological errors, making themselves less susceptible to the wear and tear of a continually changing environment. Therefore, we could use the term "intelligent" to describe such individuals whose internal mechanisms do not make the errors of which Selye wrote. For this reason, I suggest that modification of our internal functions constitutes an act of competency in our internal dimension of knowing how.

IV

What makes Selye's work and our capacity for visceral learning especially relevant to a philosophy of education and to moral education in particular, is Selye's recognition that man's constant need for social re-adaptation is the major cause of stress and distress in society. Selye noted that even the greatest experts in the field do not know why the stress of frustration, arising in large measure from interpersonal experience and conflict, is so much more likely to produce distress and disease than is the stress of excessive muscular work. Cannon anticipated this observation. He wrote that he was impressed by the fact that most of our strong visceral reactions occurred as the accompaniment of the powerful emotions of rage and fear, emotions which are, of course, often elicited as a result of social conflict.[8] With regard to these changes in the body, Cannon made a very important observation. He wrote:

> The changes which occur in emotional turmoil might, at first glance, be regarded as a gross disturbance of homeostasis. So they would be, by themselves; but they can be explained, I believe, only as preparatory for extreme muscular exertion. If that takes place, the changes in the fluid matrix (the internal environment) at once become useful and are counteracted by the effects of the exertion itself.[9]

However, as Selye has indicated, often the individual does not follow this internal reaction with extreme muscular exertion (often deemed socially inappropriate). The result, then, is that there *is* a gross disturbance of homeostasis, leading to the "chemical scars" and physical deteriorization of which Selye wrote. There is yet another effect which our body's inappropriate visceral responses may have.

If the body is exposed repeatedly to conditions in which it continues to overreact chemically--conditions which are all too common in our society--not only will it "fall into a groove" and continue to elicit the same exaggerated visceral response, whether appropriate or not, but, as Selye wrote, the body's over-production of stress hormones in such circumstances can induce a state of "drunkenness" in the individual "without his knowing it." In suggesting that an individual can become "intoxicated" by his own stress hormones, Selye ventured to add that this sort of "drunkenness" has caused more harm to society than alcoholic intoxicants.[10] As the above statement by Cannon indicates, the effect of these hormones is only neutralized by outward exertion. However, Selye has strongly implied that if the system is continually "intoxicated," behavior aimed, ultimately, at neutralizing these hormones is less likely to be guided by the rules of conduct or moral principles that we adhere to verbally--rules or principles which, by themselves, are only a dimension of propositional knowledge, i.e., knowing that.

In suggesting that interpersonal experience is the major cause of stress, and that excessive intoxication of stress hormones, arising from social conflict, has caused harm to society, Selye has, perhaps, clearly identified a major obstacle to the general aims of a rational morality--a conception of morality which demands, among other things, that reflective thought and a consideration of the interests of others should mitigate our actions when appropriate. Selye has also, then, identified a major concern for moral education. Hormonal intoxication is, apparently, the principal mechanism by which the proverbial split between knowing and doing is effected. In other words, the disintegration of knowing and doing is a biological event, one that is precipitated by the body's excessive production of stress hormones. Or, more precisely, one might say that the excessive production of stress hormones itself constitutes a failure on the individual's part to exercise competency in a dimension of knowing how which is internal. This conclusion is foreshadowed by the fact that the processes involved in knowing and those involved in doing have a common biological base in the living structures of the human organism.

This concept of internal, visceral habits which may obstruct or interfere with our outward conduct was clearly anticipated by John Dewey. Dewey emphasized that we need to deepen and extend our conception of habit to include more than simply recurrent, external modes of action.[11] Actually, his concept of habit has an important affinity with Ryle's concept of knowing how. Ryle emphasized that knowing how is a "disposition," but not a "single track disposition like a reflex."[12] In broadening the ordinary usage of the concept of habit, Dewey wrote, also, that the essence of habit is a "predisposition to ways or modes of response, not necessarily particular acts."[13] For example, he pointed out that a man with a habit of giving way to anger, may show his habit by a "murderous act."[14] Dewey's example serves this paper well, since anger is, as Cannon wrote, accompanied by strong visceral reactions. We can say that the habit of continually giving way to anger constitutes a failure to exercise competency in the internal dimension of knowing how. The individual need not have a habit of committing apparently irrational, immoral "murderous acts" with the outwardly acting portion of his nervous system; rather, his internal, autonomic nervous system need only to have fallen into a "groove" (Selye's term) or habit, and continue to intoxicate the body with stress hormones whether warranted or not.

By failing to take those measures which would modify the reactions of internal mechanisms, and reduce inappropriate responses, the individual fails to exercise competency in his internal knowing how. If, as this paper suggests, the body's internal errors constitute a failure to exercise an internal knowing how, and these errors can be seen as precipitating social or moral problems, then man's internal knowledge may be seen as a dimension of moral knowledge. The ability to avoid biological errors would constitute an important dimension of morality, if we define morality, as Ralph Barton Perry[15] did, as that which concerns man's general endeavor to harmonize conflicting interests or actions between individuals or groups and society as a whole. Earlier, Dewey wrote that "since morals is concerned with conduct (not just rational knowledge or reasoning) it grows out of specific empirical facts," and thus "all virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces."[16] From Dewey's perspective, it would appear that Selye's theory supports a model of morality which takes into account these "empirical facts" or "objective forces" in the form of the body's biochemical reactions.

It is recognized that this position implies that which is held by Humanist psychologists such as Erich Fromm and Abraham Maslow. Each of these men has asserted that moral norms are, in certain ways, "inherent qualities" of man. It must be emphasized, though, that this dimension of moral knowledge is a form of knowing which is internal, and is neither specific outward acts, nor knowing that, i.e., maxims of moral thought. These "inherent qualities" can, perhaps, best be described as a form of "autonomic discrimination." By virtue of such discrimination human conduct itself becomes, as Thomas Green[17] suggested, *norm creating*. That is, human action may become norm creating by virtue of the internal, visceral responses which such outward action elicits in others who share our social environment. If this is so, then, undoubtedly, it is our rapidly changing physical and social environments and our incompetency in exercising our internal knowing how which gives rise to the degree of confusion which exists over moral values in our society. In other words, our often inappropriate responses become undistinguished from the appropriate ones, making a muddle of our "inherent qualities." In a paper of this length, I can only allude to the fact that this idea is pregnant with implications for moral philosophy and a philosophy of education.

If these internal mechanisms can be modifed, so as to reduce biological errors and the ensuing problems, an important question arises with regard to what extent the individual should be held responsible for his internal responses. Such a consideration is important if a reduction of biological errors will reduce hormonal intoxication and help promote the broader aims of a rational morality. Thus, the question of responsibility should be examined more closely.

V

Kurt Baier[18] has distinguished three different types of cases of responsibility: accountability, answerability, and culpability. He has indicated that there is a sense in which an individual is morally culpable for failing to take those measures which eliminate the risk of moral infractions. Such culpability is weakest when the individual's failure is not one which he partakes in wittingly. Likewise, an individual may be considered morally culpable, in a weak sense, if he fails unwittingly to take those measures which would reduce inappropriate internal responses--responses which may precipitate a split between the moral principles we adhere to verbally and our behavior. However, there is, perhaps, a stronger sense in which the educator is responsible for providing the student with ample opportunity to become competent in exercising his internal form of knowing how, or, at least, to encourage the student to take responsibility for his internal responses. If the school is, as Dewey[19] contended, responsible or answerable to the society it serves, then indeed, it would appear that the educator may bear the brunt of the responsibility for providing a means of avoiding inappropriate visceral responses--responses which, as Selye has suggested, have caused more harm to our society than alcoholic intoxicants.

In his booklet *Reason and Compassion* (1973), R. S. Peters recognized both the biological bases of such emotions as fear and anger, and the fact that they block reasonableness and the general aims of a rational morality. Peters concluded that we must try to ensure, somehow, that people experience such emotions only in situations which really are threatening or frustrating. In Selye's words, Peters has suggested that an individual must learn how to react properly with regard to his or her internal, visceral functions. Such learning could not involve simply the outwardly acting, voluntary nervous system; neither could this be purely a matter of cognitive learning, since, as Selye indicated, man's internal processes can build their own habits or dispositions "without the individual knowing it," i.e., independent of cognitive experience. For these reasons, a different strategy is necessary for gaining increased competency in exercising our internal dimension of knowing how. Research has begun to suggest that meditation training could be a likely candidate for such learning.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have examined the nature of our internal, visceral functions, and the implications of our potential capacity to modify these functions via meditation training. In the course of this examination, it was suggested that man's internal responses may represent an internal form of knowing how, which has particular relevance for social conduct and a theory of morality. For this reason, our internal functions may need to become a central concern for a moral education program. Meditation training was suggested as one possible strategy for supplementing current educational programs, which, for the most part, do not incorporate any dimension of visceral learning.

NOTES

1. Leo V. DiCara, "Learning in the Autonomic Nervous System," *Scientific American*, 222, No. 1 (January 1970).

2. Neal E. Miller, and Leo V. DiCara, "Instrumental Learning of Heart Rate Changes in Curarized Rats: Shaping and Specificity to Discriminative Stimulus," *Journal of Comparative Physiological Psychology*, 63, No. 1 (1967).

3. DiCara, "Learning in the Autonomic Nervous System."

4. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 25-61.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-30.

6. Robert Keith Wallace, and Herbert Benson, "The Physiology of Meditation," *Scientific American*, 226, No. 2 (February 1972).

7. David Orme-Johnson, "Autonomic Stability and Transcendental Meditation," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 35 (August 1973).

8. Walter B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of The Body*, Revised edition (New York: Norton, 1939, 1963 printing), p. 277.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

10. Hans Selye, *The Stress of Life* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 264-265.

11. John Dewey, *Theory of The Moral Life* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960; first published as Part II of *Ethics* by Dewey and J. H. Tufts, revised edition, 1932), p. 13.

12. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 46.

13. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922), pp. 41-42.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

15. Ralph Barton Perry, *Realms of Value* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

16. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 265 and p. 16.

17. Thomas F. Green, "Teaching, Acting, and Behaving," *Harvard Educational Review*, 34 (Fall 1964).

18. Kurt Baier, "Responsibility and Freedom," in *Ethics and Society*, ed. R. T. DeGeorge (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966).

19. John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909).

RESPONSE TO ZIGLER

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Professor Zigler's thesis is, as I understand it, "...man's internal responses may represent an internal form of knowing how, which has particular relevance for social conduct and a theory of morality." He "suggests" meditation as a strategy for supplementing current educational programs. The rationale for the suggestion of TM is current scientific research into physiological effects of TM. Professor Zigler cites a number of scientific studies that argue for what is called "visceral learning." "Visceral learning" is learning of the non-skeletal and non-cerebrospinal nervous system.

I most certainly share Professor Zigler's admiration for a holistic and non-dualistic approach to "problems of men (persons)." I am not sure I share his notion of what a holistic approach is. I surely do not claim that the scientific evidence he refers to is either false or insufficient to substantiate his claims. What does cause me considerable concern is the logical relevance of the evidence.

Professor Zigler makes a passing reference to Aristotle's view of voluntary action--actions which might merit praise or blame. He also refers to Ryle's discussion of "knowing how." But Professor Zigler does not indicate that Aristotle's biological view belongs to what Aristotle would call physics and that physics is a theoretical science. For Aristotle ethics is not a theoretical science but a practical one dealing with actions. The fact that Aristotle may have believed that voluntary action is associated with the "outward acting part of our nervous systems" does not indicate that correcting this mistake would alter Aristotle's ethics in any way. Professor Zigler does not indicate where Aristotle makes such a claim.

More significantly Professor Zigler refers to Ryle's discussion of "knowing how" but in my opinion falls easily into what Ryle calls a category mistake. For instance, Professor Zigler claims, "...these internal mechanisms controlled by the autonomic nervous system are in fact, an internal dimension of knowing how," and later "that we do not reflect before performing such internal actions is no reason to deny the use of the term intelligent to describe them when we perform them successfully." And lastly, "it is suggested that our internal responses do represent an internal knowing how,..."

Professor Zigler does not commit a category mistake in arguing for a dualistic position on the mind-body problem. Nor does he commit a category mistake by arguing for the primacy of either mind or body. Nor does he deny the existence of either the mind or the body. He commits a category mistake by identifying mind and body. The way to eliminate dualism is not to identify the two (or more) things but to find a more adequate mode of expression. I take Professor Zigler to be claiming that knowledge claims can be *identified* with physical body states. That is to say that "I know x" is to say that my body is on a certain condition--a situation describable in scientific terms.

Perhaps Professor Zigler is not making the strong claim of identity of mind and body. Perhaps he makes the weaker claim that "to know" can be correlated with physiological conditions of an organism. There is some reason to believe that Zigler makes this weaker claim because he does talk of an internal dimension in knowing. That this weaker claim is true is not established by philosophical argument but by scientific investigation. Wittgenstein comments on a claim similar to the weaker claim.

> To the statement "I feel in my hand that the water is three feet under the ground" we should like to answer: "I don't know what this *means*". But the diviner would say: "Surely you know what it means. You know what 'three feet under the ground' means, and you know what 'I feel' means!" But I should answer him: I know what a word means *in certain contexts*. Thus I understand the phrase, "three feet under the ground", say, in the connections "The measurement has shown that the water runs three feet under the ground", "If we dig three feet deep we are going to strike water", "The depth of the water is three feet by the eye". But the use of the expression "a feeling in my hands of water being three feet under the ground" has yet to be explained to me.
>
> We could ask the diviner "how did you learn the meaning of the word 'three feet'? We suppose by being shown such lengths, by having measured them and such like. Were you also taught to talk of a feeling of water being three feet under the ground, a feeling, say, in your hands? For if not, what made you connect the word 'three feet' with a feeling in your hand?" Supposing we had been estimating lengths by the eye, but had never spanned a length. How could we estimate a length in inches by spanning it? I.e., how could we interpret the experience of spanning in inches? The question is: what connection is there between, say, a tactual sensation and the experience of measuring a thing by means of a yard rod? This connection will show us what it means to 'feel that a thing is six inches long'. Supposing the diviner said "I have never learnt to correlate depth of water under the ground with feelings in my hand, but when I have a certain feeling of tension in my hands, the words 'three feet' spring up in my mind." We should answer "This is a perfectly good explanation of what you mean by 'feeling the depth to be three feet', and the statement that you feel this will have neither more, nor less, meaning than your explanation has given it. And if experience shows that the actual depth of the water always agrees with the words '*n* feet' which come into your mind, your experience will be very useful for determining the depth of water". --But you see that the meaning of the words "I feel the depth of the water to be *n* feet" had to be explained; it was not known when the meaning of the words "*n* feet" in the ordinary sense (i.e. in the ordinary contexts) was known.-- We don't say that the man who tells us he feels the visual image two inches behind the bridge of his nose is telling a lie or talking nonsense. But we say that we don't understand the meaning of such a phrase. It combines well-known words, but combines them in a way we don't yet understand. The grammar of this phrase has yet to be explained to us.[1]

I take John Dewey to be claiming that science is not a subject matter but a method and that science as a method is required in all modes of inquiry and not in science alone. What eliminates discipline dualisms is not a single subject matter but a single method of inquiry.

Let me add that if the scientific claims that Zigler refers to are true (as they seem to be) it is not the philosopher qua philosopher who decides their truth, but the scientist. The philosopher might be of considerable assistance to the scientist, but is not a scientist. It is also clear that attention to scientific discovery is crucial to education and perhaps even to moral education. Presumably one objective of moral education is to encourage moral sensitivity and rational moral decisions. If TM is of assistance in such encouraging, so be it. But the point of morality is the sensitivity and the decisions, not the physiological states.

NOTE

1. L. Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), pp. 9-10.

RESEARCH ON TEACHING:
AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

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It may be better for a professor of education
to remain silent and be thought ignorant of
educational theory than to speak out and remove
all doubt.

In this paper I want to explore what I (1) hope is a heuristic, (2) believe is a different, and (3) know you will find controversial way of approaching the question "What is good teaching?" Some educational philosophers seem to think they know the important educational questions and their correct solutions; others claim to know the questions we should be asking but do not know how to answer them. I envy both far from my view of pedagogy, I fall into a third class--I am not sure what questions to ask even to find out what "What is good teaching?" means. What follows is the exploration of a possible alternative way of dealing with this general problem area.

I. Research on Teaching as the Search for Causes

It can be reasonably generalized that many empirical studies of teaching have taken the approach or at least made the assumption that basically what is to be done is to identify the teacher variables which are causally reactive in terms of student learning. We try to set up designs for collecting and/or generating data which we hope will lead us to some more or less solid conclusions about the relationships between some independent (teacher) variables and some dependent (learner) variables. By finding the teacher variables associated with the learnings we are interested in--which as researchers like to say is given by our "basic philosophy"--we can build up a conception of good teaching. This is our "research strategy" as it is often called.

The record of this strategy is somewhat disappointing. Even after we point out the difficulty of conducting good research, and the fact that knowledge is expensive, and that NASA-type results will take NASA-type budgets, we still feel disappointment. Any promising teacher characteristic has so many exceptions that what is significant in one experiment washes out in long-run composites of data. This strategy has reached a plateau with its future uncertain.

I wish to suggest an alternative strategy for attacking this general problem. But first let me characterize a bit more completely the basic structure of the causal strategy. Fundamental to all causal reasoning are the notions of necessity and sufficiency. We are, of course, interested in both in research on teaching. Complete knowledge in, say, teaching children to read would include both factors. From this basis, development of practical questions could be better handled. Causal analyses ultimately are concerned with these relationships. Our disappointment has been in not finding either type of condition.[1] Possible exceptions are "clarity of presentation" and "knowledge of subject matter" which seem to correlate highly with student achievement; but even here there is contrary evidence.

II. Is There an Alternative Strategy?

What would it be like to give up the search for causes? Are there other types of analyses one could conduct of teaching? A causal analysis reasons from part of one whole to part of another whole: part of teaching is analyzed in terms of part of learning. We think we know the whole of learning through psychology and our "basic philosophy." The point of our method is to build up the whole for teaching. But what if we reverse this and begin with some wholistic conception of teaching and then proceed to analyze the parts of this whole? Is there any precedent for this in any type of inquiry?

The cluster theory of definitions in science asserts that for some scientific terms it is impossible to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of their extension. Oblong, sour, yellow, contains seeds, grows on trees, etc., are the cluster properties for defining 'lemon'; but these are not necessary and sufficient conditions. If we discovered a fruit which was at maturity not yellow but green and was like a lemon in all other ways we would, according to cluster theorists, call it a lemon as opposed to announcing the discovery of a new fruit. Yellow is a dispensable property though it is nevertheless a defining characteristic of lemon. Achienstein has formulated the methodology for analysis of this type of definition.[2] This methodology offers a possible clue to how to study teaching in non cause-effect ways.

Another alternative is offered by P. G. Smith's distinction between instrumental value and contributory value.[3] Instrumental value is established causally. The link between means and ends is a causal one. Throughout the instrumental value theory literature, means/end relation was always assumed to be material not analytic. A contributory relationship is, on the other hand, a relationship of the part to the whole or totality. The part does not cause the totality--the whole is more than the sum of its parts. An architect who sets out to design a Gothic church has the concept (totality) of Gothicness in mind and seeks to construct an example or exemplification of the concept within the various limits of the wishes of his client. He knows what totality he seeks but must select the parts to be used and set them in an affective relationship with each other. As Villemain once wrote,

> When steps, door, posts, etc., are conceived as symbols because their qualitative consequences upon each other add to their objective, it is then possible to note the relationships and use them to institute the qualitative consequences that will conform to the quality or form of a Roman, Gothic, or Colonial doorway.[4]

Each part of the doorway is assessed in terms of its contribution to the whole desired, say, a Gothic doorway.

There is a notable difference between causal and contributory analyses. The former consider effects for which their causes are unknown, e.g., respiratory cancer. The cause and effect are independently definable and measureable--indeed they must be to carry out such analyses. One may observe an effect without any trace of the cause being present. What is called the principle of the "plurality of causes" emphasizes this point. Contributory analyses, on the other hand, differ in that the parts of the whole are observable within that whole or totality. The posts and steps of which Villemain wrote are there to be studied in a way in which causes are not. Contributory analyses are a matter of extricating elements and relationships.

III. An Alternative Strategy

From these notions, I think an alternative conception of how we might go about studying teaching can be formulated. The analysis of teaching based upon contributory thinking evaluates a proposed teacher characteristic in terms of its contribution to a teaching totality. But what is such a totality? What takes the place in teaching that Gothicness takes in architecture? Are there basic general abstract "forms" in teaching?

Harry Broudy has for some time written of three "distinguishable types" of teaching which he names: didactics, heuristics, and philetics. Didactics is "any instruction in which the contents can be made explicit and in which the criteria for successful learning are objective."[5] Heuristics is a "type of teaching that promotes learning by discovery or by problem solving."[6] In philetic teaching the teacher concentrates on "the emotional adjustment of the pupil."[7] Any given teacher characteristic may be important for one type of teaching and irrelevant to another. The techniques of good lecturing are relevant to didactical teaching but are inappropriate for the other two; or, put differently, any given characteristic of teachers may contribute more to one of Broudy's types than another just as a certain doorway may contribute more to one kind of architecture rather than another.

I want to duck the question of whether Broudy has got the right three, or how one goes about discovering and justifying claims about forms of teaching. One need not be skeptical here, for the same questions apply to architecture. We could in both cases imagine a Dewey-type evolutionary account of the emergence of distinct forms in both architecture and teaching.

One very important consequence of this way of viewing teaching is that one of the frustrations of the causal strategy is overcome: it is expected that no one characteristic or set of characteristics will be causally necessary in producing learning. One could find several effective teachers who have very little in common that is significantly different from other less effective teachers. Poor architecture will still have doors, windows, etc.; yet good examples of Gothic and Roman buildings have little in common. What is different between good and not so good teachers is not on this model to be found in looking at which characteristics good teachers have and poor teachers lack; rather, the difference is to be found in what each characteristic present contributes to the whole. The quality of the whole is not a sum of the quality of the parts. Moreover, teacher evaluation becomes a matter of how well a particular person exemplifies a particular form in a particular situation.

As is often pointed out, when evaluators use a rating form to assess a teacher's performance there is a tendency to rate a particular characteristic on the basis of one's overall judgment about the person as teacher. This point may seem to cut against the method of analysis being considered. From my experience quite the opposite seems true. If one were schooled in contributory methodology, I would predict a decrease in the tendency to allow one's overall opinions of the person to influence the rating of individual characteristics. But this remains to be seen. What we need at this point is a better idea of the nature of contributory methodology.

III. Relevance and Centrality

A teacher characteristic *C* is a relevant characteristic to some whole or totality *(W)* if and only if the fact that an individual possesses *C* tends to count toward taking the individual to be an instance of that totality.

The claim of relevance is a claim that there exists a part to whole relationship. Achienstein,[7] in analyzing cluster concepts, submits the notions of postive and negative relevance which are helpful here. Characteristic *C* is postively relevant to totality *W* if and only if the fact that an individual *(i)* possesses *C* tends to count more toward *i*'s being an instance of *W* then the fact that *i* lacks *C* tends to count against that *i* as being an instance of *W*. *C* is *negatively relevant* to *W* if and only if the fact that *i* lacks *C* tends to count more against taking it as a *W* than the fact that *i* possesses *C* counts for it as *W*. If the totality in question is "good university teacher," "having a doctorate" has negative relevance while "liked by students" has positive relevance.

Given two relevant properties, one is more *central* to *W* than the other if and only if the fact that *i* has C_2 counts for it being *W*. As stated both *C*'s are taken as having positive relevance; but both could have negative relevance or be of mixed relevance. Centrality, thus, is a matter of degree of relevance.

One last point of methodology is noteworthy. One might claim that what has been said thus far is incomplete in that so far only the parts as individual elements have been mentioned. But what of the relationship between parts? Is this not another structural component of totality? A rose window is quite central to being Gothic. But some rose windows will contribute more to a structure's being counted as a good exemplification of Gothicness than will other rose windows. Rose windows are part of the defining characteristics of Gothicness; but all Gothic structures are not of equal worth. Aesthetic analyses will have to take into account relationships as well as elements. (Note, the question of good teaching may be better seen as a problem in aesthetics rather than ethics.)

IV. The Research Project

We could perform a kind of conceptual clarification of one's ideas about good teaching using the above notions of relevance and centrality. Given a list of teacher characteristics a person considers important, we could further examine them for their relevance and centrality, thus clarifying one's ideas about teaching.

But more importantly, rather than having to know the specific effects caused or produced by a given teacher characteristic to determine whether it is a characteristic of good teaching, we can using this method determine what this characteristic contributes to a global teaching type. The cluster concepts as well as their relevance weightings would have to be determined for each type of pedagogy identified by Broudy.

One might ask why these pedagogical types could not be defined by the method of necessary and sufficient conditions. Why assume a cluster point of view? After all, in an earlier paper I argued against the cluster approach to defining educational terms.[8] Two responses could be offered: (1) Before rejecting the cluster view we should be sure we fully understand its potential. This will obviously require our trying to use it. (2) One should reject either/or thinking with respect to definitions. The cluster methodology may be characteristic of less mature areas of inquiry. As the inquiry progresses, necessary and sufficient conditions may emerge for a term. (There is a question, it seems to me, whether a rose window is highly central or a logically necessary element in a Gothic church.) I believe the second response is best but this will have to remain as a bias for I will not consider it further here.

Once the defining conditions are explicated (or at least beginning to emerge) so we could delimit the extension of each type, the rules of combination could be hypothesized. That is what are the proper relationships between the elements of heuristic teaching; i.e., what is good heuristic teaching?

The solutions to both the definition problem and the relationship problem would I think involve more than philosophical analysis. Empirical questions are also involved. What are thought to be good examples of teaching would have to be studied--just as good examples of architecture are studied. Video tapes, etc., would be of use here. But rather than trying to find causally reactive elements of teaching, one would look for the most central contributing elements. Moreover, by knowing these, one would be in a position to raise questions about how our students are better prepared to teach.

One might fear that this method is circular: we use certain criteria to select good examples of, say, heuristic teaching and then proceed to analyze out these very criteria. This fear can be shown to be ungrounded, however, by the assumptions of contributory methods. Firstly, the totality is always greater than the sum of the parts. There is nothing metaphysical in this beyond the point that in addition to the parts there are their relationships which are also constitutive of the totality. Secondly, it seems to be the case that human beings can perceive wholes without perceiving the parts thereof. We come to like the building before we are actually aware of the parts. At times it takes a competent architect to explain to us why we like a certain building or house. Likewise it is assumed that heuristic teaching can be judged on the whole with its specifics remaining unjudged.

IV. The Evaluation of Teaching

In an earlier paper I argued that it was a mistake to attempt to evaluate particular teachers in terms of the particular people being taught.[9] A second paper[10] commented that the use of intact classrooms without estimating the number of children therein with student purposes may be quite inappropriate. Both papers argued from different perspectives that it is misleading to view teaching as the ultimate cause of learning. It was feared that teachers would too quickly resort to coercion and/or artificial rewards to get children to become students.

The present proposal being about generalized teaching forms cannot, it seems, avoid the question of effects upon children's purposes and learning. Drawing from the second paper mentioned above, we expect that a teaching form will produce not learning but the conditions for learning. It is an empirical question as to the effects of, say, heuristics on children. Does it inspire them so that they become students? Does it work better in some situations than in others? When is didactics more appropriate? I do not think that these questions are answered simply by reference to "objectives" or "goals." All three must be held accountable for their ability to create or destroy student purposes. It is probably more correct to see both instructional objectives and different kinds of student purposes as being the determiners of which teacher type is appropriate. But it is open as to how the teacher types are best evaluated.

This paper suggests that research on teaching is a tandem process: an analysis of part to whole relationships which constitute identifiable global types of teaching; on the other hand, the caused effects of each type upon children must also be analyzed. I hope that one can now see that the method of basic empiricism is not going to be able to produce a more complete view or theory of teaching. There are some undeniably logico-ontological questions about teaching which philosophy of education is better equipped to answer than is a narrowly conceived empiricism.

NOTES

1. As my colleague Henry Baich has pointed out to me, this is no reason to give up the search for causes. The strategy may still work. This paper is not an argument against the causal approach but an alternative to it.

2. P. Achienstein, *Concepts of Science* (1968).

3. P. G. Smith, "Knowledge and Value," *Educational Theory*, Winter 1976, pp. 29-39.

4. F. T. Villemain, *An Inquiry into the Nature of Aesthetic Subject-Matter* (unpublished doctoral thesis, 1942).

5. *The Real World of the Public Schools* (1972), p. 60.

6. "Three Modes of Teaching and Their Evaluation," National Symposium for Professors of Educational Research (1974).

7. *Real World*, p. 60.

8. "Definition, Logical Analysis, and Educational Theory," in B. Crittenden (Ed.), *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society* 1973, pp. 256-265.

9. "Studying" in R. Pratte (Ed.) *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society*, 1975, pp. 174-184.

10. "Science of Pedagogy and Teacher Education," Midwest Philosophy of Education Society Presentation, 1976.

RESPONSE TO POPP

by William F. Zenker
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Professor Popp begins his paper by asking what is meant by the question "What is good teaching?" However Popp's central concern is not the analysis or discussion of this question, but is rather an attempt to provide an alternative methodology which will aid us in recognizing and evaluating "Good Teaching."

Popp proceeds to argue that a causal analysis of good teaching is doomed to failure because of the extreme complexity of such analysis and the uselessness of the results of such analysis due to the 'plurality of causes' doctrine which he holds. Since a part-to-the-whole causal analysis of good teaching has proven fruitless, we must proceed with a whole-to-the-part analysis, based upon an architectonic notion of the relation to and contribution of the parts of good teaching to the whole of good teaching. Achienstein's cluster theory of definition is to serve as the model for this methodology.

I am quite willing to entertain Popp's notion that an architectonic analysis of the performance of 'good teaching' may in some sense be interesting. However, I am well aware, and Popp parenthetically states, that such a strategy ultimately will rely upon some sort of an aesthetic justification of its claims. For this very reason I believe that before we encourage the introduction of the myriad philosophical problems of aesthetics to educational theory, a clearly demonstrated need must first exist. Popp does not adequately demonstrate this need, nor does he adequately acknowledge the many problems which his solution may create.

In fact he chooses to "duck" the theoretically important question concerning what facets of teaching are to count as 'positively relevant' to good teaching. He optimistically claims that we need not be skeptical here for the same questions apply to architecture. He is indeed correct, in fact the same questions apply to all matters of aesthetic preference. Any student of aesthetics knows, these questions are theoretically so sticky that their resolution is usually based upon the partisan formation of various ideological schools of thought which are built around a shared bias of one sort or another and result in each group holding the other groups in intellectual contempt and engaging in endless bouts of name-calling. Popp implicitly recognizes this situation when he admits that it is upon a personal bias that his inclusion of a rose window is a necessary element for a Gothic architectural totality. A necessary element, which I assume for Popp, means that such a window is for him positively relevant to a very high degree to the Gothic architectural totality. In like manner for many critics a book without a plot is not a literary work, due to its negative relevancy to the aesthetic totality of a literary work, and a picture which is non-representational for similar reasons, is not a work of art. Alain Robbe-Grillet and Jackson Pollock are, for critics of this aesthetic bias, simply, respectively, a bad writer and a bad painter. Thus starts a battle that admits to no satisfactory objective resolution. Indeed the cure which Popp introduces may be worse for the patient than the disease which he diagnoses.

Popp's criticism of traditional methodologies also evidences a basic confusion between a defining or classifying type of methodology with its analytically necessary and sufficient conditions, and the methodology of a causal recipe, which has its probable, causally necessary, and sufficient conditions. In fact, I am not sure that when Popp throughout his paper speaks of the necessary and sufficient conditions of 'good teaching' whether he is speaking of these conditions in the analytic or synthetic sense. In teaching as in pies, there is a difference between defining a good one and producing a good one.

Popp recognizes that the methodology of definition does admit to analytically necessary and sufficient conditions; however he claims that these conditions can never be forthcoming because the recipe method, due to the 'plurality of causes' doctrine, does not admit to either necessity or sufficiency. Because of this confusion Popp does not recognize that even if a given phenomenon could be the result of a plurality of antecedent circumstances, and consequently causal necessary and sufficient conditions could not be provided, this does not mean that analytic necessary and sufficient conditions could not be provided for a definitional account of the phenomenon in question. There may indeed be many recipes for skinning a cat but this does not preclude the fact that a skinned cat is definable in terms of logical necessity and sufficiency.

Popp needlessly accepts the common-sense position that a particular phenomenon could be the result of alternative causes. For example, we could suppose in like manner that if a farmer's crop fails it may be caused by a drouth, by excessive rainfall, by grasshoppers or by any of hundreds of other conditions which are capable of producing a crop failure. Education, for Popp, similarly can either take place or not take place (be caused or not caused) due to the presence or non-presence of any of a plurality of causes. This view that there may be many causes which produce a single kind of effect conflicts, as Popp points out, with the notion that an effect is a necessary and sufficient condition for its cause. If there can be a plurality of causes then inferences from effects to their causes are not possible. This position appears compelling. A crop failure may be caused either by drouth, by excessive rainfall, or by grasshoppers, and learning does appear to take place under the most varied of antecedent circumstances.

Yet it must not be concluded that the viewing of an effect as a necessary and sufficient condition for a particular cause is mistaken or nonproductive. Any farmer would agree that there are different kinds of crop failures and the kind produced by drouth could not possibly have been produced by excessive rainfall or grasshoppers. If an effect is described with sufficient precision the apparent 'plurality of causes' disappears.

In every case of alleged 'plurality of causes' which science has thus far encountered, the apparent plurality vanishes when the effect in question is more rigorously specified. From this fact we can conclude, with probability, that in every case a more precise specification of the effect will decrease the number of alternative circumstances, to the limit of unity, which might have caused that effect. We can therefore accept, not on metaphysical grounds, not as necessarily true a-priori, but as highly probable on empirical grounds, the working hypothesis that every effect of a specified kind has a singular and unique kind of cause.

This causal principle cannot of course be applied simple-mindedly. In any particular test the cause and effect have to be abstracted from a more or less complex setting which we call the background, and, recognizing this, a better formulation of the principle would be that similar effects of a specific type have similar causes of a specific type if the backgrounds are similar. This condition can be summed up by the Latin phrase *ceteris paribus* other things being equal--a phrase which is explicitly and implicitly scattered throughout every scientific work. Therefore, *ceteris paribus*, we can resolve to proceed on the productive assumption that this causal principle holds, but, at the same time, to treat, with courteous skepticism, any claim to have finally established it.

It may be fruitful for educators to search for alternative methodologies with which to analyze and better understand and control the teaching-learning process. However, we must be careful that our impatience and zeal for this enterprise do not lead us to make conceptual errors which in turn will lead us to deemphasize or abandon those established epistemological principles which have been, and continue to be, productive in the gaining of empirical knowledge and theory.

Education, teaching and learning, is a complex process with no doubt mind-boggling relationships holding between causal variables and types of effects. However, the fact that precise description of educational effects is difficult does not imply that such description is not possible, nor does the fact that educational causes are varied and subtle, allow us to conclude that these processes are therefore outside the realm of empirical methodologies, and due to this require the adoption of a unique and radically different type of theoretical approach which may give rise to more problems than it solves.

Milton Hildebrand, in his article entitled "How to Recommend Promotion for a Mediocre Teacher Without Actually Lying," aptly states:

> Although the concept of effective teaching cannot be exactly defined, and although there remains much to learn about the psychodynamics of both teaching and learning, still the concept of effective teaching is more exact than those of beauty, love, morality, femininity, normality, perversion, good taste, god and many more.

It is into this vague realm that Hildebrand mentions that Popp suggests we move, by viewing "good teaching" architectonically with its constituent elements being evaluated on their aesthetically determined symphonious or cacophonous contributions to the whole.

The evaluation of a teacher's effectiveness, cognitively chosen, according to the utilization of efficient means-end relationships, is for Popp to be supplemented with the teacher's total performance being judged according to aesthetic criticism. Subjective rave-reviews and critical pans will stand alongside the hard data of pedagogical research and psychological investigation.

And if we push this methodology through a *reductio ad absurdum*, and if the principle of art for the sake of art is held--that being that form is aesthetically independent of, and irrelevant to function (which is a popular argument in aesthetics)--we arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that a good teacher need not be able to teach a thing to anyone yet still be a 'good teacher'.

THERAPEUTIC MEASURES IN EDUCATION

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In this paper I wish to discuss the concepts 'mental health,' 'education,' 'teaching,' and 'therapy' in order to determine the place of therapy as an activity and mental health as an aim in the processes of education. This is not an attempt to explicate all of the actual and possible uses of these terms. I attempt to explicate some restricted, but what I take to be important, uses of these terms. This necessarily limits the scope of the paper.

I. Preliminary Remarks

John Wilson has argued that education can and should have mental health as an aim.[1] He clarifies his contention that mental health can be an aim of education by arguing that practices which lead to mental health could be justified in existing or possible processes of education. Precisely what is being argued is not made sufficiently clear by this statement of his position.[2] Let us see how mental health can and how it cannot be an aim of education. Let us also examine the sense in which it is possible that activities which lead to mental health are justifiable in processes of education.

The question of whether x can be an aim of y is clear, only if, we first establish the sense in which we are using the words 'can' and 'aim,' and if we explain how something can be the aim of something else. This latter concern need trouble us only to remind ourselves that education does not have aims, rather it is educators, teachers, etc., who have aims. We may restate the question of aims by asking whether x is something justifiably aimed at as people engage in educational processes--of course, 'mental health' is the value of x in this discussion.

The word 'aim' may cause confusion since it is ambiguous when used in such phrases as 'aims of education.' 'Aims of education' can refer to either the desired or hoped-for result of the activity of education, or it can refer to the desired manner of carrying out that activity.[3] For example, an aim of education might be to produce enlightened citizens. But another sort of aim might be to educate in such a way that the autonomy of the student is respected. In this discussion, 'aim' will refer to the desired or hoped for result of the activity of education.[4]

The final point for clarity is that we establish 'can' to mean logically possible. Now, in order to answer the question of whether it is logically possible that mental health be a hoped-for result of education, we must consider how 'mental health' and 'education' are being used.

Education is frequently spoken of as if it were a process. James McClellan has noted various difficulties with the characterization of education as a process. His conclusion regarding these difficulties is that "nothing is to be gained by either affirming or denying that education is a process."[5] In order to avoid the problems which beset discussions of education as a process, 'education' will be used in this discussion to denote activities which people engage in with the intent of bringing about changes in someone else, but only those activities and changes appropriate to education. This circular statement is intended only to emphasize that our concern with education will only include those activities which educators, and anyone else attempting to educate, engage in as they make the attempt to educate someone else. This ignores such things as some person engaging in activities of self education, and it also ignores those activities which students must engage in so that they might learn. We should also note that the focus is on that which is purposefully done, however, and this is what makes the above statement circular; not every activity that is intended to bring about changes in someone else is education. Let us consider what may be required in order that some activity be called education.

II. 'Education' and 'Mental Health'

R. S. Peters and others have attempted to establish conditions for the uses of the term 'education.' Of the conditions which have been argued to be important for 'education,' only one will be considered here. The condition, as cited by Peters, is that for something to be called education, "the procedures for transmission" must allow for "wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner."[6] Let us pursue this condition.

In order to explicate the criterion regarding the wittingness and voluntariness of the learner, let us turn to a discussion offered by Israel Scheffler. His discussion offers a restriction on the manner in which we may teach which parallels Peters' condition for the use of 'education.'[7]

Israel Scheffler argued that every culture normally gets its new members to behave according to its norms. He argues that not every way of getting people to do things is teaching. Scheffler puts restrictions on manner which must be followed if an activity intent upon getting someone to do something is to be properly termed 'teaching.' Scheffler writes,

> To teach, in the standard sense, is at some point at least, to submit oneself to the understanding and independent judgment of the pupil, to his demands for reasons, to his sense of what constitutes an adequate explanation.[8]

This requirement excludes such activities as trickery, bribery, and open force from the possible activities of teaching. This restriction on the use of the word 'teaching' parallels Peters' restriction on the use of 'education'; however, Scheffler's statement focuses on the activities which someone might engage in for the purposes of educating someone else. Scheffler's formulation lends itself to the use of 'education' in this discussion. Let us consider whether mental health can be an aim of educators if the activities of educating someone has the requirement that the understanding and reasoning of the student be appealed to. Given this sense of what it is to educate someone, we can determine whether mental health can be an aim of education, once we determine how 'mental health' is to be taken.

Wilson suggests that one sense of mental health regards whether there is, or is not, a malfunctioning in the form of irrationality. He argues that there is an overlap within the notion that someone is malfunctioning in the form of irrationality, because some instances of this malfunction can be remedied by education while others involve some physical disorder.[9] In other words, we might say that a person is irrational, and hence, not of good mental health either because there is some physical disorder or because there is something else the matter which can be remedied by education. The issue regarding what is to count as 'mental health' has shifted to an issue regarding irrationality. But what is to count as 'being irrational'?

One sense of 'being irrational' can be translated into 'is not capable of reasoning.' Suppose that this is the case with some people. We may wish to say that it is possible to remedy such cases of irrationality by education. But if education, for it to occur, requires that we appeal to the reason of the student, then a prerequisite for its occurring must be that the student be rational. In other words, if to say that a person is mentally healthy is just to say that he is rational, then we cannot have as an aim that which is required at the outset. More generally, if x is a necessary condition for some activity to occur, then x cannot be an aim of that activity.

If we find that in order to engage in some activity, certain conditions must be realized, then it would be silly for us to have as a desired result of the activity one of those necessary conditions. This would be especially strange, were we to justify our activity by citing that we want to bring about that which is required for us to even get started. If mental health is a prerequisite for education to occur, it cannot be a desired result of education.

Thus far, it has only been argued that we can educate students only if they are mentally healthy. But this is argued for using particularly strict uses of 'education' and 'mental health.' The argument amounts to saying that we can appeal to the understanding and reason of students only if they are capable of understanding and reasoning. Let us consider other uses of 'mental health' before examining other uses of 'teaching' and 'education.'

As we have noted, Wilson claims that malfunctioning in the form of irrationality may be caused by mental illness or it may be attributed to lack of education. The latter cause of irrationality is exemplified by such cases as a person who is terrified at the sight of a chicken. According to Wilson we might label a person who is terrified of chickens as mentally unhealthy. The remedy for this "malfunctioning" could be to educate the person regarding chickens. But let us not forget our restriction on manner. The person must be capable of reasoning and understanding. If the person is mentally unhealthy, we should note that we are using 'mental health' in a different way from before. We may speak of a person who becomes terrified at the sight of chickens, given most circumstances, as having an irrational fear. It does not follow from this that the person is incapable of reasoning. Irrational fears overlap with what is sometimes called unreasonable behavior. This latter label implies either that the person can in fact reason about matters but is just not doing so, or that the person is appealing to the wrong reasons.[10]

The point to be made here is that we have two senses of 'mental health.' The sense in which mental health can be an aim of education, as we have been using 'education,' seems acceptable only if we use a borderline notion of what is ordinarily called mental health. It appears that Wilson is correct in that education does play a part in the emotions we feel, but the degree to which a lack of education can contribute to what he calls a malfunction I leave to another discussion. For this discussion let us note that mental health can be an aim of education, as we have stipulated 'education,' only if, unreasonable beliefs and behavior are included within the category 'mental health.'

III. Mental Health as a Concern

Independent of the arguments regarding the possibility of mental health as an aim of education, it is clear that educators are concerned for the mental health of their students.[11] We wish to teach in such a way that anxiety levels are not debilitating, that shy students are not embarrassed to a psychologically harmful extent, that students lacking courage are willing to speak in class, that students become able to withstand criticism, and so on. These concerns can even result in restrictions in the manner of teaching. But while these may result in restrictions on the way we teach, they do not thereby become aims of education, as we have been speaking of aims.

We may have these concerns for mental health simply because we are compassionate. Then again, these concerns might stem from our realization that some states are preferable, if we are to succeed in educating. Unless a child has the ability to speak up in class, the child will not challenge the teacher. We cannot expect children to accept our criticisms as we intend them unless they learn to bare whatever hurt feelings they might experience when criticized. These preferred emotional states, which may be the result of education, are instrumental for educational activities and educational pursuits. They might even be considered to be signs of an educated person, but they are not the intention of giving someone an education.

This concern for the emotional problems of students might be discussed by using Thomas Green's distinction between logical and strategic acts of teaching.[12] Recall that the strategic acts of teaching involve the presentation of subject matter in a manner which may most likely lead to learning. We might say that it is good strategy to encourage a student to find his or her own mistakes and bad strategy to point them out in class. But what of the child who does not see mistakes, and who cannot accept criticism which is justifiably leveled? What should a teacher do? If something is done, is it to be included as teaching?

Suppose we wish to cure a student who reacts violently to any form of criticism which is leveled at this student. We find that if we engage in some activity, call it A, the student no longer behaves in the undesired manner. Suppose that A has a calming effect on this student. This allows the student to reconsider the criticisms, and it allows us to teach the student. Have we thereby taught this student to accept criticism? We may say so, but this is not teaching in the sense that puts the restriction on manner as suggested by Scheffler. What would teaching the student to accept criticism be if we were to restrict our manner as we have discussed? We might say to the student, "You know that you cannot accept criticism." Whereupon we might expect the typical violent reaction. This example either makes teaching this student to accept criticism impossible, or it makes fun of Scheffler's restriction on 'teaching.' In fact it does neither. It does suggest that there are different senses of 'teaching' which we have yet to consider.

Let us briefly examine Scheffler's statement regarding the use of the word 'teaching.' The requirement placed on the use of 'teaching' is that at some point the understanding and reasoning of the student be appealed to. The student must be given the opportunity to demand what constitutes an adequate explanation for the student. The requirement is that this be allowed "at some point." This phrase, we may see, allows for the notion that teaching is episodic. That is to say, activities which together constitute teaching, outside of the context of other episodes, might not count as teaching. This allows for such activities as lecturing, and it permits us to avoid the constant questioning of students and still call what we do teaching. Of course the phrase, "at some point," is vague, but let us not be troubled by that for now. Instead, let us consider what is required of our subject matter which we may wish to teach while satisfying Scheffler's criterion.

For us, at some point, to allow the student the opportunity for questioning, etc., that which we teach must be suitable for explanation and justification. In other words, the request for explanation, justification, and reasons, must be appropriate. However, some things, which we can and do teach, do not require that justification, reasons, etc., be given to the student. Certainly, if we teach someone that democracy is the best form of government, or that cigarette smoking causes cancer, we would expect arguments, reasons, and justification for such statements. If our goal is that students come to know these and other things of the sort, we should encourage them to request explanations and justifications for such statements. But this is not the case with everything that we might wish to teach.

We may wish to teach students how to ride a bicycle or how to swim. Our goal may even be that they know how to do these things. The question which arises is whether or not it is necessary that students request justification when it comes to teaching such things as skills. We could say that we ought to encourage questioning even when teaching skills, but this is not necessary for teaching skills.[13] To say that one teaches only if one, at some point, appeals to the student's reason, is not to describe the conditions necessary for the use of the term 'teaching.' Rather, it is to suggest a program for teaching. This requires some explanation.

We originally asked whether or not it is logically possible that mental health be an aim of educators as they engage in the processes of education. Using special senses of 'teaching' and 'mental health,' we found that such aims are excluded. However, other senses of those terms do not necessarily exclude the possibility of mental health as an aim of education. One sense of 'teaching,' for example, when speaking of teaching skills, does not readily fit into Scheffler's use of the word, and yet, the statement "Mr. Smith is teaching Jones how to swim" is a meaningful statement. We also can say that someone was taught to do something. Such uses of 'teaching' could easily fit our example of the student who could not accept criticism. It certainly sounds acceptable to say that we taught that student to accept criticism; this is an acceptable use of 'teaching.' However, these senses of 'teach' do not fit our contention regarding what can properly be called "education."

To some extent, we have neglected discussion of the concept 'education,' but we have attempted to discuss the questions regarding education by using Scheffler's special sense of 'teaching.' We should note that there are uses of 'education' that do not rule out mental health as an aim. For example, we may use 'education' as equivalent to 'schooling.' This use would suggest that we are asking a question regarding the aims of officials of the institution which is the school. Certainly, school officials can have the mental health of their students as an aim (this is to assume that 'schooling' does not carry with it the restrictions associated with 'education' as Peters describes it). But this is hardly a conceptual question. A more interesting question might be whether teachers, and other school officials should have mental health as an aim. Let us consider some of these possibilities.

It is sometimes pointed out that the activities we engage in when teaching have therapeutic value.[14] In other words, what we do when teaching can sometimes result in curing someone of some mental disorder. If this is the case, well and good, but this does not enter into the justification of the activities that we engage in for purposes of education. We may view these other consequences of our teaching as unintended results. Just because something occurs as a result of what we do, we cannot conclude that the unintended result was our aim, no more than we would charge that we intend to deplete the fossil fuel supply when we drive our automobiles. And it does not follow that we should be charged with the obligation of mental health just because it is discovered that we can have positive effects for good mental health.

Suppose that we find that we are obligated to have mental health as an aim. Perhaps we are kidding ourselves thinking that we can succeed in getting the intended results of our teaching without sometimes engaging in therapeutic activities. Beginning educational psychology courses often stress the need for teachers to reinforce those habits which are desirable for students to have.[15] If it is true that we should reinforce behavior, we should be careful not to confuse our two distinct tasks. We have on the one hand the task of teaching students so that they will come to have knowledge, and, on the other, the task of making them capable of gaining such knowledge. Let us consider the differences between the two tasks.

If we wish to teach someone so that he or she will come to have knowledge, we must keep in mind what our aim requires of our procedure. We may, for example, wish to teach someone so that he will come to know that democracy is the best form of government. This is the kind of aim which makes appropriate the restrictions on manner which were mentioned by Scheffler. One condition which is necessary, if we are to describe someone as having knowledge of propositions like "Democracy is the best form of government," is that the person have evidence and can justify the proposition. What is more, the person must see the evidence as evidence and understand the nature of the justification.[16] In order to do so, of course, the person must be able to understand and reason, but, also, the teacher must make an effort to appeal to the reason and understanding of the student, if not doing so could result in the student's acceptance of a statement regardless of reasons.

Scheffler's restriction on manner excludes from our repertoire of activities those which would cause someone to accept a proposition. Some aims which we might have as educators may make the same exclusions. If our intent is to have students accept propositions because they understand them to be justified, then we cannot rely on methods which would result in the student's acceptance regardless of justification. Activities such as reinforcement and therapy are ruled out when they might interfere with the independent judgment of the student. We may now consider when it would be legitimate to use these methods of getting people to do things.

We have discussed instances in which students are not capable of acting in ways which are required to satisfy Scheffler's restriction on manner. The student who cannot accept criticism may not be able to engage in discussions that may lead to understanding. The timid student who is too embarrassed to speak may miss the opportunity to test his or her ideas. If there is something that we can do to solve these kinds of problems, then perhaps we should consider what we can do. We may wish to argue that we should be permitted to get the student to act in those ways which permit us to engage students in education, even if it means that the student has no say in the change to be made. Certainly, there are examples of effecting change in a person's behavior which everyone would agree are permissible, even though the person being changed might not agree. Suicidal behavior by an irrational person may serve as an example. But to permit causally manipulative behavior on our part, we must have a notion of what counts as a proper functioning person. Once we have this notion we may justify causally changing someone's behavior.

IV. Conclusion

Mental health is a concern as we engage in activities of teaching. We can and do put constraints on the manner in which we teach so that students are not psychologically harmed. Educators also concern themselves with promoting what might be called good mental health. For example, educators often express the concern for children's sense of self-worth.[17] There is a sense in which such concerns can be called aims of education. We may intend to teach in such a way that good mental health results. But these are not aims in the sense formerly stipulated. Furthermore, not all activities are appropriate if our activity is intended to educate.

Reinforcement and other activities which might be considered therapeutic, having the effect of curing, can have their place in education, but only insofar as they might be necessary to engage someone in education or to allow education to continue. And even in these cases, we have seen that some activities are ruled out either because they interfere with our intended result or because they are incompatible with other restrictions on manner.

NOTES

1. John Wilson, "'Mental Health' as an Aim of Education," *A Critique of Current Educational Aims: Part 1 of Education and The Development of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 87.

2. The purpose of this discussion is not to correct what Wilson has argued but to extend discussion on the issue.

3. Keith Thompson discusses the ambiguity of 'aim' in *Education and Philosophy: A Practical Approach* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), ch. 9.

4. I wish to thank Edward Makruski for helping me with this point.

5. James McClellan, *Philosophy of Education* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 16-17.

6. Richard S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1964), p.20.

7. This last point must be argued. We will see that Scheffler restricts what may appropriately be called "teaching" in a way which departs from the ordinary use of that term. His use suggests a program.

8. Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), p. 57.

9. Wilson, pp. 84-85.

10. This overlap of irrational and unreasonable is noted by Max Black, "Reasonableness," *Reason: Part 2 of Education and The Development of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 49.

11. This is evidenced by such works as Jack Canfield and Harold C. Wells, *100 Ways To Enhance Self-Concept in The Classroom* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976) and by the literature associated with the "Values Clarification" approach for education.

12. Thomas Green, *The Activities of Teaching* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 4-9.

13. This is to disagree with Scheffler's criterion for the use of the word 'teaching.'

14. This point was made by Wilson, pp. 87-88.

15. For one example, see Janice T. Gibbon, *Psychology For The Classroom* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 114 ff.

16. Scheffler discusses this in *Conditions of Knowledge* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 70 ff.

17. See footnote 11.

RESPONSE TO VARGA

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The thesis which Mr. Varga argues in his paper "Therapeutic Measures in Education" is an interesting and provocative one. It is that mental health as an aim of education is a logical possibility and that classroom strategies can be considered to be logically possible as therapeutic activities by the teacher.

As I see it, this thesis is developed within the boundaries of two grammars: one being the grammar of education and the other being the grammar of mental health. Also, I have three issues to raise which are concerned with what I take to be the grammar of mental health. Before doing this, I want to briefly explicate what I understand to be the structures of the grammars of education and mental health.

It seems to me that the grammar of education which Kurt presents to us in this paper is constructed of the following elements. First, an aim of education is any intended consequence of an educational activity which guides the interaction of two people: the teacher and the student. Furthermore, it expresses an intention on the part of the classroom teacher to act in a certain manner in order to aid the learner to gain knowledge. Secondly, the educational enterprise is an affair of intended transformation of the student within a formal setting. A third element of this grammar is that the person being taught, freely and willingly participates in the process. One is not forced to learn, although one may be coaxed to learn.

A further aspect is that education or the act of education--teaching, assumes that the person who is being taught something, has the ability or skill to understand and to reason about that which is being taught. A fifth attribute of the grammar of education (which is the process of teaching X to Y so that Y comes to know X) is that the content of the teaching activity must be presented in a manner that has as its consequences the learning of the content. And, a final element is that a student can be intentionally taught both facts or skills. This grammar is used in what I call the grammar of mental health.

For Mr. Varga, mental health is to be considered an aim of the educator if irrationality (as a form of human malfunction) is translated to and read as unreasonable behavior. That is, using the criterion in the grammar of education which says that the teacher must teach by appealing to reason, we can say that the educator must work to change unreasonable behavior, i.e., to educate. This requires that the teacher have an educational aim of mental health.

Furthermore, this unreasonable behavior is viewed from the perspective of reasonable behavior. In addition to this, the student who is acting irrationally or behaving unreasonably is really unwilling to act reasonably. Or, to put it differently, the student in the case of unreasonable behavior is willfully and voluntarily acting irrationally or unreasonably.

Thus, to teach such a student, one's strategy is to be therapeutic. The teacher attempts to inculcate skills of reasonableness. This is necessary because mental well-being or mental health is preferable in order to successfully teach something to that person. Therefore, mental health as an aim of the teacher becomes a means by which any subject is taught. This seems to satisfy the criterion that any content in a formal situation must be offered is such a way that there is every possibility of learning it on the student's part. Hence, mental health is an instrumental end which guides the selection of methodology and classroom strategies. (Indeed, it may even radically affect the subject matter. In other words, courses are watered-down and become, in the language of one university, "gut" courses [soft]).

Teaching, therefore, in its methodological aspect is therapeutic because the "how" of the educational activity must aid the student to be reasonable or rational. Teaching activities are therapeutic because they intend an appeal to the student's emotional, eh, excuse, a Freudian slip, *rational* "state" within the process of learning.

Hoping that I have successfully represented Kurt's argument, I should like to raise three attending issues (as I see it).

Briefly and not to dwell on this concern, Mr. Varga's thesis that mental health can logically be considered a possible aim of education, or to move the concern from the modality of probability to actuality, mental health as an aim of education is interesting not for what is stated but, it seems to me, is interesting because it seems to be a product of a particular social environment. That is, mental health is a middle class concern and problematic. (I see this from Basil Bernstein's perspective of restricted and elaborated codes.)

A second issue I should like to raise here is that it is clear to me that we no longer know or are certain about what it means to be rational. In the slippage from irrationality to unreasonable behavior and the idea that unreasonable behavior implies reasonableness but that the student does not want to so act, the language-game of rationality has been moved to a different ball park. That is, no one is just quite sure what it means to be rational anymore.

A third objection as I see it, and one which the second objection leads to, concerns the issue of what we are to be about in the classroom. I guess the question which this paper raises for me is whether I should begin a program toward a degree in psychoanalysis or some other certification process such as "health services." To put it bluntly, are we to teach and say something about knowledge or are we to hold hands? But, what I am trying to do here in response has been written by Suzanne Britt Jordan, in the column "My Turn," in the November 17, 1977 issue of *Newsweek* (page 23).

> The function of schools, their first and primary obligation, is not to probe tender psyches, to feed and clothe the homeless, nor to be the papa and mama a kid never had. The job is to teach. The teacher's job is to know his subject, inside out, backward, forward and every which way. Nothing unnerves a student more than to have a teacher who doesn't know his or her stuff. Incompetence they cannot abide. Neither can I. Before educators lost their way and tried to diversify by getting into the business of molding human beings, a teacher was, ideally, someone who knew a certain body of information and conveyed it.

In ending, I have tried in this response to raise briefly issues in Mr. Varga's paper that we should be concerned with.

PART IV

RECORDS AND REPORTS

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Webster Hall Hotel
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
November 18-19, 1977

1. The meeting was called to order by Gordon Chamberlin at 3:15 p.m. on November 19, 1977. The minutes of the 1976 meeting and the Treasurer's Report were called for by Mr. Chamberlin and presented by Keith Raitz. The minutes and the Treasurer's Report were approved and accepted.

2. Old Business.

   A. William Brownson reported on subscriptions to the *Proceedings* and the cost of its publication over the last ten years.

   B. Mr. Raitz moved that the Society's contribution to *Studies in Philosophy and Education* reported in the Treasurer's Report for 1975 shall be the entire contribution of the Society to that journal during 1975 and 1976. Mr. Raitz's motion was seconded and passed.

   C. Mr. Raitz moved that the publication and distribution of an OVPES Newsletter by the President and/or Secretary-Treasurer of the Society be authorized by the membership; and, further, that insofar as possible this Newsletter should include or have its distribution coordinated with announcements of the Society to its membership. Mr. Raitz's motion was seconded and passed.

3. New Business.

   A. Richard Pratte moved that the Society make a contribution to *Educational Theory* in the amount of $150. Mr. Pratte's motion was seconded and passed.

   B. Marvin Berlowitz recommended that the Program Committee consider soliciting proposals for presentations at the annual meeting as well as soliciting papers.

   C. Mr. Raitz moved that the President and the Secretary-Treasurer select the site for the annual meeting and that they strongly consider Cincinnati for the 1978 annual meeting. Mr. Raitz's motion was seconded and passed.

   D. Dennis Senchuk proposed the following resolution: Be it resolved, the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society expresses its thanks to the host institution, the University of Pittsburgh, for accommodating the Society's 1977 annual meeting; and especially to Dean James Kelly, Jr., for his warm and generous hospitality to the Society and his participation in the meeting; and to Provost Rhoten Smith for receiving the members of the Society. Mr. Senchuk's resolution was unanimously approved.

   E. It was moved that the President of the Society write letters to the appropriate officials of Xavier University and the University of Akron thanking those institutions for their contributions to the Society's *Proceedings*. The motion was seconded and passed.

F. Mr. Chamberlin announced that the Nominating Committee was composed of the following members:

Robert Wilhoyte (Chairman)
Keith Raitz
Philip G. Smith

4. Nominating Committee Report. The Nominating Committee's slate of officers was unanimously elected. The officers for 1978 are:

Gerald Reagan	President
David Engel	President-Elect
Eleanor Griffin	Secretary-Treasurer
Walden Crabtree	Executive Board Member (to 1978)
Richard LaBrecque	Executive Board Member (to 1979)
Everett Jarboe	Executive Board Member (to 1980)
Gordon Chamberlin	Executive Board Member as Immediate Past President
John Carter	Program Committee
Thomas Minter	Program Committee
Richard Pratte	Program Committee
William Brownson	*Proceedings* Editor
John Carter	*Proceedings* Editor

5. Thanks were expressed by the membership to Mr. Chamberlin and Mr. Raitz for their efforts on behalf of the Society.

6. President Chamberlin turned the chairmanship of the meeting over to President Reagan at 3:50 p.m.

7. Mr. Reagan adjourned the meeting at 3:52 p.m.

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Treasurer's Final Report for 1977

December 31, 1977

BALANCE: January 1, 1977		1552.15
Receipts:		
Membership Dues Received Before the 1977 Annual Meeting:	85.00	
Sale of Proceedings:	177.50	
Monies Collected at the 1977 Annual Meeting:	204.50	
Contribution from the University of Akron:	396.00	
Interest on Savings Account #55015901 at Liberty National Bank; Louisville, Kentucky:	88.04	
TOTAL RECEIPTS:		951.04
Disbursements:		
Newsletter Costs:	117.66	
Second Call for Papers Postage:	29.07	
Postage for Proceedings:	63.00	
Copyright fee for Proceedings:	6.00	
Cost of Printing Proceedings:	396.00	
Costs of 1977 Annual Meeting:	221.82	
Hotel Accommodations for Invited Speaker at 1977 Annual Meeting:	32.86	
Contribution to *Educational Theory* (Voted at the 1977 Annual Meeting):	150.00	
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS:		1016.41
NET BALANCE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1977:		1486.78

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